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ABSTRACT
The first chapter studies mass layoff decisions. Firms in the SP 500 often an-
nounce layoffs within days of one another, despite the fact that the average SP 500
constituent announces layoffs once every 5 years. By contrast, similar-sized privately-
held firms do not behave in this way. This paper provides a theoretical model and
empirical evidence illustrating that such clustering behavior is largely due to CEOs
managing their reputation in financial markets. The model’s predictions are tested
using two novel datasets of layoff announcements and actual mass layoffs. I compare
the layoff behavior of publicly-listed and privately-held firms to estimate the impact
of reputation-based incentives on cyclicality of layoffs. I find that relative to private
firms, public firms are twice as likely to conduct mass layoffs in a recession month. In
addition, I find that the firms that cluster layoff announcements at high frequencies
are also the ones that are more likely to engage in mass layoffs during recessions. My
findings suggest that reputation management is an important driver of layoff poli-
cies both at daily frequencies and over the business cycle, and can have significant
macroeconomic consequences.
In the second chapter I present a theory of the safe assets market and make three
central points. First, the quantity of safe assets has a strong influence on equilibrium
risk premium and households’ willingness to hold risky assets. Second, the banking
iii
system and its regulation largely determine the quantity of safe assets (money-like
claims) available to households. Lastly, by regulating banks’ safe asset creation, cen-
tral bank policy influences risk premium even in a flexible-price world. I show that
the optimal central banking policy involves managing risk in the economy, which
sometimes calls for large interventions.
The third chapter studies the asset allocation decisions of investors and central
banks. This chapter identifies the fundamental drivers for these decisions and de-
termines whether their influence has been altered by the global financial crisis and
subsequent low interest rate environment in advanced economies.
The fourth chapter analyzes the welfare losses of taxation in a simple dynamic
moral hazard model under symmetric information.
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Chapter 1: Strategic Corporate
Layoffs
1 Introduction
Voluntary disclosures of bad news by firms are often immediately fol-
lowed by similar disclosures by other firms. Clustering of bad news is ob-
served in the release of negative earnings announcements, write-downs, or
layoff announcements.1 This paper focuses on layoffs and investigates the
mechanisms that influence managers’ decisions to cluster their layoff an-
nouncements. It also studies the aggregate implications of such decisions,
which is relevant for welfare since the timing and quantity of layoffs is
tightly linked to unemployment dynamics.
As a case study of clustering in layoff announcements, we consider the
behavior of the top three US firms in the banking industry (Bank of Amer-
ica, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup) and the automobile manufacturing industry
(G.M., Ford and Chrysler) around the 2001 recession. Figure 1.1 represents
the timelines of layoff announcements for each of these firms from 2000
to 2003. Layoff announcements tend to be clustered within industry: in
many cases we observe announcements within the same week. We also
observe clustering of announcements across industries.2 To further investi-
1Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer (2011) present a model based on asymmetric informa-
tion that predicts such behavior. Tse and Tucker (2010) provide evidence of clustering of
bad news in the form of earnings warnings. Our paper is the first to document herding in
layoff announcements.
2In the Fall of 2002, Chrysler and Ford announced layoffs on the same day. Similarly, in
the Fall of 2003, J.P. Morgan and G.M. announced their layoffs in the same week, and days
later Bank of America announced a layoff.
1
gate the degree of clustering, we apply standard temporal clustering tests to
our full sample from 1970 to 2010, and find statistically significant evidence
for excess clustering in the time series of layoff announcements. Further,
we show that such clustering behavior is observed only in publicly-traded
firms (“public” firms), and not in comparable privately-held firms (“pri-
vate” firms). Motivated by these facts, the central question in this paper is:
why do public firms engage in clustering of layoffs, while private firms do
not; and what are the aggregate implications of such behavior?
We interpret the observed degree of clustering and the differences be-
tween public and private firms through a model based on asymmetric in-
formation between managers of firms and the financial market. The central
mechanism of the model is as follows. The market perceives a layoff an-
nouncement as a negative signal about the manager’s ability. When aggre-
gate business conditions are adverse, such as during recessions or industry-
wide downturns, the market will attribute greater blame to external factors
than to managerial ability. This generates incentives for managers to time
their layoff announcements to occur during downturns, thereby minimiz-
ing the blame for the bad news. This key idea of our paper is a counter-
part to the early paper by Gibbons and Katz (1991), who provide evidence
that workers laid off on a discretionary basis are viewed less favorably by
the market than are those losing jobs in plant closings. We invoke the same
Gibbons-Katzmechanism to illustrate how the cyclicality of layoffs is linked
to the lower reputation penalty that managers face in recessions.
The model has two main cross-sectional predictions. First, if managers
care more about their reputation (relative to the cash flows of the firm), then
they are more likely to engage in layoffs during adverse states. Second, the
2
model also predicts that firms with managers who don’t have a long-track
record are more likely to engage in layoffs during adverse states. This is
because the market’s perception of their ability is more sensitive to new in-
formation. These predictions of our model apply to both business cycle and
daily frequencies. The business cycle frequency results predict differential
layoff strategies in recessions, while the daily frequency results are associ-
ated with differential propensity in clustering of layoff announcements. We
test both mechanisms in turn using two novel datasets.
The first dataset consists of layoff announcements by the largest publicly-
listed firms (Fortune 500 constituents) and largest privately-held firms (Forbes
100 constituents), collected from daily issues of the Wall Street Journal be-
tween 1970 and 2010. The second dataset, which we are the first researchers
to access, consists of confidential microdata on actual mass layoffs from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics under their Mass Layoff Statistics program. Since
this program collects data from unemployment insurance (UI) claims, it al-
lows us to observe the timing and the exact number of displacements arising
from mass layoffs.3
To estimate the impact of reputation management on layoff propen-
sity at the business cycle frequency, we focus on differences between pub-
lic and private firm behavior. This analysis is motivated by certain fun-
damental differences between public and private firms, which make the
public firm managers relatively more likely to manage their reputation in
financial markets. First, since public firms sell shares to outside investors
who are not involved in managing the firm, there exists separation between
ownership and control. Therefore, since the managers of public firms do
3Because it looks at actual displacements, the BLS data is not subject to reporting bias.
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not completely internalize the costs of adopting inefficient policies, they
are more likely to prioritize reputation management over maximizing firm
value. Second, owners of public firms typically have shorter investment
horizons: the increased liquidity of public markets makes it easy for share-
holders to sell their stock at the first sign of trouble rather than actively
monitoring management. This leads to relatively myopic behavior among
investors of public firms, which weakens incentives for effective corporate
governance (Amar (1993)) and generates incentives for managers to engage
in myopic reputation management (Stein (1989)). Third, managers of pub-
lic firms are subject to takeover threats, which depend on the stock price
of targeted firms. This can lead to managerial myopia in public firms in
order to actively manage current stock prices (Stein (1988) and Edmans,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2011)). Because reputation management focuses on
boosting perceptions of short-term performance at the expense of long-run
value, myopic managers are more likely to engage in the strategic behav-
ior predicted by our model. Taken together these differences imply that if
reputation management drives layoff behavior over the business cycle, the
effect should show up as differences in behavior of comparable public and
private firms. We emphasize reputation management in financial markets,
because the managers of both public and private firms are likely to have
similar motivations for reputation management among other constituents.4
Using a pairwise matching estimator based on size and three-digit in-
dustry, we find that the layoff propensity of public firms is twice as sensitive
to recessions, relative to their matched private counterparts.5 In a range of
4Notable recent work that explores public-private differences are Asker, Farre-Mensa,
and Ljungqvist (2011) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Jarmin (2006)
5That is, in recession months, the propensity to layoff for public firms increases by
roughly 5 percentage points, whereas that of private firms increases by roughly 2.5 per-
4
robustness tests, we show that these differences are not driven by public-
private differences in lifecycle effects, leverage, workforce size, or on the
criteria we use to match public and private firms. Within our sample of
public firms, we find that firms predicted to be more strategic by our the-
oretical analysis, are also the ones more likely to engage in mass layoffs
during recessions. Our results therefore suggest that reputation manage-
ment is an important driver of the observed differences in the cyclicality of
layoffs between public and private firms.
Next, we test our model at the daily frequency, and find further sup-
port for its predictions. We show that a large firm announcement (i.e. the
20 largest firms based on past year’s revenue) is associated with future lay-
offs by other Fortune 500 firms, but not with past layoffs.6 We find that
this effect is twice as strong if the large firm is in the same industry as the
follower firm. For our sample of privately held firms we find no such clus-
tering behavior either before or after the large-firm layoff announcement.
Moreover, when we compare the characteristics of firms that lay off in the
five days after a large-firm announcement (“followers”) to those that lay off
in the five days before a large-firm announcement (“counterfactual follow-
ers”), we find that follower firms have a greater likelihood to be managed
by short-tenured CEOs (i.e. with a tenure between 0 and 4 years) and to
place greater reliance on equity-linked compensation for their CEOs. Con-
sistent with our theoretical framework, these results suggest that reputation
management is an important driver for the timing of layoff announcements
at high frequencies.
centage points.
6Our results are related to the work of Gabaix (2011), who examines the role of large
firms in explaining aggregate fluctuations.
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Lastly, we establish a connection between high-frequency clustering
and layoff behavior at business cycle frequencies. We find that the follower
firms are roughly 3 percentage points more likely to engage in a mass layoff
during a recession month, compared to counterfactual follower firms. This
link between the daily frequency reputation management and the cyclical-
ity of layoffs over the business cycle provides significant evidence that rep-
utation concerns are an important driver of firms’ layoff policies.
To rule out the role of alternate theories in driving our results, we con-
duct a series of additional tests. The key alternate explanations we consider
are: common shocks, learning from other managers, compassionate CEOs,
and market inattention. While each of these mechanisms may contribute to
some of the patterns we observe in layoff behavior, no combination of these
effects can explain the full range of our results. Taken together, the findings
of this paper suggest that managerial behavior not only has costs for the
individual firm, but also has significant aggregate implications at business
cycle frequencies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
statistical tests for detecting excess clustering in layoff announcements. Sec-
tion 3 presents the theoretical model. In Section 4 we describe the construc-
tion of our twomain datasets. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology
and business-cycle frequency tests of the model, while Section 6 presents
daily-frequency tests. In Section 7 we link the daily-frequency results to the
business-cycle frequency results. Section 8 discusses alternate explanations
of layoff behavior, and Section 9 concludes.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of layoff announcements by top 3 firms in the banking
and automotive industry between 2001 and 2003. A dot represents a layoff
announcement on a given day.
2 Statistical Evidence of Clustering
As illustrated in the case study (Figure 1.1), we observe that layoff an-
nouncements are often clustered within days of each other. The size of these
clusters ranges from within a day to over two weeks. Though this is sug-
gestive evidence of excess clustering, it is not clear whether this observation
represents a general trend which applies to other periods and other firms in
the economy. In this section, we take a systematic approach to identify and
characterize the nature of excess clustering in firms’ layoff announcements.
Our approach uses a measure called the scan statistic, which is used to
7
detect unusual clusters in a sequence of events that occur over time. The
approach is known as “moving window analysis” in the engineering litera-
ture (see Glaz, Naus, andWallenstein (2001)). To see how it works, consider
N events that occur on an unit interval. First, consider the number of oc-
currences in each window of size w. Then consider the maximum of these
over all windows of size w in the unit interval. Under the null of a uniform
distribution, the distribution of this maximum can be calculated. For a con-
fidence level, e.g. α = 0.05, we can then construct a critical value, cα, such
that Pr [Sw > cα] = α. Here Sw denotes the largest number of events to be
found in any subinterval of [0, 1] of length w, and is called the scan statis-
tic. If the maximum observed local statistic, Sw, is larger than or equal to
cα, then we should reject the null hypothesis and infer existence of a local
region with a statistically significant cluster.
The distribution of scan statistic described above is a function of two
parameters: the size of the subwindow, w (relative to the size of the entire
interval); and the number of events, N, which occur in the entire interval
[0, 1]. We denote the p-value of this test as Pr [k;N,w]. This p-value should
be interpreted as follows: under the null of N events independently drawn from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1], Pr [k;N,w] is the probability that we observe k
or more events in any subwindow of size w.7
The unit of time for our tests is business days. We conduct our tests
for two different interval sizes: 60 business days (approximately one quar-
7Under the null hypothesis, the probability of observing a scan statistic, Sw, greater than
k, can be characterized as a function of the two parameters:
Pr [Sw  k]  Pr [k;N,w]
Exact estimates of this common probability exists for certain cases, and researchers have to
rely on approximations for the other cases. See chapter 10 of Glaz, Naus, and Wallenstein
(2001).
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ter) and 20 business days (approximately one month). Our sample period
begins in 1970 and ends in 2010, and we run separate tests for every non-
overlapping window in this period of 41 years. Since the test has low power
when N is small, we exclude months in which we observe fewer than 5 lay-
off announcements.8 Also, we run the tests for two categories: all indus-
tries combined; and the manufacturing industry. This allows us to assess
whether there is excess clustering at both the aggregate and the industry
level.
Figure 1.2: This graph reports the log p-values (multiplied by negative
unity) of the sequence of tests for each non-overlapping 60 (business) day
window to identify clustering at 1, 5, 10 or 15 day horizons when the null
is that the layoff announcements are distributed uniformly over each 60
day window.
8Our results are do not change when we include all the months in our analysis.
9
Figure 1.2 plots the results of our analysis for each non-overlapping in-
terval of 60 business-days. To facilitate viewing, we present the negative
log of the p-value as our y-axis variable. Therefore, a higher value suggests
that we can reject the null with greater confidence. Though this sequence
of individual tests is suggestive of several episodes of clustering, we would
like to combine the results from these different independent observations
into a single statistical test. For this, we rely on Fisher’s method to com-
bine the p-values from our tests into a single statistic, using the formula
X2 =  2∑ki=1 log (pi), where pi is the p-value for the i-th independent test.
This ‘combined p-value’ is reported in the last column of Table 1.1. The
main conclusion of this analysis is that we can reject the null of no excess
clustering for subwindows of 5 or more days using one-month intervals,
and for subwindows as small as three days using quarterly intervals. Hav-
ing established the existence of excess clustering, we proceed to offer a po-
tential explanation for this phenomenon in Section 3, where we present our
theoretical model.
3 Model
In this section, we present a reputation-based model of management
layoff decisions, focusing on the tradeoff between firm profits and the per-
ception ofmanagerial talent. A similarmodel was presented in Rajan (1994),
which studies the clustering of credit policies by banks. We focus on a
three-period version of the model in the main text, incorporating fully ratio-
nal Bayesian expectations and solving for the set of trembling-hand perfect
equilibria. We discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions and
10
Table 1.1: Fisher's Method for Combining Results from Independent Scan Statistics
Window     
(days)
Sub-window 
(days)
# of months
Test Statistic 
(Fisher's 
Mehtod)
Degrees of 
Freedom
p-value      
(Fisher's 
Mehtod)
20 1 325 507.99 650 1.000
20 3 325 626.82 650 0.736
20 5 325 708.67 650 0.055
20 10 325 781.41 650 0.0003
60 1 109 202.26 218 0.771
60 3 109 255.70 218 0.041
60 5 109 254.52 218 0.045
60 10 109 268.86 218 0.011
60 15 109 288.03 218 0.001
20 1 252 374.27 504 1.000
20 3 252 437.20 504 0.986
20 5 252 551.12 504 0.072
20 10 252 631.32 504 0.0001
60 1 83 181.26 166 0.198
60 3 83 192.81 166 0.076
60 5 83 198.53 166 0.043
60 10 83 213.82 166 0.007
60 15 83 212.48 166 0.009
This table reports our results for Fisher's Method, which is a method to combind results from the independent 
Scan Statistics we compute for each non-overlapping interval of 20 or 60 business-days between 1970 and 2010. 
The top half of the table conducts this analysis for all layoffs in our sample, while the bottom half restricts the 
sample to layoffs in the 3 digit NAICS industries. The null hypothesis is to assume that there is uniform layoff 
propensity for each 20 or 60 day window. The subwindow lists the length of window under consideration for 
excess clustering. The test statistic is a combined p-value of all individual tests, and is distributed with a chi-
squared distribution. The degrees of freedom is simply twice the number of individual tests, which is given in the 
third column. The last column lists the 'combined p-value' from Fisher's method. If this p-value is below 0.05 then 
we can reject the null of no excess clustering for the given subwindow. 
All Firms
3-digit Industry Firms 
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expand to multiple periods in the theoretical appendix.
3.1 Setup
Our model starts at date 0, and ends at date 2. There is no discounting
between periods. There are two types of agents in this model: firm man-
agers and the market.9 Managers care about the profits of their firm, and
about their reputation with the market. The market takes no direct action
in this model, but simply observes the actions of managers, and updates its
priors according to Bayes’ Rule.
Firm managers are the primary decision-making agents in this model.
Each manager i is associated with a firm which, at date 0, begins a new
project and hires one unit of labor to engage in production. There is con-
tinuum of manager types, which differ along the dimension of managerial
talent, denoted by ηi. The only restriction on the distribution of talent, de-
scribed by density f (ηi), is that its support be within the unit interval, [0,1].
For convenience, we define the mean and variance of the distribution of
talent to be µ and σ2η, respectively.
After the project is undertaken, the aggregate economic state is realized
at date 1.10 The aggregate state is denoted by s 2 S = fN, Ag : it can be
adverse (A) with probability pi, or normal (N) with probability 1  pi.
The probability that a project succeeds depends on both the talent of
9There are many possible interpretations for the role of the market. One possibility is
the population of equity market investors - this interpretation links our model to concerns
about stock price responses to layoffs. Another option is the demand side of the market for
managerial talent - this interpretation is more in line with the literature on career concerns
(Holmström (1999)). We do not pin down a specific interpretation in order to allow for the
broadest possible application of the model.
10We can interpret the aggregate economic state as either an economy-wide indicator, or
a measure of the health of a particular sector.
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the manager and the aggregate state, and is given by:
θis = ηiλs (1)
such that λN = 1, and λA = 1  δ. In the adverse state the probability of
project success is ηi(1  δ), and in normal states it is ηi. There is symmetric
uncertainty about the aggregate state for both managers and the market
throughout all time periods.11
The manager privately observes the outcome of his firm’s project at
date 1. If the project was successful, there is no decision to make: the project
continues into date 2, where it generates earnings of $1, and then ends. If
the project is not successful, the manager has to decide whether to terminate
or continue the project. Termination involves firing the labor force hired at
time 1, and is therefore fully observable. The firm’s date 2 earnings are zero
if it terminates an unsuccessful project at date 1. We label this approach as
the “terminate” policy.
Instead of termination, the firm can hide the unsuccessful outcome of
the project from the market by not laying off the labor force assigned to the
project. If the manager adopts such a policy, he must pay the worker for
one more period even though the worker will not be productive. We denote
this cost as C. Relative to the terminate policy, this decision delays the end
of the project by one period. We therefore label this approach as the “delay”
policy.
We assume that adopting the delay policy is costly relative to the deci-
11The results of this model do not rely on the particular functional form assumed here
for the probability of success. The key comparative statics are identical if instead of a
multiplicative function we assume an additive function: θis = αηi + (1  α) λs, for 0 < α <
1.
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sion to terminate. This is given by Assumption 1: C > 0. This assumption
implies that in a first-best world, the delay policy should not be adopted.
Despite its inefficiency, managers have an incentive to adopt the delay
policy because it is better for their reputation to hide an unsuccessful project
outcome. In setting up the maximization problem for managers, let D 2
f0, 1g represent whether or not a given manager adopts the delay policy
when his firm’s project fails. We can then describe managers’ preferences
by the following utility function:
max
D
Ui =  DC+ γEmkt

ηijDˆ, Layoffs

(2)
such that γ is the utility weight the management places on his reputation
in the eyes of the market, and Dˆ is the conjecture of the manager’s strategy
that the market uses to interpret the observation of layoffs or no layoffs.
3.2 Reputation and Updating Rules
Themarket’s updating rule depends on 2 factors: a) its conjecture about
the manager’s strategy in addressing a failed project; and b) whether or not
it observes layoffs. We begin our equilibrium analysis by focusing on four
primary cases:
No Layoffs Layoffs
Conjecture: ‘Terminate’ Emkt

ηijDˆ = 0, L = 0

Emkt

ηijDˆ = 0, L = 1

Conjecture: ‘Delay’ Emkt

ηijDˆ = 1, L = 0

Emkt

ηijDˆ = 1, L = 1

When the market conjectures that the firm will adopt the Terminate
policy
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If the market believes the firm is going to adopt the terminate policy, i.e.
Dˆ = 0, then the firm will lay off the project’s workers upon failure, and not
lay off workers when the project succeeds. Therefore, not observing layoffs
implies that the firm’s project has succeeded. This makes the updating rule
straightforward: the observation of layoffs or no layoffs is perfectly corre-
lated with the outcome of the project.
Using Bayes Rule we can calculate the resulting posteriors as:
Emkt

ηijDˆ = 0, Layoffs = 0

= Emkt [ηijProject Succeeds] = µ+
σ2η
µ
(3)
Emkt

ηijDˆ = 0, Layoffs = 1

= Emkt [ηijProject Fails] = µ 
σ2η (1  piδ)
1  µ (1  piδ)
(Proof in Appendix A.1)
To interpret these results, note that the market’s prior about managerial
talent is given by µ. When the market observes no layoffs, they update their
beliefs about managerial talent positively, which is reflected by the positive
additive term in the first equation. Analogously, when the market observes
a layoff, then they update their beliefs negatively, which is reflected by the
negative additive term in the second equation. The weight of the additive
terms depend positively on σ2η since it measures how noisy was the mar-
ket’s prior was at the start of the period. The second equation also depends
negatively on the probability of being in an adverse aggregate state (pi).
Therefore, when pi is high, the reputation penalty of laying off is lower.
When themarket conjectures that the firmwill adopt theDelay policy
We get an analogous updating rule for the case in which the market
believes the firm is going to adopt the delay policy, i.e. Dˆ = 1. Under stan-
dard equilibrium assumptions, the outcome of layoffs under this policy will
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never occur, and the Bayesian posterior would not be uniquely determined.
We therefore introduce trembles and focus on trembling-hand-perfection as
our equilibrium concept. Because successful projects continue automati-
cally, they do not require any action from the manager and are not suscep-
tible to trembles. By contrast, the decision to adopt the delay policy requires
a direct action by the manager, who could tremble and choose to termi-
nate the project instead. Therefore, whenever the firm engages in layoffs
the market knows the project must have failed, even though this outcome
will (almost) never be observed in equilibrium. The updating rule in this
situation can be calculated as follows:
Emkt

ηijDˆ = 1, Layoffs = 1

= Emkt [ηijProject Fails] = µ 
σ2η (1  piδ)
1  µ (1  piδ)
(4)
Once again when the market observes a layoff they update their beliefs
about managerial talent negatively. By contrast, when the market observes
no layoffs, they do not know whether the project failed or not. This is be-
cause the firm is expected to adopt the delay policy of no layoffs irrespective
of project outcomes. Therefore, when the market observes no layoffs, they
get no new information about the firm, and the updating rule is simply:
Emkt

ηijDˆ = 1, Layoffs = 0

= E0 [ηi] = µ (5)
(Proof in Appendix A.2)
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3.3 Equilibrium Selection
In equilibrium the market conjecture about the manager’s policy must
be correct, and hence Dˆ = Di.
To support the equilibrium where the manager always adopts the ter-
minate policy, the following incentive compatibility condition must hold:
γEmkt

ηijDˆ = 0, Layoffs = 1
   C+ γEmkt ηijDˆ = 0, Layoffs = 0 (6)
By contrast, to support the equilibriumwhere themanager always adopts
the delay policy, the IC constraint is:
γEmkt

ηijDˆ = 1, Layoffs = 1
   C+ γEmkt ηijDˆ = 1, Layoffs = 0 (7)
Using the Bayesian analysis in the previous section, the above con-
straints, respectively, simplify to:
C  γσ2η

1
µ
+
1  piδ
1  µ (1  piδ)

(8)
and
C  γσ2η

1  piδ
1  µ (1  piδ)

(9)
From the above constraints, it is clear that for sufficiently high values
of γ and σ2η, managers will choose to always adopt the delay policy. At
the same time, for sufficiently low values of these variables, managers will
always choose to adopt the terminate policy. Having already characterized
these equilibria, we nowmove to consider the intermediate set of parameter
values, which support neither pure-strategy equilibrium.
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For intermediate values of γ and σ2η, the equilibrium reputation penalty
under the terminate policy is so large that managers prefer the delay policy,
and the equilibrium reputation penalty under the delay policy is so small
that they prefer the terminate policy. This means that for these parameter
values, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. We therefore proceed to
analyze a mixed-strategy equilibrium, where managers randomize between
adopting the terminate and delay policies.
As in the previous section, we begin our characterization of the mixed-
strategy equilibrium by focusing on the market’s posterior following an ob-
servation of either layoffs or no layoffs. In this case, instead of a binary con-
jecture about the policy of the manager, we move to a continuous conjecture
Dˆ 2 (0, 1) which corresponds to the probability with which the market ex-
pects the manager to choose the delay policy, conditional on project failure.
In such a setting, we calculate the market’s posteriors as:
Emkt

ηijDˆ, Layoffs = 0

= µ+
(1  Dˆ) (1  piδ) σ2η
Dˆ+ (1  Dˆ) (1  piδ) µ (10)
and
Emkt

ηijDˆ, Layoffs = 1

= µ  σ
2
η (1  piδ)
1  µ (1  piδ)
(Proof in Appendix A.3)
Note that the above posteriorsmatch upwith pure-strategy beliefs when
we take the limits as Dˆ ! 0 and Dˆ ! 1 for the cases of the terminate and
delay policies, respectively.
To complete the characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we
need the manager to be indifferent between the two strategies available to
him. Using the same IC constraint framework as in the pure-strategy case,
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we need:
γEmkt

ηijDˆ, Layoffs = 1

=  C+ γEmkt

ηijDˆ, Layoffs = 0

(11)
Using the posteriormarket beliefs for themixed-strategy case, the above
constraint simplifies to:
C = γσ2η

(1  Dˆ) (1  piδ)
Dˆ+ (1  Dˆ) (1  piδ) µ +
1  piδ
1  µ (1  piδ)

(12)
The equation above allows us to solve for themanager’s randomization
probabilities in the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Note that because the RHS
is monotonically decreasing in Dˆ, there is a unique set of mixing probabil-
ities that supports equilibrium play for any given set of parameter values.
Further, because the limits of the expression match up to the pure-strategy
equilibria described in the previous section, there is a continuous progres-
sion from always choosing the terminate policy, through a mix of both op-
tions, and finally to always choosing the delay policy, as the product of γ
and σ2η increases from zero.
3.4 Equilibrium Implications
The results of the previous section describe conditions under which
the firm will undertake the delay policy, despite the inefficient reduction
in earnings that result from it. To gain an insight into these central results,
Figure 1.3 plots the equilibrium policies of managers based on their values
of γ (degree of reputational concerns) and σ2η (variance of market’s prior
about firm). Managers who adopt the delay policy will lie above and to the
right of mixed-strategy region. In this region, managers and their firms will
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delay project termination and avoid layoffs, despite their project failing.
Figure 1.3: Parameter Space and Equilibrium Layoff Policy
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the firm has an incentive
to undertake the delay policy when:
 the manager places a high weight on reputation (as measured by γ)
 layoffs are particularly informative about the manager’s ability, due to
significant uncertainty in the market’s prior beliefs (i.e. a high value
of σ2η).
The above implications have direct links to observable variables in em-
pirical corporate finance. A high value of γ is likely to be associated with
firms that incentivize their management with high-powered, market-based
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compensation packages. As for the informativeness of layoffs, a high value
of σ2η (a sufficient statistic for the signal-to-noise ratio in our model) is likely
to be associated with firms that have a new management, precisely because
the market will have less information about them, and any action taken by
them will be relatively more informative.
An interesting implication of the model is the effect of changing beliefs
about the aggregate state S, where the expectation of an adverse state is
measured by pi. Figure 1.4 plots the same boundaries as Figure 1.3, and adds
another set of boundaries to demonstrate the effect of the market’s percep-
tion about aggregate state becoming pessimistic. Assuming that this per-
ception is justified, there will be a direct effect of fewer successful projects
in an adverse economic environment. Because of this, the market is less
likely to attribute the negative signal of a layoff to the manager’s level of
talent, and consequently the reputational concern associated with layoffs
diminishes. This is illustrated by the rightward shift of the boundaries in
Figure 1.4. As a result, the parameter region for which firms will adopt the
delay policy shrinks. More firms nowwill choose to announce layoffs if their
project fails.
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Figure 1.4: Comparative Statics — when belief about aggregate state
worsens.
In addition to the direct effect of adverse economic conditions lead-
ing to higher rates of project failure, our model also predicts a shift-in-
equilibrium effect: conditional on project failure, a larger fraction of man-
agers will choose to terminate their projects and engage in layoffs during
these economic downturns.12 In the pure-strategy regions of the parameter
space, there is no shift in equilibrium because managers are effectively at
a corner solution. Those who strictly prefer the delay policy will continue
12In the multi-period model discussed in the appendix, we show that firms with failed
projects are likely to continue them until the next economic downturn, effectively sav-
ing their layoffs until they can implement them without suffering the normal reputational
penalty.
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to have a layoff rate of precisely zero, while those who strictly prefer the
terminate policy will have a layoff rate equal to their project failure rate:
1  η(1  piδ), or 1  µ(1  piδ) on average. The interesting case is that of
managers in the mixed-strategy region. We describe their layoff rate in the
following proposition:13
PROPOSITION 1. For managers in the mixed-strategy region of the parame-
ter space, an increase in the expected probability of a downturn leads to a
strictly higher rate of layoffs. Specifically:
∂Pr[Layoffs j pi,γ, σ2η;C, δ]
∂pi
=
δγσ2η
C [1  µ(1  piδ)]2
> 0
PROOF. See appendix A.4.
From this result, it follows that managers who care most about reputa-
tion (i.e. have a high value of γ) and who have a short track record (i.e. a
high value of σ2η) are most likely to be affected by the adverse shift in mar-
ket’s perception of the aggregate state. These insights are summarized in
the following two corollaries:
COROLLARY 2. If the market’s belief about a firm’s management is less pre-
cise, then the manager is more likely to announce layoffs in downturns.
That is,
∂2 Pr[Layoff j pi,γ,σ2η ;C,δ]
∂pi∂σ2η
 0.
COROLLARY 3. If the manager’s utility function puts more weight on his
reputation, then the manager is more likely to announce layoffs in down-
turns. That is,
∂2 Pr[Layoff j pi,γ,σ2η ;C,δ]
∂pi∂γ  0.
13While Proposition 1 and the two corollaries below and the rest of the analysis focus
on changes in the probability of experiencing an adverse aggregate state, similar results
obtain when considering an increase in the severity of the adverse state, represented by the
magnitude of δ.
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3.5 Extending the Model: Impact of a Large Firm
In this section we extend the model presented above by introducing a
large firm into the economy. The notion of large here is that the firm’s per-
formance contains information about the aggregate state of the industry. By
contrast, the performance of small firms is heavily influenced by conditions
in their local market, so the ability to obtain information about the aggre-
gate state of the industry from the performance of a small firm is assumed to
be negligible. As a result, the large firm’s layoffs decision will influence the
other firms in the industry through the information it provides about the
aggregate state about the industry. As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, the
market’s beliefs about the aggregate state have a strong influence on firms’
layoff decisions. With the addition of a large firm, the model therefore gen-
erates strategic interaction between firms.
In formulating this extension of the model, we move from a general-
purpose metric of beliefs about the aggregate state, pi, to a firm-specific
metric represented by pii. Here it’s more appropriate to interpret pii as the
probability of an adverse economic state in the industry or local market of
small firm i. Specifically, it combines the outcome of the aggregate state sagg
with firm-specific conditions described by εi:
pii = f (1  (sagg = A) + εi)
and we restrict f () to be a monotonically increasing function with a sup-
port equal to the interval [0,1].14 For simplicity, we assume that the project
outcome for the large firm is directly dependent on sagg as before, with the
14While we do not specify a functional form, the most widely-used options include the
logistic function and the probit, or normal quantile function.
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prior probability of an adverse aggregate state measured by pi0. For the
small firm, an adverse aggregate state increases the chances that the firm-
specific economic state will also be adverse, but does not predict this per-
fectly. We maintain the same framework of observability as before, where
prior distributions are common knowledge, but only the layoff decision is
observed by the market.
The market updates the smaller firms’ reputation in two steps. First,
it updates its prior on the realization of sagg, using the large firm’s layoff
decision. This, in turn, leads to an updated belief about pii for the small
firm, in turn impacting the reputational penalty the small firm would face
if it announced layoffs of its own.
Using Bayes’ Rule, the process of updating expectations about sagg us-
ing the layoff decision of the large firm is straightforward. Letting pi0 be the
prior expectation of the adverse state, the posterior expectation conditional
on observing layoffs by the large firm, pi1  Pr[sagg = AjLarge Firm Layoff =
1] is given by:
pi1 = pi0

1  η(1  δ)
1  η(1  pi0δ)

> pi0 (13)
Note that the above updating rule is true for all possible strategies em-
ployed by the large firm, as long as we allow for trembles in the case where
the large firm would like to always choose the delay policy. Moreover, while
the market does not know the value of η for the large firm, taking expec-
tations over any prior distribution leads to the same conclusion: pi1 > pi0.
Thus, whenever the market observes layoffs by the large firm, its posterior
beliefs imply that there is a higher chance that the aggregate state is adverse.
This, in turn, increases the likelihood that the firm-specific economic state si
will be adverse for the small firm. As a result, layoffs by the large firm lead
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to an increase in pii as the market prepares to observe the action of the small
firm.
Combining this result with the analysis in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, it fol-
lows that following a layoff by the large firm, the small firm will be more
likely to choose the terminate policy. Intuitively, the layoff by the large firm
means the market will be more willing to attribute poor performance to an
adverse state rather than a lack of managerial talent, making further layoffs
more likely. In effect, our model predicts a clustering or "safety in numbers"
effect, where some firms will strategically announce layoffs close to the an-
nouncements of other firms, in groups in order to minimize the reputational
costs they incur. In particular, we expect that firms whose characteristics
normally push them toward the delay policy will be followers in such situ-
ations, announcing layoffs in the wake of firms whose characteristics push
them toward the terminate policy. The following proposition summarizes
this insight:
PROPOSITION 4. Firms tend to cluster layoff announcements after layoffs
by a large firm. That is,
∆Pr[Layoffsi=1 j pii,γ,σ2η C,δ]
∆(Large Firm Layoff)  0.
PROOF. See appendix A.5.
Themechanism described above can also occur in response to economic
news that signals a deterioration of firm performance. Consequently, we
expect that adverse aggregate news, correlated with real firm performance,
will also trigger clustering of layoff announcements. This gives us the fol-
lowing corollary:
COROLLARY 5. Firms cluster layoff announcements after negative macro-
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economic news. The strength of the effect depends on the predictive power
of the negative news with respect to firm performance. Specifically,
∆Pr
h
Layoffsi = 1 j pii,γ, σ2η C, δ
i
∆ (Adverse Macro Event)
 0
and
∂
24∆Pr
h
Layoffsi = 1 j pii,γ, σ2η C, δ
i
∆ (Adverse Macro Event)
35 /∂  ∆pii
∆ (Adverse Macro Event)

 0
PROOF. See appendix A.6.
The key message of this analysis is that after a large firm layoff (or re-
lease of negative macroeconomics news), perceived probability of indus-
try downturn (pii) increases. This in turn leads to an increase in the layoff
propensity of other firms. Since other firms’ layoff propensity increases si-
multaneously, they all tend to lay off at the same time, leading to clustering.
Therefore clustering in this model is not driven by the desire of firms to lay
off close to other firms. Instead, it is driven by an aggregate shock (layoff of
a large firm in the same industry, or other types of common bad news).
Extending the analysis further, we turn to the types of firms which are
more likely to cluster their layoffs in response to shocks such as layoffs by
large firms and adverse macroeconomic shocks. Similar to the results of
proposition 1 and 2, we find with strong reputation-based incentives and
shorter track records are most likely to engage in layoff clustering. The
following two corollaries summarizes these results:
COROLLARY 6. If there is significant uncertainty about the manager’s tal-
ent, then he is more likely to cluster layoff announcements after layoffs by
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a large firm: ∂
∂σ2η

∆Pr[Layoffsi=1 j pii,γ,σ2η C,δ]
∆(Large Firm Layoff)

 0.
PROOF. See appendix A.6.
COROLLARY 7. If the manager’s utility function puts more weight on his
reputation then he ismore likely to cluster layoff announcements after leader
layoff. That is ∂∂γ

∆Pr[Layoffsi=1 j pii,γ,σ2η C,δ]
∆(Large Firm Layoff)

 0.
PROOF. See appendix A.6.
The propositions and corollaries in Section 3 summarize the testable
predictions of the model. We now move to Section 4, which discusses how
we link the parameters of the model to measurable attributes of firms and
managers. With respect to the empirical tests, proposition 2 and its asso-
ciated corollaries deal with leader-follower behavior, which we test using
high-frequency data over short time horizons. By contrast, we test proposi-
tions 1 and its corollaries using lower-frequency data over the course of the
business cycle.
3.6 Mapping the Model to the Data
Themodel presented in this section is a static three-periodmodel. There-
fore, in order to test the model’s predictions we need to specify the appro-
priate time horizon. In principle, the time horizon depends on the persis-
tence of beliefs about the economic state, and the corresponding persistence
of reduced reputational costs to layoffs. Thus, to guide our empirical tests
we choose the appropriate time horizon for our tests based on the frequency
at which market’s belief about the aggregate state of the economy changes.
As summarized in the propositions above, the key comparative statics in-
volve change in manager’s behavior after the release of adverse aggregate
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news. Guided by this principle, our empirical tests are conducted at two fre-
quencies: business cycle frequencies and daily frequencies. The timescale of
business cycles is a natural candidate because market participants are much
more pessimistic about the aggregate states during recessions relative to
booms. Similarly, testing the predictions at daily frequencies is informative,
since release of unexpected bad news by a leading firm in an industry often
drastically changes market’s beliefs about the state of the industry in a mat-
ter of hours. The next section describes how we construct our datasets, and
then turns to the empirical strategies and results for both the business cycle
frequency tests (Section 5), and the daily frequency tests (Section 6).
4 Data Construction
4.1 Constructing Dataset of Layoff Announcements and Firm Character-
istics
The data for this study are based on two sets of firms: large publicly-
listed firms, and large privately-held firms. The publicly-listed firms are
the population of firms in the annual Fortune 500 from 1970 to 2010. Anal-
ogously, the privately-held firms are the population of firms in the Forbes
annual list of largest 100 privately held firms (“Forbes 100”) from 1985 to
2010. To minimize selection bias, we restrict the sample in any given year
to the subset of firms that are contemporaneously constituents of the For-
tune 500 or Forbes 100 in that year.15 Over the relevant range of years, we
track 1013 different publicly-listed firms and 436 privately-held firms at an
15However, conducting our empirical analyses on the entire sample of firms that were
ever in the Fortune 500 or Forbes 100 does not alter our key results.
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annual level. With this framework, we track announcements of layoffs by
these firms in the Wall Street Journal, the definitive source of news for large
US-based firms. For the publicly-held firms data from 1970 to 2006 comes
from Kevin Hallock.16 Using the same methodology as Hallock (2009), we
extended this dataset to 201017, and independently constructed a dataset
of layoff announcements for the private firms from 1985 to 2010 (see data
appendix for more details).
From the Wall Street Journal announcement dataset, we focus not only
on the number of layoffs by a particular firm in a given year, but also track
the total number of workers laid off. We then match our firms to four
of COMPUSTAT’s datasets: Prices, Dividends, and Earnings; Fundamen-
tals Annual, Fundamentals Quarterly, and ExecuComp. From the Prices,
Earnings, and Dividends dataset, we obtain a firm’s NAICS code, as well
as information on its annual earnings and its equity: shares outstanding,
market and book values, and dividends. From Fundamentals Annual,
we obtain firm employment numbers and information from balance sheets
and income statements: measures of debt, revenues, income, and capital
expenditures. From Fundamentals Quarterly, we obtain date of earnings
announcements, which serves as an important control variable in some of
our empirical tests.
The data from ExecuComp is limited by the fact that it starts in 1992;
however, it provides valuable information on the tenure and compensation
16For related research using this data see Billger and Hallock (2005) and Farber and Hal-
lock (2009). Also, Hallock (2009) provides an interesting discussion of other aspects of this
dataset which we do not explore.
17There are several approaches to conducting searches on historical news database. In
consultation with Kevin Hallock we narrowed the search critieria to three different meth-
ods. Using the three criteria we re-constructed the dataset for the publicly-held firms for
three random years in the period 1970 and 2006. To ensure consistency we settled on the
search criteria that yielded the maximum amount of overlap between the two datasets.
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of the CEOs of firms in our sample. We supplement this dataset with in-
formation from the Forbes CEO Compensation list of the largest 500 firms
from 1970 to 1991. This allows us to construct measures of CEO tenure over
several decades for a large subset of firms. This is critical for some of our
empirical tests involving CEO tenure, as it allows us to include firm-fixed
effects to examine within-firm variation.
In addition to these firm-specific measures, we also obtain sector-level
data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics National Survey covering
employment levels and number of hours worked, and measures of value-
added from the National Income and Product Accounts of BEA, decom-
posed by NAICS major industry groups. We also obtain daily stock market
returns from the CRSP database for the entire sample period, 1970 to 2010.18
With these data, we first construct a range of standard control vari-
ables in order to cover a wide range of standard predictors of firm behavior.
Specifically, the following variables are constructed based on firms’ annual
earnings reports covering the year prior to the layoff announcements being
analyzed. We begin with the standard measures investors use to categorize
companies into groups: firm size and value vs. growth. For the former,
we include both the traditional market capitalization measure, as well as
a measure of total firm value which combines equity market capitalization
with the firm’s long-term debt obligations. For the latter, we use both the
ratio of equity book value to equity market value, as well as the earnings to
price ratio for the firm’s stock. In addition to these, we include a measure of
financial leverage, equal to the ratio of the value of long-term debt obliga-
tions to the sum those obligations and the firm’s equity. We also construct a
18The data appendix goes into more detail about our methodology and procedures for
constructing and merging the different datasets.
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measure of firm maturity as measured by years since initial public offering
(IPO) date.
To test the propositions outlined in the theory section we construct two
different datasets. In the first dataset each firm is tracked annually (Annual
dataset), and in the second each firm is tracked every business day (Busi-
ness Day dataset). Out of 5569 layoff announcements we only find two to
be announced in the Weekend edition of the Wall Street Journal. Conse-
quently, the Business Day Histories is at the business day level rather than
the calendar day level.19
4.2 Confidential Microdata from the Mass Layoff Statistics Program of
BLS
TheMass Layoff Statistics program (MLS) of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) is a Federal-State cooperative statistical effort which uses a stan-
dardized, automated approach to identify, describe, and track the effects of
major job cutbacks, using data from each State’s unemployment insurance
database. Establishments which have at least 50 initial claims for unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) filed against them during a consecutive 5-week period
are contacted by State agencies to determine whether the claimants are fac-
ing separations of at least 31 days duration, and, if so, information is ob-
tained on the total number of separations, the reasons for these separations,
and recall expectations. Establishments are identified according to indus-
try classification and location, and unemployment insurance claimants are
identified by demographic characteristics including age, race, sex, ethnic
group, and place of residence. The data is collected at a monthly frequency
19These two layoff announcements were recoded as occuring on the following Monday.
Our results are identical when we drop these two observations.
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starting in April of 1995. We end our sample in December 2010.
According the MLS definitions, a mass layoff occurs when at least 50
initial claims are filed against an establishment during a consecutive 5-week
period. An extended mass layoff occurs when at least 50 initial claims are
filed against an establishment during a consecutive 5-week period and at
least 50 workers have been separated from jobs for more than 30 days. Since
extended mass layoffs are a better measure of layoffs that lead to more per-
manent job dislocation (greater than 30 days), we focus on this measure in
our analysis.
Our focus on the subset of establishments employing 50 or more work-
ers means that, according to the 2003 data, 4.6 percent of all covered em-
ployers and 56.7 percent of covered employment are in the program’s scope.20
This measure has been quite stable over time: more than two decades ago,
5 percent of employers and 61 percent of total employment were reported
in establishments with 50 or more workers (Brown (2004)).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics keeps the identity of companies that
engage in mass layoffs confidential. Under the auspices of the onsite re-
searcher program of BLS, we were able to access the confidential microdata,
which allowed us to extend our empirical analysis to actual mass layoffs, in
addition to the layoff announcement observations based on the Wall Street
Journal data. Five state employment offices, however, rejected our proposal
to access the confidential data citing state legislation that disallows them to
share the identity of establishments even for research purposes. Neverthe-
less, the researchers at the BLS estimate that the confidential data that was
20The large difference in percentages reflects the strongly right-skewed distribution of
employer size, where a relatively small fraction of establishments provide a majority of
jobs.
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accessible to us covered more than 85% of all the mass layoff events they
track. Having access to actual mass layoffs data allows us to examine the
degree to which strategic behavior by firms can lead to actual changes in
the labor market outcomes.
5 Business Cycle Frequency Tests
One of the main predictions of the model presented in Section 3 is that
firms with managers who care most strongly about reputation are more
likely to engage in layoffs during downturns (proposition 2 and 3). In an
ideal experiment, we would estimate the magnitude of this effect using two
identical firms, such that the manager of one firm has incentives to manage
reputation while the other does not. In the absence of such an experiment,
we exploit differences in the incentives faced by publicly-listed firms (“pub-
lic” firms) and privately-held firms (“private” firms). Public firms differ
from private firms along three major margins, all of which make their man-
agers more likely to manage their reputation in financial markets, relative
to a similar private firm. First, since public firms sell shares to outside in-
vestors who are not involved in managing the firm, there exists separation
between ownership and control. This may lead to agency problems if man-
agers’ interests diverge from those of their investors (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). Second, owners of public firms typically have shorter horizons,
since liquidity makes it easy for shareholders to sell their stock at the first
sign of trouble rather than actively monitoring management. This relative
myopic behavior of investors, weakens incentives for effective corporate
governance (Amar (1993)), and generates incentives for managers to be my-
34
opic in their reputationmanagement (Stein (1989)). Third, managers of pub-
lic firms are subject to takeover threats, which are, in part, dependent on the
stock price of targeted firms. This can lead to managerial myopia in pub-
lic firms in order to actively manage current stock prices (Stein (1988) and
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011)).21
If reputation management drives layoff behavior over the business cy-
cle, the first-order effect should show up when comparing differences in
behavior of similar public and private firms. Here we emphasize reputa-
tion management in financial markets, since the managers of public and pri-
vate firms are likely to have similar motivations for reputation management
among other constituents. The next section describes the empirical strategy
and data samples we use for our tests.
5.1. Comparing Public-Private Firms: Empirical Strategy
The analysis of this section is based on the confidential microdata col-
lected at a monthly frequency from April 1995 to December 2010 by the
Mass Layoff Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The dataset
includes firms that ever engaged in a layoff during the sample period. Us-
ing this data we create three different samples for our study.
5.1.1 Full Sample. — The construction of our full sample for this portion
of our analysis begins with all public firms that are Fortune 500 constituents
between 1985 and 2010; and all private firms that are Forbes 100 constituents
21Private firms, in contrast, are often owner-managed and even when not, are both illiq-
uid and typically have highly concentrated ownership, which encourages their owners to
monitor management more closely. Indeed, evidence from the Federal Reserve’s 2003 Sur-
vey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) shows that 94.1% of the larger private firms in the
survey have fewer than ten shareholders (most have fewer than three), and 83.2% are man-
aged by the controlling shareholder. As a result, agency problems are likely to be greater
among public firms than among private ones.
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between 1985 and 2010. We then match these firms to the microdata we ac-
cessed from the MLS database, resulting in a total of 478 public firms, and
135 private firms tracked over the period covered by MLS, namely, 1995-
201022. We call this sample the “full sample.” Table 1.2 reports the charac-
teristics of both the private and public firms in this sample. Over the 1995-
2010 time period, the public firms tend to be larger than the private firms
in terms of both revenue and number of employees. Also, the baseline lay-
off propensity of public firms is about 1.8 percentage points grater than the
private firms, although we find no difference in the number of workers laid
off by both these firms in a given mass layoff event. In an ideal world, we
would like to compare the investment behavior of two otherwise identical
firms that differ only in their listing status. To get closer to this ideal we
need to find pairs of public and private firms that are observably similar to
each other. One convenient way to do this is through matching, which is
what we turn to next.
5.1.2 Matching Sample. — Since size is an important observable differ-
ence between the public and private firms in our sample, we match on size
(revenue) in addition to matching on industry. This procedure closely fol-
lows the methodology of Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011), who
conduct a similar matching between public and private firms to investigate
differences in investment sensitivities. Matching on size implies that our
matched sample consists of the bottom half of public firms in the Fortune
500, which correspond to the size of all private firms in the Forbes 100. (see
22The number of firms we track for this analysis is reduced by two factors: First, five
states did not allow us to access their mass layoffs information. Second, not all firms in
our broad sample engaged in layoffs between 1995 and 2010. This sample differs from our
other results in that it considers non-contemporaneous constituents. The vast majority of
our results are unchanged when restrict the sample to contemporaneous constituents of
the two lists between 1995 to 2010, although this substantially reduces the sample size.
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Table 1.2 for a comparison).
In the language of the matching literature surveyed in Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009), we use a nearest-neighbor match adapted to a panel
setting. Starting in fiscal year 1985, for each public firm, we find the private
firm that is closest in size and that operates in the same three-digit NAICS
industry, requiring that the ratio of their total revenue (TR) is less than 2
(i.e., max
 
TRpublic, TRprivate

/min
 
TRpublic,TRprivate

< 2). If no match is
found, we discard that observation and look for a new match for that firm
in the following year. Once a match is formed, it is kept in subsequent years
to ensure the panel structure of the data remains intact. If a matching firm
exits the panel, a new match is spliced in. Because we match with replace-
ment, to maximize the match rate and match quality, the matched sample
contains 206 public firms and 74 private firms. Our results are not sensi-
tive to matching without replacement, although this substantially reduces
the sample size. The standard errors are appropriately clustered to account
for the resampling of private firms. The middle three columns in Table 1.2
compare the characteristics of the matched sample, and allows us to assess
how good this match is. Since we match on size as measured by revenue,
it is not surprising to find no statistical difference in the average revenue
of public and private firms in our matched subsample. We find almost no
difference in the average number of employees between public and private
firms, and no difference in average layoff propensity or severity.
5.1.3 Leverage Buyout Sample. — Next, we create an alternate subsample
based on leverage buyout (LBO) attempts. From the full sample we only
keep private firms that were once public and went private through a LBO
after 1985. We obtain this data from the Forbes annual survey of largest
38
private firms in the US. As for the public firms, we track firms after 1985,
and only include the public firms that were targeted by an unsuccessful
LBO attempt.23
In Table 1.2 we report the observed differences between public and pri-
vate firms in this subsample. We again find no significant differences in rev-
enue, number of employees, layoff propensity, and the share of employees
laid off between public firms (resulting from unsuccessful LBO attempts)
and private firms (resulting from successful LBO attempts). We do find a
difference in the average number of workers laid off, but the difference be-
tween medians is much smaller.
5.2 Comparing Public-Private Firms: Results
The main results of the analysis are reported in Table 1.3. We estimate
the same set of two regressions using the three different samples described
above. In each set the first regression has an indicator for mass layoff as the
dependent variable, while the second regression uses the share of employ-
ees laid off (conditional on a layoff). All regressions include controls for
the log of the previous year’s revenues. Additionally, the regressions with
layoff indicator as the dependent variable controls for the previous year’s
employee size. We are unable to control for other firm characteristics since
the Forbes dataset only reports these two variables for private firms.
5.2.1 Full Sample Results. — In the first set of specifications, (1) and (2),
we estimate the regressions on the full sample, with no firm fixed effects
23If the withdrawal of the LBO action is random, differences between successful LBOs
and withdrawn LBOs will allow us to identify the differences in layoff propensity of public
firms relative to private firms. However, the withdrawal of LBOs are not always random.
We run several tests to examine the observable differences between the two sets of firms.
We find no systematic differences in firm characteristics.Still, unobservable differencesmay
exist, which we are unable to control for.
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or time fixed effects, but with 4-digit industry fixed effects. In addition
we control for seasonality by including calendar month fixed effects, and
for the overall time trend using a quadratic function. Using the BLS mi-
crodata for the period 1995 to 2010 at a monthly frequency, we find that
private firms are roughly 2.01 percentage points more likely to layoff in a
recession month. Compared to them, the public firms’ propensity to lay
off workers in recession months is 2.47 percentage points greater, indicating
that the layoffs of public firms are more than twice as sensitive to recessions
as those of private firms. The relatively modest response of private firms
to recessions also shows up in the share of employees they lay off in reces-
sion years. Conditional on a layoff, private firms exhibit no difference in
the share of employees they layoff in recession months and non-recession
months. Contrastingly, the share of workers laid off by public firms goes
up by 0.28 percentage points (conditional on a layoff) in a recession month
when compared to the share laid off by private firms.
In the next set of specifications, (3) and (4), we conduct the same analy-
sis but with firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects, and with
month fixed effects instead of the controls for seasonality and time trends.
We are still able to identify the impact of the private firm indicator, since this
regression takes advantage of public-to-private and private-to-public tran-
sitions. During our sample years of 1995-2010, we have 38 such transitions.
The recession indicator in these regressions is not identified due to presence
of month fixed effects. Under these specifications we find very similar re-
sults:a firm is more likely to announce layoffs in a recession if it is public.
Similarly, when compared to private firms, public firms lay off more work-
ers in recession years, although this coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
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5.2.2 Matched Sample Results. — Our results using the matching estima-
tor are reported in columns (5)-(8). These four specifications are a counter-
part to the first four specifications discussed above. In addition to using
our smaller matched sample, the key difference is in the control structure:
we include a matched-pair fixed effect instead of the industry- and firm-
level fixed effects in the previous specifications. Therefore, the identifica-
tion in these regressions is based off within-pair variation, where each pair
consists of one public and one private firm within the same subindustry
matched on size. The matching estimator results are in line with the results
above: the layoff propensity of public firms is more than twice as sensitive
to recessions as that of public firms, and the same is true for the share of
employees laid off conditional on a layoff. Specifically, the propensity of
private firms to engage in a mass layoff increases by 2.4 percentage points
in recession months, while public firms experience an increase that is 3.2
percentage points greater than the effect we see in private firms. We also
find that public firms are 0.64 percentage points less likely to lay off work-
ers outside recessionmonths when compared to private firms, although this
result is not precisely estimated. We find similar results for the fraction of
employees laid off conditional on a layoff. Outside recession months public
firms lay off a relatively smaller fraction of employees compared to private
firms, whereas the opposite holds in recession months. These coefficients,
however, are not precisely estimated and cannot be interpreted as definitive
results.
The general message from the matched sample results is that the pub-
lic firms are more cyclical in their layoff policies compared to their matched
private counterparts. These results suggest that public firms may be car-
42
rying excess capacity and waiting for longer periods between layoffs when
compared to similar private firms. To investigate this further, we use the
same matching methodology to estimate both the total number of workers
laid off and the median duration between layoffs over the course of a full
business cycle. We present these results in Table 1.4. In examining the total
number of workers laid off, we use a peak-to-peak identification, starting
from October of 2000 and ending in July of 2007. We report our findings in
column (1): public firms tend to lay off approximately 30% more workers
over the course of the entire business cycle, though this result is not pre-
cisely estimated. When we consider the median duration between layoffs,
we use a slightly different time period. We begin our sample in April of
2002, approximately six months after the trough of the 2001 recession, and
end in December of 2009. The motivation for this is to observe firm behav-
ior in the period after they are most likely to have adjusted their labor force
to their desired optimal level: most layoffs occur between the start and the
trough of a recession, and the firms in our sample would have had ample
opportunity to adjust their labor force. Using within-pair variation, we find
evidence for a difference in layoff timing between public and private firms,
and report these results in column (2) of Table 1.4. We find that the average
duration between layoffs for a sample of firms that engage in layoffs during
the 2002-10 period is 7.76 months. Using within-pair variation, we find that
the duration between layoffs for public firms is roughly 0.65 months greater
than their matched private counterpart. While this effect is not precisely es-
timated, it is consistent with the view that public firms may wait longer to
announce layoffs.
5.2.3 Leveraged Buyout Targets Sample Results. — The last set of results
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Table 1.4: Public - Private Comparison over the Business Cycle (part II)
Sample
(1) (2)
Public Indicator 0.3039 0.0656*
(0.4251) (0.0363)
Mean 2.5745 7.76
Std. Dev 3.1077 6.69
Matched-Pair Fixed Effects  
Observations 236 260
Matched Sample
Dependent Variable
Log of 1 plus total # of 
workers laid off over 
business cycle
Median Months Since Last 
Layoff
This table reports characteristics of the matched sample and examines differences in public and private firm 
behavior over the business cycle with respect to their layoff policies. The first specification (1) computes the 
total number of workers laid off by a firm over an entire business cycle (peak-to-peak from 6 months prior to 
the peak of the 2001 recession (October 2000) to 6 months prior to the peak of the 2008 recession (July 
2007)). Correspondingly each firm has one observation in this sample. We control for matched pair fixed 
effects, and correspondingly the coefficient on the public indicator variable relies on a comparison of a public 
firm with its matched private counterpart. In specification (2) using the same data structure we study the 
median distance mass layoffs for each firm over an entire business cycle. For this specification we rely on a 
trough-to-trough period, since the period right after a recession is a more natural starting point for this 
analysis. Once again each firm has one observation in the sample. We again control for matched pair fixed 
effects so as to rely on within pair variation. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
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are estimated using a fixed effects specification with the firms in our LBO
sample, and we report these results in Table 1.5. We find that after control-
ling for 4-digit industry category, log of revenues and log of employees, the
layoff propensity of public firms increases by 6.04 percentage points in re-
cession months when compared to private firms in the sample. Outside of
recession months, however, we find that public firms are slightly less likely
to engage in layoffs. Examining the share of workers laid off, we once again
we find that public firms are likely to lay off a larger fraction of their work-
force in a recession month when compared to a private firm, but the effect is
not statistically significant. Overall, these results are consistent with those
from our other samples: public firms are much more cyclical when com-
pared to private firms.
5.3 Possible Alternate Explanations for the Difference in Public vs. Pri-
vate Layoff Behavior
This section explores the plausibility of explanations other than reputa-
tion management for the difference in layoff propensity between public and
private firms. The key concern is that when we compare public and private
firms, there are unobservable differences between unrelated to reputation
management whichmay be driving the results presented above. Among the
set of possible sources of unobservable heterogeneity between public and
private firms, financial leverage and lifecycle effects are central and may
directly alter the layoff behavior of firms independent of any reputation-
management behavior of managers. Private firms tend to have greater de-
gree of financial leverage compared to public firms, and also tend to be
younger than public firms. Since we do not observe these characteristics for
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Table 1.5: Public - Private Comparison over the Business Cycle (part III)
Sample
(1) (2)
Public Indicator -0.0079 -0.0088
(0.0261) (0.0272)
Public x Recession 0.0604** 0.0181
(0.0258) (0.0176)
Mean 0.0692 0.0142
Std. Dev 0.2550 0.0610
Industry Fixed Effect (4-digit NAICS)  
Month Fixed Effects  
Log Employees and Recession Interaction 
Log Revenue and Recession Interaction  
Observations 7116 470
Layoff Indicator Share Laid Off Dependent Variable
This table analyzes differences in actual layoff behavior over the business cycle between public and private 
firms. The unit of observation is a the firm level tracked montly between April 1995 and December 2010. In 
this table, a layoff constitutes a mass layoff as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics under its Mass Layoff 
Statistics Program (see section 4.2 for further discussion). The set of regressions is estimated on a subsample 
of firms that were targets of a leveraged buyout (LBO). Among the targets the public firms are those for 
whom the LBO offer was withdrawn, and the private firms are those for whom the buyout offer was 
successful. The regressions include month fixed effects, and controls for previous year's log revenue and its 
interaction with the recession dummy, and previous year's number of employees and its interaction with the 
recession dummy (except when the dependent variable is share laid off).  Since the month fixed effects 
absorb all variation over time, the effect of a recession indicator is not separately identified in these 
specifications. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown 
underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
LBO Targets
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our sample of private firms we cannot control for them in our regressions.
In order to assess the importance of these characteristics we instead com-
pare our sample of private firms to the most levered public firms, and to the
youngest public firms. If these characteristics are drivers of layoff policies,
we would expect that in recessions, the layoff behavior of high-leverage
public firms and young public firms will be quite similar to that of private
firms. We investigate these alternate hypotheses in Table 1.6.
The dependent variable in all the regressions in Table 1.6 is the layoff
indicator. Column 1 restricts the sample of public firms to ‘young’ firms
(those whose time-since-IPO in their first year in our panel is less than the
median time-since-IPO of all public firms in a given calendar year), while
column 2 restricts the sample of public firms to ‘old’ firms. Similarly, Col-
umn 3 restricts the sample of public firms to ‘high leverage’ firms (those
whose leverage ratio exceeds the median leverage ratio of all public firms in
a given calendar year), while column 4 restricts the sample of public firms to
‘low leverage’ firms. In the last specification, we restrict the sample to pub-
lic firms only, and estimate the interactions between the recession indicator
and each of the two characteristics above: the log of years since IPO, and
the leverage ratio. Each regression includes month fixed effects, the log of
previous year’s employees and its interaction with recession indicator, and
the log of the previous year’s revenue and its interaction with the recession
indicator.
We find that the younger public firms are much more likely to lay off
in a recession month compared to older public firms (specification (5)). We
also find no significant effect of leverage on the sensitivity of layoff propen-
sity to recessions. These results are consistent with specifications (1)-(4): the
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Table 1.6: Assessing Alternate Explanations for Public - Private Differences in Cyclicality of Mass Layoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public Indicator 0.0095 0.0055 0.0009 0.0071
(0.0154) (0.0231) (0.0139) (0.0196)
Public x Recession 0.0478*** 0.0133 0.0187* 0.0250**
(0.0127) (0.0099) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Leverage Ratio 0.0721***
(0.0137)
Log(1+Years since IPO) 0.0005
(0.0136)
Recession X Lev. Ratio 0.0259
(0.0190)
Recession X Log Age -0.0341***
(0.0116)
Mean 0.0567 0.0785 0.0602 0.0759 0.0718
Std. Dev 0.2314 0.2689 0.2379 0.2639 0.2582
Firm Fixed Effects 
Industry Fixed Effect (4-digit NAICS)    
Month Fixed Effect     
Log Emp. and Interaction with Rec. Indicator     
Log Rev. and Interaction with Rec. Indicator     
Observations 44805 47019 45078 46746 69621
Layoff Indicator 
This table explores the plausibility of alternate explanations for the difference in layoff propensity between public and private firms. The 
dependent variable in all the regressions is the layoff indicator. Column 1 restricts the sample of public firms to 'young' firms (those 
whose time-since-IPO in their first year in our panel exceeds the median time-since-IPO of all public firms in the same calendar year), 
while column 2 restricts the sample of public firms to 'old' firms. Similarly, Column 3 restricts the sample of public firms to 'high leverage' 
firms (those whose leverage ratio exceeds the median leverage ratio of all public firms in the same calendar year), while column 4 
restricts the sample of public firms to 'low leverage' firms. In the last specification, we restrict the sample to public firms only, and 
estimate the interaction between the recession indicator and, both, log of years since IPO and leverage ratio. Each regression includes 
month fixed effects, log of previous year's employees and its interaction with recession indicator, and log of the previous year's revenue 
and its interaction with the recession indicator. The first four specifications include industry fixed effects, whereas the last one includes 
firm fixed effects. Since the month fixed effects absorb all variation over time, the effect of a recession indicator is not separately 
identified in these specifications. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown underneath the 
coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
Dependent Variable Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator 
Public OnlySample Young Firms Old Firms
High Leverage 
Firms
Low Leverage 
Firms
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difference between public and private firms is strongest when comparing
against young public firms, and is relatively consistent when comparing
against high- and low-leverage public firms. The key implication of the
results in this table is that the observed differences in layoff propensity in
recessions between public and private firms are not being driven by unob-
servable differences in either leverage or lifecycle effects.
Though these results rule out two key possible alternate explanations,
there may be other forms of unobserved variation between public and pri-
vate firms. In order to investigate this further, we refined our matching cri-
teria to match on size and 4-digit subindustry (instead of 3-digit subindus-
try). This reduces our sample size by approximately 50% , but we have
enough observations to conduct similar analysis as reported in Table 1.3.
The results of this analysis is reported in Table 1.7. These results based on
the four digit industry level replicate what we find in Table 1.3, and the
magnitudes of the coefficients in this table line up with the analysis using a
matching criteria based on the three digit industry level. Therefore, our re-
sults is robust to changes in the matching criteria we use. Moreover, using a
more stringent matching criteria (i.e. at the four digit industry level) allows
us to mitigate unobservable differences between public and private firms.
5.4 Variation within Public Firms
So far, our analysis has been based on comparing public and private
firms. In this section we look for differences in layoff behavior within our
sample of public firms. In seeking to identify managers that are more likely
to engage in reputation management and time layoffs strategically, we rely
on the following two measures. First, we use an indicator variable called
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Table 1.7: Public - Private Comparison over the Business Cycle (Robustness Tests)
Sample
(1) (2)
Public Indicator -0.0194** -0.0117***
(0.0090) (0.0041)
Recession Indicator
Public x Recession 0.0312* 0.0115**
(0.0185) (0.0048)
Mean 0.0569 0.0155
Std. Dev 0.2318 0.0267
Quadratic Time Trend & seasonality controls
Month Fixed Effects  
Matched-Pair Fixed Effects  

Log Employees and Recession Interaction 
Log Revenue and Recession Interaction  
Observations 10920 656
Layoff Indicator Share Laid Off 
This table is a robustness test for results presented in Table 2, in which the matching algorithm relies 
on 4-digit industry instead of 3-digit industry. The table exploits within-firm or within-industry 
variation to analyze differences in actual layoff behavior over the business cycle between public and 
private firms. The unit of observation is a the firm level tracked montly between April 1995 and 
December 2010. In this table, a layoff constitutes a mass layoff as defined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics under its Mass Layoff Statistics Program (see section 4.2 for further discussion). In this 
table we have two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable is layoff indicator, 
which takes a value of one if the firm engages in a mass layoff in a given month. The second 
dependent variable is the number of workers laid off as a share of previous year's employees. The 
sample includes matched public-private pairs (see section 5.1.2 for the methodology) based on size 
(revenue) and 4-digit NAICS industry. These specifications rely on comparing each public firm to its 
matched private counterpart since we include matched-pair fixed effects. All regressions include 
controls for previous year's log revenue and its interaction with the recession dummy, and previous 
year's number of employees and its interaction with the recession dummy (except when the 
dependent variable is share laid off).  Since the month fixed effects absorb all variation over time, 
the effect of a recession indicator is not separately identified. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all 
columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
Matched Sample
Dependent Variable
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short-tenured CEO, which takes a value of 1 if the CEO’s tenure with the
firm is four years or less.24 Second, we measure a firm’s past equity-linked
compensation share as the share of total CEO compensation that comes
from equity-linked instruments over the past 5 years. We are interested in
the impact of these variables on actual layoff behavior over the business cy-
cle, and we report the results in Table 1.8. We use the same set of firm-level
controls as in Table 1.6, and also include month fixed effects and firm fixed
effects. The sample includes all contemporaneous constituents of the For-
tune 500 that ever engaged in a layoff. In specification (1) we find that short-
tenured CEOs are roughly 1.44 percentage points more likely to engage in
a layoff in a recession month, relative to firms with longer-tenured CEOs.25
Similarly, in specification (2), we find that a one-standard-deviation increase
in the share of equity-linked compensation (controlling for the level of to-
tal compensation) is associated with an increase of roughly 0.7 percentage
points in layoff propensity during a recession month.26
In specification (3) we restrict the sample to all firms that have option
share above the median level for a given year. Similarly, in specification (4)
we restrict the sample to all firms that have CEO tenure below the median
level for a given year. We estimate the same regressions as in specifications
24Some CEOs may choose to lay off workers immediately after they are hired, so as to
start with a ‘clean sheet.’ Therefore, we also run the same test with a separate indicator
variable for CEOs with a tenure between 0 and 1 year. Our results remain unchanged.
25One might expect that firms which bring in new CEOs are also aiming to maintain
(or even reduce) their labor force, rather than looking to expand aggressively. If true, this
could lead to the result that firms with younger CEOs also engage in relatively more lay-
offs during recessions: firms looking to expand aggressively can respond by cutting back
on hiring rather than announcing layoffs. To evaluate this alternative interpretations, we
examine the relationship between new CEOs and employment growth at their firms. We
find no effect, indicating that our layoff results are not coming from reduced hiring by new
CEOs.
26The equity-linked compensation findings are consistent with results in the earnings
management literature with respect to CEO incentives (see Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006))
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(1) and (2), and find that our results get stronger: both short-tenured CEOs
and equity-linked compensation are linked to a greater incidence of layoffs
during recessions. These results suggest that within the set of public firms,
the CEOs who are most likely to care strongly about reputation are also
the ones who are most likely to engage in layoffs during recessions. This
suggests that reputation management by CEOs plays a significant role in
determining the cyclicality of their firms’ layoff polices.
6 Daily Frequency Tests
In this section we turn to the daily frequency tests of our model’s pre-
dictions. First we establish that the reputation penalty is lower if a firm
announces a layoff right after other large firms in the economy announce
layoffs (Section 6.1). We evaluate the strength of the response to this reduc-
tion in reputation penalty when we test Proposition 4, which predicts that
firms will cluster layoffs after layoff announcements by large firms. Finally,
we test the differential sensitivity results in Corollaries 6 and 7, which pre-
dict that strategically-motivated managers (those with high γ and σ2η) will
be more likely to cluster their layoff announcements.
6.1 Is the Reputation Penalty of Layoff Announcements Lower after Lay-
offs by Other Firms?
Though the manager may be managing his reputation with several
constituents–the stockmarket, the board of directors, employees of the firm–
the analysis in this section focuses on financial market reputation, which
we can test this using daily stock returns. This focus on stock-market-based
52
Table 1.8: Actual Layoff Propensity over the Business Cycle (Public Firms), 1995-2010
Sample
High Option 
Share Firms
Short-tenured 
CEO Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KV = Short CEO Tenure Indicator 0.0032 0.0025
(0.0050) (0.0062)
KV = Avg. Equity-Linked Compensation Share 0.0072 0.0164
(0.0071) (0.0091)
 Key Variable (KV) x Recession 0.0144* 0.0261** 0.0255** 0.0352**
(0.0079) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0168)
Mean 0.0787 0.0790 0.0812 0.0831
Std. Dev 0.2693 0.2697 0.2732 0.2761
Industry Fixed Effects    
Month Fixed Effects    
Firm Controls and Recession Interaction    
Observations 28746 27882 16818 13410
Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator 
This table exploits within industry variation to analyze the impact of the equity-linked executive compensation and short 
tenure of CEO on layoff propensity over the business cycle. The unit of observation is at the firm level  tracked monthly 
between April 1995 and December 2010. In this table, a layoff constitutes a mass layoff as defined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics under its Mass Layoff Statistics Program (see section 4.2 for further discussion). The sample for the first two 
specifications includes all contemporaneous constitutents of Fortune 500 that ever announced a layoff. In specification (3) we 
restrict the sample to all firms that are above the median with respect to option share of compensation in the previous year. 
Similiarly, in specification (4) we restrict the sample to all firms above the median with respect to CEO tenure in the previous 
year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which takes a value of one when a firm announces a layoff in a given 
month, and zero otherwise. In each regression specification the main explanatory variables are the recession indicator, key 
variable, and the interaction of the key variable with the recession indiciator. The recession indicator takes a value of one in 
months classified as recession months by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. The first key variable (specification (1) 
and (3)) is a measure of short-tenured CEO, which is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the tenure of a given CEO 
at the firm is between 0 and 4 years. The second key variable (specification (2) and (4)) is a measure of equity-linked 
compensation, which is the Black-Scholes past five year average of the value of stock-option grants a CEO receives as a share of 
the average total compensation. All the specifications include month fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm-level 
controls and the interaction of each of these controls with the recession indicator. The firm level controls include Earnings-
Price ratio, Book-to-Market Ratio, Market Capitalization, Leverage Ratio, Years since IPO, which are all obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. Since the month fixed effects absorb all variation over time, the effect of a recession indicator is not separately 
identified in these specifications. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown 
underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
(two-sided), respectively. 
Full Sample
Dependent Variable Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator 
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measures is driven by ease of testability, and should not be seen as a nar-
row interpretation of the reputation management mechanism in our model.
Several studies have documented a negative stock market reaction to layoff
announcements (Farber and Hallock (2009), Hallock (2009)). In this section
we are interested in whether this negative penalty is lower if a firm an-
nounces a layoff within days of a layoff announcement by a large firm. Our
empirical strategy follows the conventional event-study approach.
Using a sample of the Fortune 500 constituents from 1970 to 2010, we
calculate cumulative excess returns using return data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The excess
return is the part of the movement in the stock return of a company that is
not correlated with overall market movement in stock returns and presum-
ably reflects unexpected firm-specific factors. To do this we run a first-stage
regression where the daily stock return for company i on day t, denoted by
Rit, is regressed on the value-weighted return of the market, Rmt:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + ηit
Next, for days around the event, the daily abnormal (or excess) returns
is calculated as follows:
ERit = Rit  
 
αˆi + βˆiRmt

where αˆi and βˆi are estimates of the previous regression. The first stage
regression is run for a period in the past, which in this study ranged for a
period of one year ending 30 days before the event. We rely on the average
cumulative excess return over a five-day window–two days before, the day
54
of, and two days after the event for each of the 41 years from 1970 to 2010.
Changes to this window length has no material effect on the results. The
results are listed in Table 1.9 Panel A. Specification (1) restricts the sample
to all layoff announcements that occur within the three days following a
layoff by the largest 20 public firms in the economy as measured by the pre-
vious year’s revenue. Specification (2) considers the complementary case,
in which the sample includes layoff announcements that occur on all other
days.
We find that the cumulative excess return around a layoff announce-
ment that occurs within the three days following a top 20 firm announce-
ment is -0.38 percentage points. On the other hand, if a layoff occurs on
any other day, the cumulative excess return is more than twice as large:
-0.87 percentage points. This suggests that in the context of financial mar-
kets, the reputation penalty of layoffs is lower immediately after negative
signals about the state of the economy.
In Panel B of Table 1.9 we further examine the nature of stock market
penalty of layoff announcements. Our model predicts a mitigated reputa-
tion penalty for the first-mover when their layoff is followed by layoffs by
others in the industry. This is because the initial negative penalty should
partially be undone when the market realizes other firms in the industry
also are laying off. We test this in column (1) of Panel B. For a top-20 firm
that laid off within the last three days, we find a three-day cumulative ab-
normal return of 0.33 percentage points when other firms in the industry
engage in a layoff. Consistent with the results of Panel A, this result also
confirms the mitigated penalty prediction of our model.
In column (2) we estimate the stock market reaction of other firms in
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Table 1.9: Stock Penalty of Layoffs: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (from day -2 to day +2)
Panel A
Dependent Variable
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Layoff by Top 20 Firm in Previous 3 days = 1 0.0049*** 0.0052*** 0.0042** 0.0044**
(.0017) (.0019) (.0020) (.0021)
Layoff by Top 20 Firm in Next 3 days = 1 -0.0025 -0.0027
(.0029) (.0029)
Constant (Baseline CAR) -0.0087*** -0.0081***
(0.0013) (0.0016)
Year Fixed Effect  
Industry Fixed Effect  
Observations 4796 4796 4796 4796
Panel B
Dependent Variable
Constant (CAR)
Observations
This table reports the cumalative abnormal returns (CAR) around a layoff announcement. The sample includes daily 
observations from 1970 to 2010. In Panel A, the baseline CAR is reported in specification (1) and (3) against the constant 
term of the regression. The main coefficient of interest is associated with the indicator variable reported in the first line, 
which takes a value of one if the firm under observation announces a layoff within three days after a layoff 
announcement by any of the largest 20 firms in the economy (as measured by previous year's revenue). In specifications 
(3) and (4) we also include an indicator variable for whether there was a layoff announcement by the same set of largest 
20 firms within the three days following the layoff announcement by the firm under observation. Specification (2) and 
(4) also includes year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Inclusion of these fixed effects implies that we cannot 
estimate the constant term in these specifications. In Panel B, we estimate the cross-effects of a layoff announcement 
on other firms. Column (1) reports the CAR of a top-20 firm that laid off within the last three days when another firm in 
the industry engages in a layoff. This is effectively the reverse effect on the industry leader when other firms follow up 
with a layoff. Column (2) reports the CAR of other firms in the industry when a top-20 firm lays off. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. 
We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
CAR of Industry Leader that Laid off 
Within Last 3 Days when Follower 
Firms Lay off                                 
0.0033***
(.0011)
212
(1)
CAR of Other Firms in Industry 
when Industry Leader Lay off                  
(2)
-0.0003
(.0007)
8286
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the industry when a top-20 firm (as measured by previous year’s revenue)
engages in a layoff. The model predicts a negative effect since a layoff by a
large firm changes market perception about industry condition. We find a
small negative but insignificant effect (-0.03 percentage points). This result
indicates that the change in perceptions regarding industry conditions is
largely offset by a countervailing effect, likely stemming from the dynamics
of product market competition. Specifically, when one firm in an indus-
try does poorly, other firms may benefit due to reduced competition in the
product market. The results suggest that this second effect is offsetting the
primary effect predicted by our model (i.e. adversely changing the belief
about industry condition).
Lastly, in Table 1.10 we find that the first-mover penalty to persist even
after one month. We refer you to table 1.10 for further discussion of this
result. In the next section, we proceed to test whether firms respond to these
incentives by timing their layoff announcements to occur immediately after
a layoff announcement by top-20 firms.
6.2 Do Firms Announce Layoffs after other Large Firm Layoff Announce-
ments?
6.2.1 Empirical Strategy. — To assess whether firms engage in a ‘leader-
follower’ behavior with respect to layoff announcements, our estimation
strategy relies on a dynamic regression model with lagged and future ef-
fects. For a firm i at time t, the regression specification is
Layo f fit = αi +
p
∑
j= p
βjMacroEventg,t j + X
0
itφ+Y
0
tω+ εit (14)
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Table 1.10: Stock Penalty of Layoffs: One-Month Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Dependent Variable
Cumulative One Month Return of 
Firms that Lay off              
Cumulative One Month Return of 
Firms that Lay off              
Sample
Firms that Announce Layoffs 
(Excluding Industry Leaders) 
Industry Leader Firms            
(1) (2)
Laid off within 1-week after Leader Layoff = 1 0.0039
(.0088)
Laid off within 1-week before Leader Layoff =1 -0.0168
(.0113)
Industry leader with Follower Layoffs 0.0229***
(.0068)
Constant (Baseline CAR) 0.0040 0.0023
(.0029) (.0022)
Observations 3125 1882
This table reports the one-month cumalative abnormal returns (CAR) after a layoff announcement. The sample includes daily 
observations from 1970 to 2010. In Column (1) the sample includes all firms that announce layoffs and are not classified as 
industry leaders (based on prior-year revenue). This column estimates the cumulative 1-month return of being a follower layoff 
firm (i.e. layoff within 1-week after a leader layoff) versus being a counterfactual-follower layoff firm (i.e. layoff within 1-week 
before a leader layoff). In column (2) the sample includes all firms that are industry leaders (i.e. firms that are classified as 
industry leaders based on prior-year revenue). This column estimates the cumulative 1-month return after a leader firm layoff for 
firms that have follower firms layoff within the next week versus those who do not using an indicator variable. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in 
all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
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The central variables are Layo f fit, an indicator variable which takes a
value of onewhen firm i announces layoff on business day t, andMacroEventg,t j,
which is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there was a neg-
ative macroeconomic news released on date t  j relevant for a firm in in-
dustry g. We also include firm-level controls, denoted by X0it to control for
firm-level heterogeneity. We begin our analysis by focusing on the layoff
announcements of public firms. For public firms, these controls include to-
tal revenue, number of employees, years since IPO, book-to-market ratio,
earnings-price ratio, leverage ratio, and days since last earnings announce-
ment.27 For private firms, we include the two control variables that we are
able to observe: total revenues and number of employees. In addition to
concerns about firm heterogeneity, we also need to account for the possi-
bility that firms may be more likely to announce layoffs on certain days of
the week (e.g. Friday) or in certain months. To address these concerns, the
vector Yt includes year fixed effects, month fixed effects, and day-of-week
fixed effects.
We consider three different types of macro events: layoff by a top 20
firm (as measured by previous year’s revenue), layoff by a firm in the top
20 which shares the same 1-digit NAICS code as firm i, and, as a placebo
test, unexpected negative news announcements that are not directly linked
to economic performance. We conduct this analysis separately for public
firms and private firms. In the first measure, which we label “Leader Lay-
offs,” we restrict our group of large firms to the largest 20 firms as measured
by previous year’s revenue.28 This ensures that the layoff announcements
27Controlling for earnings announcement date is important since firmsmay be clustering
layoff announcements around earnings announcement date, and we may observe cluster-
ing merely because different firms have earnings announcement dates close to each other.
28Press and analyst coverage of publicly-listed firms is highly skewed, with the largest
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of these firms correspond closely with the notion of ‘negative macroeco-
nomic news’ in our model. This measure takes the form of an indicator
variable equal to one on the business day the WSJ reports any such lay-
off announcement. Our second measure, which we label “Industry Leader
Layoffs,” is similar in structure. It takes a value of one whenever the first
measure takes a value of one and the large firm is in the same 1-digit NAICS
industry as firm i. The final measure, which we label “NewsMedia Events”,
is based on the ‘biggest news stories’ as measured by press coverage. Using
a survey of major news events from USA today (2007), we construct a list
of events for the period 1970 to 2010. Events are selected to be negative in
nature (e.g. the Sept. 11 attacks), and to occur over a span of a day or less
(i.e. news events such as the Afghanistan invasion of 2001 are excluded).
As above, this measure is an indicator variable that takes the value of one
on days when these events occur.29
Our model predicts a strong asymmetry in layoff behavior before and
after a large-firm layoff announcement. This is in sharp contrast to the com-
mon shock hypothesis, which predicts layoff announcements by smaller
firms both before and after the leader layoff. The event study framework
also enables us to tackle the issue of reverse causality: a potential concern
is that smaller firms may drive large firm layoff announcements. There-
firms receiving an inordinately high degree of coverage compared to slightly less large
firms (Fang and Peress (2009)). Our results are almost identical when we use a threshold
of 5, 10, 25 or 30 for classification of large firms instead of the 20 largest firms measured by
previous year’s revenue.
29The purpose of considering these three different measures of macro events is to evalu-
ate the predictions of the model in Proposition 4 and Corollary 5. As we will discuss in the
alternate hypotheses section below, juxtaposing the results of these three regressions will
allow us to exclude several alternate hypotheses that are otherwise consistent with some
of our leader-follower results. Future terms are included in the dynamic regression model
for falsification purposes. Most importantly, it allows us to tackle one of the main alternate
hypotheses of common shocks.
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fore, the coefficient on future events will enable us to establish whether this
mechanism is at play. We report results for a lag length of p = 5, but note
that our results are almost identical when we choose p = 10 or p = 15. To
ensure comparability across all the regressions the sample of public firms is
restricted to all contemporaneous constituents of the annual Fortune 500 list
excluding the top 20 firms. Similarly, our sample of private firms include
all contemporaneous constituents of the annual Forbes 100 list.
6.2.2 Results: High Frequency Announcement Behavior of Firms. — Fig-
ure 1.5 plots the sequence of βj estimates from the event study specifica-
tions (14), along with point-wise 95% confidence intervals using standard
errors clustered at the firm level. Panels A and B report the response to all
“Leader Layoffs” by public and private firms, respectively. In Panel A, we
see that the sequence of βj estimates is roughly flat and close to zero before
the leader layoff announcement (j < 0), and then jumps discretely at t = 0,
and thereafter decreases gradually over the next 5 business days. Thus, a
large firm layoff announcement is associated with future layoffs by other
large public (Fortune 500) firms, but not with past layoffs. The magnitudes
of these βj should be compared to the unconditional average daily layoff
announcement propensity of 0.0008. In Panel B, by contrast, we find no sim-
ilar response to “Leader Layoffs” by private firms. Specifically, we find no
evidence of clustering either before or after a top 20 layoff announcement.
This is consistent with our business cycle frequency results, in which the
public firms exhibited much greater propensity to engage in actual layoffs
in recession months compared to the private firms.
In Panel C, we return to public firms and investigate the response to
“Industry Leader Layoffs.” We again find the pattern of no effect prior to
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the event date, followed by a strong jump and gradual decline at t = 0.
Notably, the magnitude of the within-industry response of public firms to
a layoff by a large firm is almost twice that of the economy-wide response
described in Panel A. In Panel D, we turn our focus to the response of public
firms to “News Media Events.” In contrast to events based on large-firm
layoffs, a large negative media event does not predict future or past layoff
announcements by the Fortune 500 firms. This suggests that firms are not
attempting to time layoff announcements during periods when investors
may be distracted by non-economic events.
Taken together, these results suggest that the Fortune 500 firms are
more likely to time their layoff announcements in the days immediately
after negative economic news is released, such as the aftermath of a lay-
off announcement by a very large firm. The strength of the ‘follower’ be-
havior is stronger when the negative news is more related to the firm’s
own productivity; and the effect is absent after large negative news that
are non-economic in nature. Therefore, these results are more in line with
the leader-follower mechanism being driven by an informational channel,
rather than a ‘hiding behind the headlines’ channel. Moreover, the asym-
metric response of the firms before and after the large layoff announcements
offer evidence against the ‘common shock’ hypothesis, which would pre-
dict a more symmetric response in layoff announcement responses of the
Fortune 500 firms.
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Figure 1.5: These graphs report the response of layoff propensities to
”Leader Layoffs” — layoff announcements by the largest 20 firms in the
economy, based on previous year’s revenue. We plot the coefficients of
dynamic regressions which predict daily layoff propensities over the
11-day event-time periods surrounding large-firm layoff announcements.
6.3Which Type of Firms Layoff after a Large Firm Layoff Announcement?
6.3.1 Empirical Strategy. — To identify the characteristics of firms that
announce layoffs immediately after a large firm layoff announcement, we
construct an annual dataset in which the unit of observation is at the firm
level for every year. With this framework, we aim to test the model’s pre-
dictions on the type of firms which are most likely to behave strategically.
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Specifically, corollaries 6 and 7 predict that managers for whom the market
lacks strong priors, and who care most about reputation, will be most likely
to engage in strategic layoff timing. These results rely on public firms since
we do not observe clustering behavior for private firms. The basic regres-
sion specification is:
yit = αi + Z0itφ+V
0
tω+ εit (15)
zit = αi + Z0itφ+V
0
tω+ εit
In these regressions, yit is an indicator variable which takes a value of
one when a firm is a ‘follower’ firm and zero otherwise; analogously, zit
is an indicator variable which takes a value of one when a firm is a ‘coun-
terfactual follower’ firm and zero otherwise. A follower firm is defined as
any firm that announces a layoff in a 5-day window following a large layoff
(including the day of the large layoff). Similarly, a counterfactual follower
firm is a firm that announces a layoff in a 5-day window prior to a large
layoff (excluding the day of the large layoff). The first set of regressions
(specification (1) and (2)) is based on all firms in the dataset. This effectively
treats all other Fortune 500 constituents as the control group. The second
pair of regressions (specification (3) and (4)) restricts the sample to all firms
that announce a layoff in year t. In effect, the control group in these speci-
fications is the set of firms which also announced layoffs, but were outside
the ten-day window which identifies firms as followers or counterfactual
followers. In the last column (specification (5)), we restrict the sample to
all firms that announce a layoff within 5 days (before or after) a large firm
layoff announcement. In this last specification, the control group is simply
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the counterfactual followers: firms that announced layoffs in the five days
prior to a large-firm layoff.
In all five specifications, the vectors Zit and Vt include the same con-
trol variables and explanatory variables used in Table 1.8 and Figure 1.5:
total revenue, number of employees, years since IPO, book-to-market ratio,
earnings-price ratio, leverage ratio, and days since last earnings announce-
ment. We also include a full set of time-based (annual) fixed effects.
In a closely-related test, we examine whether clustering at these short
horizons is driven by information. Specifically, we test whether firms change
their clustering behavior after they start being covered by financial ana-
lysts. We estimate the same set of five specifications as described above,
and include an indicator variable for analyst coverage as an explanatory
variable. Using I/B/E/S sell-side analyst recommendations for U.S. stocks
from 1993 to 2010, we construct an aggregate analyst coverage indicator
variable. I/B/E/S codes recommendations from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell).
We first restrict our sample to all firms that appear at least once in the
I/B/E/S database. Next, we create an indicator variable, ‘Past 3 years cov-
erage,’ which takes a value of 1 if an analyst covered by the I/B/E/S dataset
made a recommendation in the previous three years. We report the results
on determinants of follower behavior in Tables 1.11 and 1.12, with the for-
mer focusing on compensation structure and CEO tenure, while the latter
focuses on analyst coverage.
6.3.2 Results. — The key independent variables in Table 1.11 are the same
ones we used in the business cycle frequency results of public firms in Ta-
ble 1.8: an indicator variable for short-tenured CEO and the average of the
share of CEO compensation that derives from equity-linked compensation
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over the past 5 years.
The results in this panel suggest that firms with a higher degree of
equity-linked compensation are more likely to be followers; by contrast,
this variable has no predictive power for counterfactual followers. Similarly,
firms with short-tenured CEOs are more likely to be followers, while the
same quality has a weak negative effect on the likelihood of being a coun-
terfactual follower. These results are robust to the estimation using the full
sample (specifications (1) and (2)), or the more restricted samples in speci-
fications (3)-(5), although the coefficients are less precisely estimated due to
reduced sample size.30 Overall, we find that the same characteristics which
predict layoff cyclicality on a business-cycle level also predict strategic be-
havior over shorter horizons: firms with short-tenured CEOs and with sig-
nificant equity-linked compensation are much more likely to act as follower
firms, but not as counterfactual followers. This suggests an important role
of reputation management in driving the high degree of observed ‘leader-
follower’ behavior in layoff announcements.
To further explore the role of asymmetric information and reputation
management, Table 1.12 reports our results from the analyst coverage re-
gressions. The specifications here are identical to those in Table 1.11, except
here the key explanatory variable is the indicator variable of analyst cov-
erage. The results are broadly similar: when a firm is being covered by
analysts, it is much less likely to announce layoffs after a large firm layoff.
At the same time, the analyst indicator has no predictive power for counter-
factual follower firms. We interpret these results as supporting the idea of
30To ensure that the short-tenured CEO result is not being driven by the desire of newly-
appointed CEOs to start with a ‘clean sheet’ we run the same regressions with a separate
indicator variable for CEOs with tenure between 0 and 1 year. The results of this analysis
are almost identical to those discussed here.
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Table 1.11: Follower Chracteristics, 1970-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All Firms All Firms
All Firms that 
Laid Off in Given 
Year
All Firms that 
Laid Off in Given 
Year
All Firms that 
Laid off within 5 
days 
before/after 
large firm layoff
Avg. Equity-linked Compensation Share 0.0741*** 0.0186 0.1850 -0.1086 0.4689*
(0.0186) (0.0165) (0.1546) (0.1415) (0.2833)
Total Compensation -0.0014*** 0.0004 -0.0043 0.0110*** -0.0073*
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0038)
Ceo Tenure = 0 - 4 years 0.0229*** -0.0042 0.1458** -0.0945* 0.2534***
(0.0075) (0.0056) (0.0583) (0.0496) (0.0928)
Mean 0.0292 0.01763 0.2764 0.1645 0.6238
Std. Dev 0.1685 0.1316 0.4482 0.3715 0.4869
Year Fixed Effects     
Firm Level Controls     
Observations 2151 2151 228 228 101
In this table we report our results about the characteristics of public firms that layoff before and after the largest 20 firms in the 
economy as mesured by previous year's revenue. Correspondingly the sample is restricted to the Fortune 500 constituents that 
are not the largest 20 firms as measured by revenue. The unit of observation is at the firm level observed over every business day 
between 1970 and 2010. There are two indicator variables that serve as dependent variables in the analysis. The follower 
indicator takes a value of one if in a given year the firm announces the layoff in a 5-day window following a large firm layoff 
(including the day of the large layoff). Similarly, the counterfactual follower indicator takes a value of one if in a given year the 
firm announces a layoff in a 5-day window prior to a large layoff (excluding the day of the large layoff). The first pair of 
regressions ((1) and (2)) are estimated using the entire sample (i.e. all Fortune 500 firms not in the top 20). The second pair of 
regressions ((3) and (4)) are estimated using only the sample of firms that laid off in a given year. By restricting the sample to this 
pool of firms, we are effectively relying on variation within firms that have relatively high propensity to layoff. In the last 
specification (5), we restrict the sample even further and include only firms that laid off within 5 days before or after a large firm 
announcement. Since in this case the two dependent variables are perfectly negatively correlated, we just need to estimate one 
regressions (instead of the pair). All the specifications include year fixed effects and firm level controls. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
Dependent Variable
Follower 
Indicator 
Follower 
Indicator 
Follower 
Indicator 
Couterfactual 
Follower 
Indicator 
Couterfactual 
Follower 
Indicator 
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asymmetric-information based factors driving the leader-follower behavior.
7 Linking High Frequency Results to Business Cy-
cle Frequency Results
The high frequency results in the previous section offer strong evidence
for strategic behavior, but on their own, they do not indicate the existence
of significant welfare-relevant effects. In order to assess this, we investigate
the impact of being a follower firm on changes in layoff propensity over the
business cycle. Being a high-frequency follower in layoff announcements is,
in principle, a better measure of active reputation management than other
measures we have used (such as short-tenured CEO and equity-linked com-
pensation). This is because we can rely on direct observations of reputation
management behavior rather than predictions of such behavior. The results
in this section seek to establish a connection between our high frequency
results and the business-cycle-frequency results described in Section 5.
7.1 Empirical Strategy. — For this analysis, we first identify firms that
have been ‘follower’ firms in the past five years, using the same methodol-
ogy as in the previous section. This is our basis for our measure ‘Past 5 year
follower,’ which takes the value of one for a specific firm in a given calendar
month if, at any point over the prior five years, that firm has engaged in a
layoff announcement within the five days following a layoff announcement
by a large (i.e. top-20) firm. Analogously, we create a measure of ‘Past 5
year counterfactual followers,’ which takes a value of one for a specific firm
in a given calendar month if, at any point over the prior five years, that firm
has engaged in a layoff announcement within the five days prior to (and not
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Table 1.12: Follower Chracteristics, 1970-2010 (part II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All Firms All Firms
All Firms that 
Laid Off in Given 
Year
All Firms that 
Laid Off in Given 
Year
All Firms that 
Laid off within 5 
days 
before/after 
large firm layoff
Analyst Coverage in Past 3 years -0.0254*** -0.0068 -0.2061** -0.0476 -0.1222
(0.0093) (0.0060) (0.0898) (0.0777) (0.1935)
Mean 0.0361 0.0246 0.2464 0.1836 0.5940
Std. Dev 0.1864 0.1550 0.4439 0.3874 0.4916
Firm Fixed Effects    
Year Fixed Effects     
Firm Level Controls     
Observations 7185 7185 964 964 436
Follower 
Indicator 
In this table we conduct the same analysis as in Table 8, except now our key dependent variable is a measure of analyst 
coverage. The sample is still restricted to the Fortune 500 constituents that are not the largest 20 firms as measured by 
revenue. The unit of observation is at the firm level observed over every business day between 1970 and 2010. There are two 
indicator variables that serve as dependent variables in the analysis. The follower indicator takes a value of one if in a given 
year the firm announces the layoff in a 5-day window following a large firm layoff (including the day of the large layoff). 
Similarly, the counterfactual follower indicator takes a value of one if in a given year the firm announces a layoff in a 5-day 
window prior to a large layoff (excluding the day of the large layoff). The first pair of regressions ((1) and (2)) are estimated 
using the entire sample (i.e. all Fortune 500 firms not in the top 20). The second pair of regressions ((3) and (4)) are estimated 
using only the sample of firms that laid off in a given year. By restricting the sample to this pool of firms, we are effectively 
relying on variation within firms that have relatively high propensity to layoff. In the last specification (5), we restrict the 
sample even further and include only firms that laid off within 5 days before or after a large firm announcement. Since in this 
case the two dependent variables are perfectly negatively correlated, we just need to estimate one regressions (instead of the 
pair). All the specifications include year fixed effects and firm level controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
Dependent Variable Follower 
Indicator 
Couterfactual 
Follower 
Indicator 
Follower 
Indicator 
Couterfactual 
Follower 
Indicator 
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after) a layoff announcement by a large firm.
7.2 Results. — The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1.13. We
find that outside of recession months the propensity of follower and coun-
terfactual follower firms are statistically indistinguishable. However, within
recession months, a firm that has been a follower firm in the previous five
years is roughly 3.14 percentage points more likely to engage in a mass lay-
off. By contrast, we find the impact of recessions on layoff propensity is
not statistically different from zero for counterfactual follower firms. These
results suggest that the firms we identify as ‘strategic’ over the very short
horizons of our daily frequency data are also the firms that are more likely
to have cyclical layoff policies over the course of the business cycle.
8 Alternate Explanations of Layoff Behavior
The results in Sections 5 and 6 are consistent with the predictions of the
model of strategic corporate layoffs; however, several alternative theories
also predict the temporal clustering of both mass layoffs and announce-
ments of mass layoffs. In this section, we discuss whether these alternate
theories are partially or fully consistent with the broad set of results pre-
sented so far. The leading alternatives theories focus on common shocks,
compassionate CEOs, management learning from other firms, and market
inattention. Sections 8.1-8.4 discuss these alternative mechanisms and ex-
plore whether their implications match the empirical results. Notably, we
do not seek to reject these alternate explanations; rather, we argue that none
of them can explain the full range of results in the previous sections. We
see this as strong support for the conclusion that reputation management in
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Table 1.13: Linking Daily Frequency Layoff Behavior to Business Cycle Outcomes, 1995-2010
Sample
(1) (2)
Past 5 year Follower Indicator 0.0135***
(0.0035)
Past 5 year Counterfactual Follower Indicator 0.0120***
(0.0036)
Recession × Past 5 year Follower Indicator 0.0314***
(0.0085)
Recession × Past 5 year Counterfactual Follower Indicator 0.0041
(0.0095)
Mean 0.0722 0.0722
Std. Dev 0.2587 0.2587
Firm Fixed Effects  
Month Fixed Effects  
Firm Controls and Recession Interaction  
Observations 70170 70170
This table examines whether firms that engage in high frequency clustering of layoff announcements also are the ones that are 
more likely to layoff in recessions. The unit of observation is at the firm level  tracked monthly between April 1995 and 
December 2010. In this table, a layoff constitutes a mass layoff as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics under its Mass 
Layoff Statistics Program (see section 4.2 for further discussion). The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which takes a 
value of one when a firm announces a layoff in a given month, and zero otherwise. In each regression specification the main 
explanatory variable is the interaction of the key variable with the recession indiciator. The recession indicator takes a value of 
one in months classified as recession months by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. The first key variable 
(specification (1)) is a follower indicator, which takes a value of one if in the past five years a given firm has announced a layoff 
in a 5-day window following a large firm layoff (including the day of the large layoff). Similarly, the counterfactual follower 
indicator (specification (2)) takes a value of one if in the past five years a given firm has announced a layoff in a 5-day window 
prior a large firm layoff excluding the day of the large layoff). All the specifications include month fixed effects, firm fixed 
effects, and firm level controls and the interaction of each of these controls with the recession indicator. The firm level 
controls include Earnings-Price ratio, Book-to-Market Ratio, Market Capitalization, Leverage Ratio, Years since IPO, which are 
all obtained from COMPUSTAT. Since the month fixed effects absorb all variation over time, the effect of a recession indicator 
is not separately identified in these specifications. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown underneath the coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
Dependent Variable Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator 
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the context of financial markets plays a significant role in determining the
layoff behavior of large firms.
8.1 Common Shocks
The first alternative explanation for the patterns in Sections 5 and 6
is rooted in common shocks. If an aggregate shock hits a large subset of
firms simultaneously, this will lead them to announce layoffs within a short
period of time. A simple model with such common shocks will generate
temporal clustering of layoff announcements, and also that of actual lay-
offs. A more sophisticated model of common shocks may generate excess
sensitivity of firms with certain characteristics to these common shocks. If
these firm characteristics are correlated with the structure of executive com-
pensation or CEO tenure, we would not only observe temporal clustering
of layoffs, but also that firms with greater equity-linked compensation or
short-tenured CEOs are more sensitive to the common shocks.
While common shocks are certainly part of the story, the results in Fig-
ure 1.5 provide suggestive evidence against the common shock theory at
a daily frequency. If either the crude or the more-sophisticated version of
the common shock theory were true, we should observe responses in layoff
announcements both before and after layoff announcements by large firms,
both in the aggregate and within industries. However, the results demon-
strate a stark asymmetry in the dynamic response of layoff announcements
of Fortune 500 firms. In the business days leading up to a large firm an-
nouncement, the response of layoff announcements of the other firms is flat
and close to zero. By contrast, it jumps up on the day of the large firm an-
nouncement, and gradually returns to zero in the next 4-5 business days.
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Additionally, in the results of Table 1.11 we find that firms that announce
layoffs within the five days following a large firm announcement are more
likely to have greater equity-linked compensation and short-tenured CEOs.
Conversely, no such association was found among the firms that lay off in
the five days prior to a large firm’s layoff announcement.
Over the longer horizons explored in our business cycle frequency data,
our matching estimator results (based on size and four-digit industry) sug-
gest a differential sensitivity of public firms’ layoff behavior in response to
recessions, compared to the behavior of matched private firms. Neither ver-
sion of the common shock theory offers a clear prediction on the differential
sensitivity of public and private firms, indicating that common shocks alone
cannot explain the full range of our results.
8.2 Compassionate CEOs
Another mechanism that may generate the observed layoff behavior is
that CEOs are compassionate and care about their labor force. This interpre-
tation is compatible with the analysis in our model, but shifts the context of
reputation from financial markets to the firm’s employees. The degree of
reputation concerns would therefore reflect factors such as altruistic mo-
tives or the CEO having strong ties to the labor force. Such motivations
may lead the CEO to be biased against engaging in layoffs, and delay their
layoffs until absolutely necessary. Consequently, CEOs with such charac-
teristics will appear to pursue a cyclical layoff policy, or announce layoff
announcements after other large firms have announced a layoff. Moreover,
it is quite reasonable to expect that theremay be strong correlations between
a CEO’s level of compassion for his employees, and his tenure and compen-
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sation structure.
Testing the general validity of this mechanism is difficult because the
level of compassion of a CEO may manifest itself in a number of different
ways. We propose the following narrow test to identify the strength of such
a mechanism in explaining our observed empirical patterns. If the CEO
has spent many years at the firm (greater than 10 or 15 years) before being
appointed its CEO (“home-grown CEOs”), then he is more likely to be com-
passionate. Conversely, CEOs that are externally-recruited or did not spend
many years at the firm before being appointed to head it are less likely to be
compassionate towards their labor force. We therefore evaluate the viabil-
ity of this mechanism by testing its ability to explain the pattern of strategic
firms having a greater sensitivity of layoff propensity to recessions.
We report the results of these tests in Table 1.14. The results suggest
that home-grown CEOs who have been with the firm for many years are
less likely to announce layoffs in general (although the point-estimates are
imprecisely estimated). However, we find no effect of being home-grown
on the cyclicality of layoff announcements. Therefore, we conclude that
though compassionate CEOsmay alter the firm’s baseline layoff propensity,
we find no evidence for this mechanism affecting layoff behavior differently
over the business cycle. Thus, we cannot appeal to this mechanism in ex-
plaining the cyclical layoff behavior of the strategic firms in our analysis.
8.3 Market Inattention
Another alternate mechanism that can lead to ‘leader-follower’ behav-
ior and potentially cyclical layoff policies is that firms are relying on market
inattention to hide behind bad news. There are two versions of this alter-
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Table 1.14: Compassionate CEOs and Layoff Announcements over the Business Cycle, 1970-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Firms
Only Firms with 
"home-grown" 
CEOs
All Firms
Only Firms with 
"home-grown" 
CEOs
Recession x Years at Firm before CEO > 5 years -0.0160 0.0058
(0.0372) (0.0435)
Years at Firm before CEO > 5 years -0.0011 -0.0194
(0.0554) (0.0588)
Recession x Years at Firm before CEO > 15 years -0.0129 0.0048
(0.0413) (0.0437)
Years at Firm before CEO > 15 years -0.1005* -0.1240**
(0.0530) (0.0573)
Mean 0.1438 0.1438 0.1438 0.1438
Standard Deviation .3509 .3509 .3509 .3509
Firm Fixed Effects    
Year Fixed Effects    
Firm Level Controls and Recession Interactions    
Observations 2295 1694 2295 1694
Layoff Indicator 
This table analyzes the impact of compassionate CEOs on layoff announcement propensity over the business cycle. The unit of 
observation is at the firm level tracked yearly between 1970 and 2010. The sample includes all contemporaneous constitutents of 
Fortune 500 that ever announced a layoff. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which takes a value of one when a firm 
announces a layoff in a given year, and zero otherwise. Our first measure of compassionate CEO is an indicator variable which 
takes a value of one, if the tenure of a given CEO at the firm before he was appointed CEO is greater than 5 years. This is used in 
specification (1) and (2). For specification (3) and (4) we change the cutoff from 5 years to greater than 15 years. In specifications 
(1) and (3) all firms in the sample are used for estimation, whereas in (2) and (4) we restrict the sample to firms that had no 
externally-appointed CEOs in the given year (i.e. only "home-grown CEOs). All the specifications include year-fixed effects, firm-
fixed effects, and firm-level controls and the interaction of each of these controls with the recession indicator. The firm level 
controls include Earnings-Price ratio, Book-to-Market Ratio, Market Capitalization, Leverage Ratio, Years since IPO, which are all 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. Note that since we include year-fixed effects, the reccesion indicator cannot be spearately identified 
in these regressions. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown underneath the 
coefficient estimates in all columns. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator Layoff Indicator 
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nate theory. The first relies on the market’s underreaction to information
caused by limited attention of market participants (Dellavigna and Pollet
(2009)). In this version, there are certain days, e.g. Fridays, on which the
market participants pay less attention to news, and therefore firms choose
to release negative information on such days so as to reduce the adverse
reputational effect. Thus, we would expect to observe firms clustering their
layoff announcements around certain dates, but this would not be driven
by interactions between firms. Rather, it would be the direct result of firms
responding to common external drivers of market inattention.
The second version of themarket inattention theory is that firms are fol-
lowing large firm layoff announcements because it allows their news article
to be pushed to the back pages of the newspapers (or analogously gain less
prominence in televisions news or other media). If market participants have
some information processing cost, they are less likely to chance upon this
negative news, allowing the firms to release negative news in a relatively
‘concealed’ manner.
The high-frequency event study results presented in Figure 1.5 already
controls for day of week and calendar month to control for predictable mar-
ket inattention. In addition, the regressions also control for whether the
daily observation occurs within a week (before or after) the firm’s sched-
uled earnings announcement date. Correspondingly, the leader-follower
behavior observed in Panels A and C of Figure 1.5 stems from mechanisms
other than those suggested by the first version the market inattention the-
ory. As for the second version, we refer to the results of Panel D. If firms
were trying to hide behind other negative news, we should find the same
mechanism to hold after days of major negative non-economic news (e.g.
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Hurricane Katrina). The results presented in the last panel, however, illus-
trate that there is no systematic change in layoff announcement behavior
either before or after such major negative non-economic news. In addition,
we separately conduct an analysis of the page of the Wall Street Journal
on which each layoff announcement was originally reported. We find no
significant difference in the placement of layoff announcement coverage on
days of layoff announcements by large firms, when compared to other days.
While it is possible that market inattention may play a role in determining
the timing of layoff announcements, we are unable to find any evidence for
this in our analysis, and cannot appeal to this mechanism to explain our
results at either the daily or the business cycle frequency.
8.4 Learning from Other Managers
A final alternate mechanism that may lead to ‘leader-follower’ behav-
ior is that managers are uncertain about the state of the aggregate economy,
and they are waiting to receive a signal from the actions of the largest firms
in the economy. By virtue of being larger, the managers of the largest firms
may have better information about the aggregate state. Consequently, man-
agers learn about the aggregate state from the performance of large firms,
and respond to layoff announcements by large firms with layoffs of their
own. This mechanism would also predict that short-tenured CEOs would
bemore likely to react to the announcements of large firms, as they are more
likely to be inexperienced, and thus more reliant on learning from other
managers.
Despite its intuitive appeal, this mechanism cannot account for the dif-
ferences we observe between public and private firm layoff behavior. If
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the ‘learning-from-others’ theory is the primary driver of layoff policy, we
should observe little difference between public and private firms, particu-
larly whenmatching on size and industry. Wewould expect all firms within
an industry to face similar market conditions regardless of their ownership
status, so the optimal response to learning about changes in market condi-
tions should be identical across the two groups.
Moreover, the stock penalty results we find in Table 1.9 fit squarely with
ourmodel, but cannot be explained by this alternate mechanism. In particu-
lar, the reputation-based mechanism has strong predictions about the cross-
effects of one firm’s action on the reputation penalty of other firms in the
same industry (e.g. mitigated reputation penalty for layoffs followed by a
large-firm layoff). Our empirical findings confirm these predictions. By con-
trast, the learning-based mechanism has limited predictions with respect to
such cross-effects. In particular, mechanisms based on learning should be
largely predictable, and therefore subsequent layoffs should have no ob-
servable (abnormal) cross effects on stock prices. In sum, to explain the
full range of our empirical findings we need to appeal to reputation-based
mechanism such as the one described by our model.
8.5 Alternate Mechanisms: Taking Stock
The key conclusion of this section is not that the alternate mechanisms
discussed here play no role in the high-frequency clustering of layoff an-
nouncements or the cyclicality of layoffs at the business-cycle level. Instead,
we conclude that the main results of this paper cannot be fully explained
solely by these alternate mechanisms. Instead, we argue that reputation
concerns in the context of financial markets represent the most salient ex-
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planation for the patterns we observe.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we document that there is excess clustering of layoff an-
nouncements at weekly and daily horizons. We interpret this clustering of
announcements within a theoretical framework in which managers delay
layoffs during good economic states to avoid damaging the market’s per-
ception of their ability. We test the implications of our model at both daily
and business-cycle frequencies using two novel datasets. Using a pairwise
matching estimator based on size and three-digit industry, we find that the
layoff propensity of public firms is twice as sensitive to recessions, relative
to their matched private counterparts.
In a range of robustness tests we show that these differences are not be-
ing driven by public-private differences in lifecycle effects, leverage, work-
force size, or on our matching criteria. Within our sample of public firms,
we find that firms predicted to be more strategic by our theoretical analysis,
are also the ones more likely to engage in mass layoffs during recessions.
Our results therefore suggest that reputation management is an important
driver of the observed differences in the cyclicality of layoffs between public
and private firms.
At the daily frequency, we also find significant support for our model.
We show that a large firm announcement (i.e. the 20 largest firms based on
past year’s revenue) is associated with future layoffs by other Fortune 500
firms, but not with past layoffs. We find that this effect is twice as strong
if the large firm is in the same industry as the follower firm. For our sam-
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ple of privately held firms we find no such clustering behavior either before
or after the large-firm layoff announcement. Moreover, when we compare
the characteristics of firms that lay off in the five days after a large-firm
announcement (“followers”) to those that lay off in the five days before
a large-firm announcement (“counterfactual followers”), we find that fol-
lower firms have a greater likelihood to be managed by short-tenured CEOs
(i.e. with a tenure between 0 and 4 years) and to place greater reliance on
equity-linked compensation for their CEOs. Consistent with our theoretical
framework, these results suggest that reputation management is an impor-
tant driver for the timing of layoff announcements at high frequencies.
Lastly, we establish a connection between high-frequency clustering
and layoff behavior at business cycle frequencies. We find that the fol-
lower firms are roughly three percentage points more likely to engage in
a mass layoff during a recession month, compared to counterfactual fol-
lower firms. This link between the daily frequency reputation management
and the cyclicality of layoffs over the business cycle provides significant
evidence that reputation concerns are an important driver of firms’ layoff
policies. Taken together, the findings of this paper suggest that managerial
behavior not only has costs for the individual firm, but also has significant
aggregate implications at the business cycle frequencies.
Taken together, the findings of this paper indicate that reputation man-
agement in financial marketsmay strongly impact the real decisions of firms,
particularly with respect to labor decisions. At the firm level, this mecha-
nism can lead to significant deviations from optimal policy by delaying the
termination of unprofitable projects. In addition, this mechanism also im-
pacts industry dynamics by influencing the timing of layoffs by other firms
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in the same industry.
This paper suggests that understanding how distortions in manager-
ial behavior impact industry dynamics can lead to a number of implica-
tions and directions for future research. First, to understand industry dy-
namics one should place added emphasis on shocks to large players such
as Walmart, Ford, or Nokia. For example, in our analysis, layoffs by one
of these firms may trigger clustering of layoffs by other firms in the econ-
omy. Second, this paper highlights a novel mechanism through which cor-
porate governance can not only influence the financial decisions, but also
the real decisions of firms and industries. Third, our research suggests that
the timing of other forms of corporate disclosure, such as dividend cuts and
writedowns, may also be subject to clustering, and have implications for de-
termining firm value and performance. Future papers can take advantage
of the empirical methodologies used here to understand the mechanisms
driving disclosure dynamics.
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Chapter 2: Uncertainty and the
Special Role of Safe Assets
1 Introduction
Money serves three functions: medium of exchange, unit of account,
and safe store of value. This paper is exclusively concerned with the last
function: safety. The central premise of the paper is that the quantity of
money-like instruments that provide safe storage between periods, cru-
cially determines households’ appetite for holding risky assets. That is, the
risk premium demanded for holding risky assets will be lower when there
is a greater quantity of money-like claims in households’ portfolio. Using
this novel connection between money and risk premia, I characterize how
central bank policy affects the real economy. The key insight is that by reg-
ulating the quantity of federally-insured deposits available to households,
central banks directly control the quantity of safe assets available to house-
holds. In such an economy, the role of central banking authority becomes
stronger when private agents’ (such as banks) ability to produce safe assets
weakens. This weakening may stem from agency frictions, e.g. incentives
for banks to cheat by selling more safe securities than they actually own. I
present a model that highlights why the banking sector fails to self-regulate
itself and consequently it is socially optimal for the central bank authority to
play an active role in regulating the banking sector. In particular, I show that
these interventions will mirror standard policy tools in modern economies:
deposit-insurance and reserve requirements. Using these insights, this pa-
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per attempts to provide a theory of central banking in a flexible-price world
with a strong emphasis on the mechanics and regulation of safe asset cre-
ation (by traditional banks and shadow banks).
The next few paragraphs discuss the mechanics of my model to facili-
tate understanding of the novel features of the model. The model in the pa-
per presents an economy in which there are two types of agents, risk-averse
households and risk-neutral banks. These agents have access to projects
(or assets) with returns that can be decomposed into a safe and a risky
component. Since the households are risk-averse they will prefer to hold
safer assets instead of the original projects which have a risky component.
The risk-neutral banks recognize this shortage of safety, and sells money-
like safe instruments to households to offer them insurance. How can the
banking sector create these safe instruments? The simple answer is capital
structure. The banks will find it optimal to buy the original projects (as-
sets side) and then tranche and sell securities that are backed by the safe
component of these assets (liability side). This tranching technology essen-
tially enables the banks to create ‘inside money’ and increase the degree of
risk-sharing in the economy. The banks benefit from selling these safe secu-
rities, since in turn they can create more assets with the proceeds of the sale
of the tranched safe security. This ‘safety transformation’ role of banking
effectively makes the household more insured, thereby lowering the risk
premium households demand for holding risky securities.
In such a setup, the fundamental friction I introduce is the inclination
of banks to create too many safe securities. This effectively captures one of
the most perennial problems of the banking sector. Historically, the unreg-
ulated banking sector has had strong incentives to create too many demand
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deposits that are riskless (nominally), than the safety of their assets per-
mit. Such incentives were forcefully highlighted during the financial crisis
of 2007-09 in which the shadow banking sector bundled together substan-
tial tail risk in their super-senior AAA-rated securities. This friction lowers
the degree of risk-sharing in the economy relative to the optimal frictionless
benchmark, leading to an increase in risk premium.
In presence of such frictions, I show that the optimal policy is for the
central bank authority to offer deposit insurance to households for the safe
securities issued by the banks. In addition, to ensure that this deposit in-
surance program is self-financing (i.e. to limit the burden to the banking
sector), the central bank must regulate the quantity of safe securities banks
are permitted to issue. This policy ensures that the central bank will be able
to tax the banks to finance the deposit insurance in all states of the world.
Thus, simultaneously offering deposit insurance, and limiting the quantity
of safe securities banks issue enables the central bank to restore the opti-
mal frictionless benchmark. The immediate question is what instruments
do central banks have to regulate the quantity of safe securities? I show that
either of the two following instruments can be used to achieve this: 1) a per-
mit system in the form of reserve requirements, or 2) a limit on the degree
of leverage banks undertake.
This gives us a theory of how central banks in practice may influence
risk premia. When the central bank drains reserves from the system, they
force intermediation activity to take place outside the regulated banking
sector. Correspondingly, the shadow banking sector expands. The shadow
banks, however, are unregulated, and therefore are unable to commit to sell
completely safe securities without bundling together unsafe tranches. This
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effectively leads to a rise in the risk premia as the degree of risk-sharing in
the economy falls. Thus, the main idea here is that private money creation
by unregulated financial players is inefficient, and by draining reserves the
central bank redirects households to these unregulated players, away from
the safety provided by federally-backed demand deposits.
The logic of safe assets also highlights that inflation uncertainty can
be very costly from a welfare perspective. When there is substantial infla-
tion uncertainty, nominal debt instruments that were otherwise safe (e.g.
money) cease to be safe. This in turn can increase risk premia in the econ-
omy. This may potentially explain the large bond risk premia observed dur-
ing episodes of high inflation uncertainty. Thus, if the active management
of reserve requirements leads to a rise in inflation uncertainty, the central
bank authority may face a tradeoff between keeping inflation uncertainty
low, or having a larger quantity of safe securities be created through the
regulated banking sector.
In the last theory section, I discuss how counterparty risk can lead to
a shutdown of the shadow banking sector, and how the central bank can
restore optimal allocations by buying up risky assets in exchange for safe
claims. Using their power of taxation, the central bank can credibly commit
to pay back the safe claims. I discuss how the effect of such a policy depends
crucially on who bears the tax burden. If the risk-averse households are
likely to bear the tax burden, then such a policy is unlikely to reduce risk
premia in the economy. On the other hand, if the burden of taxation is
levied on risk-neutral shadow bankers, then this can bring about a Pareto
improvement, thereby reducing risk premia.
I conclude the paper by presenting some measurements of quantity of
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safe assets created by the banking sector that are held outside the banking
sector. One such measure is M3, which is one of the broadest measures of
the stock of money in circulation. Since the Federal Reserve stopped pub-
lishing this measure in 2006, I reconstruct this measure for the period 2006-
10. Incidentally, just after the Fed stopped publishing this measure, there
was an unprecedented growth in M3 between 2006-08. Most of this growth
can be attributed to the money market mutual funds that were central to
financing the operations of the shadow banks by purchasing asset-backed
commercial paper and entering repurchase agreements. Analogously, there
was a sharp contraction in this broad-moneymeasure in 2008 after Lehman’s
failure, which has continued into 2010. The magnitude of this contraction
(roughly 15% between 2008 and 2010) mirrors the contraction of measures
of broadly-definedmoney after the Great Depression (roughly 18% between
1929 and 1932), which continued into the mid 1930s. I also present other
evidence on the operation of the traditional and shadow banking sectors
during the recent financial crisis. The central message of this evidence sec-
tion will be that to understand central banking in the modern economy, it
is essential to take a broad view of money, which includes private money
creation by the shadow banking sector.
2 Safe Assets in General Equilibrium
2.1 Setup
2.1.1 Preliminaries. — Consider an economy with two periods and a sin-
gle consumption good. Agents have endowments in period 1 but they only
consume in period 2. There is a risky asset which is supplied elastically in
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period 1, and which pays off in period 2. In particular, one unit of the asset
pays
s¯+ v,
where s¯ 2 (0, 1) is constant (the safe portion) and v is a nonnegative random
variable with expected value equal to 1   s¯ (so that the asset’s expected
payoff is equal to 1, which is a normalization that simplifies the analysis).
Here s¯ captures the fraction of the asset payoff that is safe and v captures the
uncertainty in the asset payoff. Note that so far this is a real economy, and
therefore considerations such as inflation uncertainty that may make s¯ also
risky are suppressed. Such cases will be discussed in subsequent sections.
There are two types of agents. There is a measure one of households
who start with wH units of endowment in period 1, and who are risk averse
with utility function u (), which is continuous, strictly-concave andmonotone.
There is also a measure one of banks who start with wB units of endowment
in period 1, and who are risk neutral. The banks are in perfect competi-
tion and provide insurance to households. They can potentially invest in
the risky asset (asset-side) and issue a relatively less risky security (liability-
side), which they then sell to the households.
Here it is worth being clear about the interpretation of banks in the
model. In the real world, banks do not directly invest in physical projects
but rather lend to firms who in turn do the project selection. Abstracting
away from this extra layer is equivalent to assuming that there is no con-
tracting friction between firms and banks. The defining feature of banks
here is that they engage in tranching (i.e. issuance of structured senior secu-
rities) similar to the models in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), DeMarzo and
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Duffie (1999), DeMarzo (2005)31. Also, here the assumption of risk neutral-
ity on the part of banks (instead of relatively low risk aversion) is made for
convenience. You may interpret this difference in risk preferences arising
from a case in which the owners of banks are rich individuals, whereas the
household sector is comprised of relatively poorer households.
Formally, let T denote the set of feasible contracts (tranches) which the
bank might issue against one unit of investment (which includes also the
original asset, s¯+ v). More specifically, each t˜ 2 T is a random variable that
describes the tranche’s payoff in each state of the world. Many of the secu-
rities in T will not be issued in equilibrium (in fact only one will be issued).
Nonetheless, each t˜ 2 T has an equilibrium price, which we denote by p (t˜).
Here it is implicitly assumed that if households want to buy the original as-
set it must go through the banking sector. Also, the original risky asset will
serve as our reference security, and the price of all other securities will be
expressed relative to the price of this security, p (s¯+ v). For all subsequent
exposition, note that the use of tilde is merely to represent choice variables
in the respective agent’s maximization problem. Correspondingly, when-
ever the choice variable is presented without tilde, it represents the agent’s
optimal choice.
2.1.2 Households. — Let z (t˜) denote the households’ holding of tranche t˜
in period 1, and let cH denote the random variable that represents the house-
holds’ consumption in period 2. In equilibrium, households will only hold a
single tranche (as noted above). However, households’ portfolio choice en-
ables us to price the securities in T. In particular, the households’ problem
31For realism I could easily introduce the role of pooling risk (i.e. diversification) in
addition to tranching, by introducing idiosyncratic shocks. But since it does not add much
to the analysis I have suppressed this feature.
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is given by:
max
fz(t˜)gt˜2fTg,cH
E
h
u

cH
i
(16)
s.t. cH =
Z
t˜2T
z (t˜) t˜dt˜Z
t˜
z (t˜) p (t˜) dt˜  wH.
Using the households’ first order condition, the price p (t˜) of a tranche
t˜must satisfy
p (t˜)
p (s¯+ v)
 E

u0
 
cH

t˜

E [u0 (cH) (s¯+ v)]
(17)
This condition will hold with equality if there is an interior solution,
i.e. households hold positive quantities of (s¯+ v). Note also that, when the
prices satisfy the first order condition (17), then an allocation fz (t˜)gt˜2fTg is
optimal for the households iff it satisfies the households’ budget constraint
in (16) with equality.
2.1.3 Banks.— In principle, the bank could issue different types of tranches
for different units of investment. However, in our setting, it is sufficient to
focus attention on allocations in which banks issue the same tranche, t, for
each unit of investment32. Denoting the banks’ investment level by k, its
problem can be written as:
max
k˜,t˜2T
E

k˜ (s¯+ v  t˜) (18)
s.t. k˜  wB + k˜p (t˜) .
32This is because there is no heterogeneity among the households, and thus they choose
identical tranches. Allowing for heterogeneity in risk aversion will introduce the possibil-
ity of banks issuing multiple tranches, but such considerations are not addressed here.
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That is, banks choose their investment level, k, and the tranche, t, to maxi-
mize expected utility (taking equilibrium prices as given).
For the market for tranches to clear, consumers must hold the tranche
that is offered by banks. That is, they should choose z (t) = k and z (t˜) = 0
for any t˜ 6= t. Note, given that prices satisfy the inequality in (17), this
allocation is optimal for consumers if it satisfies their budget constraint with
equality, which can be written as:
kp (t) = wH. (19)
We are now in a position to define the equilibrium.
2.1.4 Equilibrium. —
DEFINITION 1 An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of allocations, 
t, k, cH, cB

, and prices fp (t˜)gt˜2T such that:
1. Consumers choose their allocation optimally, that is, prices satisfy (17) and
the budget constraint (19) holds.
2. Banks optimize, that is, (k, t) solves problem (18).
2.2 Frictionless Benchmark
First suppose there are no contracting or agency frictions and banks can
issue any security subject to feasibility constraints. In this case, the set T can
be represented as follows (because all possible securities can be reproduced
using such tranches):
T = fs˜+ η˜v j s˜ 2 [0, s¯] and η˜ 2 [0, 1]g .
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Hence, banks’ choice of contract is reduced to the choice of twoweights, s˜, η˜.
To see this note that this linear contract spans the contingent-state space,
since it allows the banks to offer a contract contingent on each realization of
v (and s¯ which is a constant).
Under certain parametric conditions (which will be specified below),
we conjecture an equilibrium in which banks choose
s 2 [0, s¯] and η = 0, (20)
That is, banks choose t = s, where s 2 [0, s¯] will be determined below.
In this conjectured competitive equilibrium, the zero profit condition will
apply, and thus for any security t we must have
p (t) = E [t] = s
(where we have used the assumption that the expected value of the
risky asset is 1).
Plugging these prices back into the inequality on prices imposed by
household’s first order condition (17) we know that these prices satisfy the
household’s problem. Hence, the conjecture in (20) is optimal for house-
holds.
Plugging in these prices, banks’ problem (18) can be written as:
max
k,s˜,η˜
E [k (s¯  s˜+ (1  η˜) v)]
s.t. k  wB + kE [s˜+ η˜v] .
Note that in equilibrium the banks do not profit from intermediation.
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Therefore, the banks are indifferent between any s˜, η˜ 2 [0, s¯] [0, 1].
Hence, the conjecture in (20) is also optimal for banks. In the conjec-
tured allocation, banks’ investment is then given by:
k =
wB
1  p (s) .
The only remaining condition to check is the households’ budget constraint
(16), which can be written as:
wB
1  p (s) p (s) = w
H.
By rewriting we get p (s) = wH/
 
wB + wH

. Due to the zero profit
condition, we have p (s) = s, and substituting this gives us a unique solu-
tion for s :
s =
wH
wB + wH
The conjectured allocation is indeed an equilibrium if and only if
s¯  s (21)
That is, the conjectured equilibrium exists if the security has a sufficiently
large safe portion and/or if the banks’ endowment (capital) is sufficiently
large. To recap, the results for the frictionless benchmark are summarized
in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 Under the parametric condition (21), there is an equilib-
rium in which banks invest in the original asset and issue a safe security, s 2 [0, s¯].
The households are fully insured since they buy money-like debt claims from the
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banks, and the banks retain the risky tranches on their balance sheet. The equilib-
rium allocations are given by
s =
wH
wB + wH
k = wB + wH
cB =

wB + wH

[s¯+ v]  wH
cH = wH
2.3 Equilibrium with Agency Frictions and Complexity
Let us next introduce the key friction and analyze the resulting equi-
librium, with two assumptions. Let λ be a positive but small constant (i.e.
closer to zero than to one).
Assumption (A1). For each s˜ 2 [0, s¯], households are unable to tell the
difference between the security s˜ and the security (1  λ) s˜+ λs˜ vE[v] .
Note that the corresponding security has two features: (i) it has the
same expected payoff as the original security s˜, (ii) it is riskier than the orig-
inal security s˜. In words, this assumption posits that, households are unable
to tell the difference between a completely safe security and a security that
is slightly risky. This can be motivated by complexity of the tranched secu-
rities. We also make the following assumption, which generates an agency
friction in our setup.
Assumption (A2). After contracting with households, a bank that chooses
t = s˜ 2 [0, s¯] is unable to commit to not replace the security.
Denote bank’s profits as ω. Then from the bank’s first order condition,
taking prices as given we get ∂E [ω] /∂s  0, as long as p (1)  1. This
condition always holds since households are risk-averse and are willing to
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pay a premium for safe securities. Thus, the banks always have incentive to
replace the security (because the replaced security allows the banks to sell
more safe securities). Off the equilibrium path, when households don’t take
this replacement into account, this allows banks to create λs˜ units of addi-
tional securities that have face value s˜, but is effectively backed by payoff
(1  λ) s˜+ λs˜ vE[v] . Hence, the key implication of these two assumptions is
that banks have incentives to create too many safe claims, which effectively
reduces the safety of each claim they issue.
However, households will take this into account when they price the
security. Hence, these assumptions effectively reduces the set of securities
to:
T f =

(1  λ) s˜+ η˜v j s˜ 2 [0, s¯] and η˜  λs˜
1  s¯

.
After replacing T with T f , the rest of the equilibrium definition is iden-
tical. We next conjecture an equilibrium inwhich the replacement constraint
binds, that is, banks choose:
t = (1  λ) s+ λs
1  s¯ v =

(1  λ) + λ
1  s¯ v

s (22)
Note that the expected payoff of this security is s, since E [v] = 1   s¯.
But note also that this security is risky, unlike the frictionless benchmark.
Hence, households’ consumption is given by, cH = kt, which is riskier than
the frictionless benchmark. This implies that the risk premium in this econ-
omy may be greater than the frictionless benchmark since expected mar-
ginal utility will be higher.
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Once again, due to the zero profit condition we have
p (t) = E [t] = s
(where we have used the assumption that the expected value of the risky
asset is 1). These prices satisfy the inequality (17) and therefore, the conjec-
ture (22) is optimal for households.
Plugging in these prices, banks’ problem (18) can be written as:
max
k,s˜,η˜
E [k (s¯  s˜+ (1  η˜) v)]
s.t. k  wB + kE [s˜+ η˜v] .
Note that the banks are again indifferent between any s˜, η˜ 2 [0, s¯] 
[0, 1]. This is because in equilibrium the banks do not profit from inter-
mediation. Hence, the conjecture in (22) is also optimal for banks. In the
conjectured allocation, banks’ investment is then given by:
k =
wB
1  p (t) .
The only remaining condition to check is the households’ budget con-
straint (16), which can be written as:
wB
1  p (t) p (t) = w
H.
By rewriting we get p (t) = wH/
 
wB + wH

. Using the zero profit
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condition this solves uniquely for s:
s =
wH
wB + wH
Again the conjectured allocation is indeed an equilibrium if and only if
s¯  s (23)
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2 Under the parametric condition (21), and assumptions
(A1) , (A2), there is an equilibrium in which banks invest in the original asset
and issue a quasi-safe security, s+ ηv. The households are not fully insured since
the banks are unable to commit to not replace the safe security. The equilibrium
allocations are given by
s =
wH
wB + wH
k = wB + wH
t = (1  λ) s+ λs
1  s¯ v
cB =

wB + wH

[s¯+ v]  wH

(1  λ)  1+ (λ) v
E [v]

cH = wH

(1  λ)  1+ (λ) v
E [v]

The key implication of this proposition is that when all banks issue
quasi-safe securities (instead of fully safe), households are less insured and
consequently the risk premium in the economy goes up.
To gainmore intuition, supposewe start from the allocation of the econ-
omy with frictions and suppose we remove the frictions. Then, a bank at
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the margin has an incentive to offer a safer security (because consumers
are willing to pay an even greater premium for that security). Hence, the
above equilibrium unravels. But when all banks do that, consumers become
more insured and the risk premium diminishes. In the resulting (friction-
less) equilibrium, the consumers are better off.
The main message of this analysis is that agency frictions may hin-
der the degree of risk-sharing between risk-neutral banks and risk-averse
households. In particular, the banks will always have incentives to bundle
together some risk with the safe securities, which in equilibrium will make
households less insured. This agency friction that prevents optimal risk
sharing creates room for regulation to restore the optimal allocation. The
next two sections discuss the role of regulation.
2.4 Why Self Regulation Fails?
This subsection discusses why the banking sector as a whole may not
want to regulate themselves, even if they had access to a technology that
will completely eradicate the incentive to cheat among all banks. To see
this we need to modify our setup in a way that allows banks to make some
profits so as to cleanly understand their incentives to self-regulate. The way
I do this here is to introduce an interim period of trading. The characteristics
of the interim period are summarized in the following definition.
DEFINITION 2 The interim period has the following properties:
1. It occurs after period 1 contracts are written, but before period 2 uncertainty
is realized.
2. With probability α, households receive an endowment of wI units of original
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assets that pay (s¯+ v) in period 2.
3. Banks can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell tranches to households in
exchange for the endowments households receive.
The rationale behind the third property is that the quantities of securi-
ties cannot be adjusted in the interim period (since they are fixed in period
1). This gives the banks a temporary market power since supply is inelastic
in the interim period. In addition I impose the following assumption, which
makes the analysis simpler.
Assumption (A3). Households cannot write period 1 contracts contingent
on endowments that they may receive in the interim period.
This assumption leaves household’s actions in period 1 unaltered. To
see this note that households have no incentives to hoard resources to trade
in the interim period, since they can always get a better deal in period 1
when the banking sector is competitive. Also due to assumption (A3), they
cannot buy additional securities based on the interim period endowments.
This gives us the following lemma, which simplifies exposition.
LEMMA 1 Under the definition of interim period, assumption (A3), and when
wI is sufficiently small :
1. Households’ period 1 problem and the interim problem are independent.
2. Banks’ period 1 problem and the interim problem are independent.
PROOF. (see Appendix).
Note here the assumption wI being sufficiently small is needed to en-
sure that the banks have sufficiently large quantity of safe assets on their
98
balance sheet to sell to households in the interim period. It will turn out
that the parametric restriction on wI will be wI 
 
wB + wH

s¯  wH.
Since the banks are able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, they will find
it optimal to set prices such that households are indifferent between trading
with them (which will allow the banks to extract all the surplus from the
trade). This implies that the prices in the interim period will be pinned
down by the household’s first order condition. Let’s denote the interim
prices as pI (t˜I) for tranche t˜I .
2.4.1 Households. — Based on the lemma, we can write household’s in-
terim period problem as:
max
fz(t˜I)gt˜ I2fTg,cH
E
h
u

cH
i
s.t. cH = kt+
Z
t˜2T
z (t˜I) t˜Idt˜Z
t˜
z (t˜I) pI (t˜I) dt˜I  wIpI (s¯+ v)
Under the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it contracts, the price pI (t˜I)
of a tranche t˜I must satisfy
pI (t˜I)
pI (s¯+ v)
=
E

u0
 
cH

t˜I

E [u0 (cH) (s¯+ v)]
(24)
2.4.2 Banks. — The banks take these prices as given, and decide which
securities to trade in exchange for the wI units of assets, each of which will
pay s¯+ v in period 2. The banks’ problem is then simply given by:
max
t˜I2T
E

(s¯+ v)  pI (s¯+ v)
pI (t˜)
t˜I

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That is, banks choose a tranche tI that they exchange with households
for one unit of the original asset that pays (s¯+ v).
For the market of tranches to clear, consumers must hold the tranche
that is offered by banks. That is, they should choose z (tI) pI (tI) = wIpI (s¯+ v),
and z (t˜I) = 0 for any t˜I 6= tI . Note that given the prices satisfy household’s
first order condition, this allocation is optimal for consumers if it satisfies
their budget constraint with equality.
2.4.3 Solution. — Since the prices are pinned down by household’s prob-
lem (due to the take-it-or-leave-it offer), households are indifferent between
any tranche t˜I . Therefore, the optimal tranche is pinned down by banks’
first order condition taking household’s problem as given. Choosing t˜I is
equivalent to choosing (s˜I , η˜ I). The first order condition, with respect to η˜,
at η˜ = 0, is negative:
∂E [(s¯+ v)  fpI (s¯+ v) /pI (t˜I)g t˜I ]
∂η˜

η˜=0
 0
Therefore, the optimal tranche is t˜I = sI , sI 2 [0, s¯].
In equilibrium the budget constraint of households hold with equality,
which pins down total resources transferred from banks to households in
period 2, in exchange for wI units of the original asset:
sI z (sI) = wI
pI (s¯+ v)
pI (1)
Therefore, the solution to this problem is that households give up their
endowment that pays off wI (s¯+ v) units in period 2, in exchange for secu-
rities that pays off wIpI (s¯+ v) /pI (1) units in period 2.
2.4.4 Frictionless Case. — In the frictionless benchmark, the households
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are perfectly insured, and therefore their first order condition (24) gives
us that the relative prices pI (s¯+ v) /pI (1) = 1. Therefore total resources
households receive from trading with banks in the interim period is:
sIz (sI) = wI
This indeed is an equilibrium as long as the banks have enough safe re-
sources to sell to households in the interim period: wI 
 
wB + wH

(s¯  s).
Replacing s, we get
wI 

wB + wH

s¯  wH
2.4.5 Casewith Frictions.— In the casewith frictions as specified in (A1),(A2),
the relative prices pI (s¯+ v) /pI (1) < 1. This is because household con-
sumption is risky, and therefore they are willing to pay a premium to get
additional riskless securities in the interim period. This implies that the to-
tal resources households receive is less than wI , i.e. less than the frictionless
benchmark:
sIz (sI) < wI
Equivalently, the banks get greater profits in the case of frictions than no
frictions. This implies that the banking sector as a whole will be unwilling
to regulate themselves in order to eliminate the frictions. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
PROPOSITION 3 Under the conditions given in lemma 1, and in presence of
frictions given in A1-A2:
1. An individual bank has incentives to eliminate the agency problem (A2) in
period 1.
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2. The banking sector as a whole has no such incentives to eliminate the agency
problem (A2) in period 1.
The main message of this proposition is that the banking sector as a
whole is more profitable due to the agency frictions. This is because the
agency friction acts as a coordination device to sell less insurance to house-
holds, which in turn makes the premium for safe assets higher in the in-
terim period. This is somewhat counter-intuitive since agency frictions usu-
ally makes the agent worse-off, but here due to the general equilibrium ef-
fect arising from risk-sharing we get the opposite result. Since the bank-
ing sector as a whole does not have incentives to collectively create a self-
regulation body, this creates room for public regulation of the banking sec-
tor, which I turn to next.
2.5 Central Bank Policy
2.5.1 Implementing the frictionless benchmark.— The results of the friction-
based model showed that banks have incentives to bundle together risk
with safe securities, which renders them quasi-safe. This effectively is a
market failure. This section shows how the central banking authority can
regulate the banking sector to restore the frictionless benchmark. The ad-
vantage they will have over the private agents is that they enjoy the power
of taxation, which gives them a broader set of instruments. It will be shown
that the central bank can implement the frictionless benchmark with two
instruments: deposit insurance and a constraint on bank leverage. The key
insights of this section will be close to the insights presented in Stein (2010).
The role of deposit insurance provided to households will be to ensure
that households have access to a completely safe security. Recall that this
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safe security belongs to the set T, but does not belong to the restricted set
with agency frictions, T f . In this case, even when banks have incentives
to replace a fraction of the safe security with risky tranches, the backing
of the central bank will ensure that the households effectively get a safe
security. The obvious question is how will the central bank finance this
deposit insurance?
In principle, to restore the frictionless benchmark we want the banks to
bear the burden of cheating so as to leave household’s consumption unaf-
fected. More specifically, since the resources that are required to finance the
deposit insurance will be a random variable, it will not be optimal for the
risk-averse households to bear the burden of financing this. If the house-
holds were to be taxed to finance the deposit insurance, it would make their
consumption riskier, thereby moving us away from the frictionless bench-
mark.
Consequently, the tax burden will be optimally levied on the banks.
When banks have promised s to households, then in the worst case scenario
(i.e. when v = 0) they have only (1  λ) s units to give the households, and
the central bank has to pay λs to meet the deposit insurance claim. That is,
the maximum payout of the deposit insurance is λs units. To make this a
self-financing program, the central bank should be able to tax the banks λs
ex-post (in period 2 after the realization of uncertainty). Consequently, the
central bank must ensure that the banks must hold at least λs units of the
safe tranche ex-ante (in period 1). This gives us the following restriction on
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s:
s¯  s  λs
or s  s¯
1+ λ
Therefore, when the central bank can limit the quantity of safe securi-
ties the banks can issue, they will have no incentive to replace the security,
since they the central bank will be able to tax them in all states of the world
to recover the replacement. The key principle here is that the central bank
must constrain the banks from issuing more safe securities than the safe
assets they have on their books. Recall that in the frictionless benchmark
s = wH/
 
wB + wH

. Plugging this into the above inequality we find that
the frictionless benchmark will be restored if
wH
wB + wH
 s¯
1+ λ
(25)
i.e., if the constraint needed to be imposed by the central bank is not
too restrictive. This gives us the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4 When (25) holds, the central banking authority can restore
the frictionless benchmark by using two tools:
1. Offer deposit insurance to households against all safe tranches t = s˜ 2 [0, s¯]
issued by the banks.
2. Constrain bank leverage such that the set of tranches the banks can issue is
restricted to TC =

s˜+ η˜v j s˜ 2 0, s¯1+λ and η˜ 2 [0, 1]	.
This implementation of central bank authority to make the deposit-
insurance program self-financing may look like a capital adequacy ratio (or
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a leverage ratio), which regulatory authorities often impose on commercial
banks. The central bank can impose this by essentially imposing a tax τ (s)
on every unit of investment made by the banks such that
τ (s) =
8><>: 0 if s 
s¯
1+λ
∞ if s > s¯1+λ
Alternatively, the central bank can implement the same allocation us-
ing permits to issue safe securities. The real-world analogue of these per-
mits are reserves (that satisfy reserve requirements). The Federal Reserve’s
actively manages the creation of safe securities by participating in the Fed
Funds market by draining and creating reserves. At a 10% reserve ratio,
each permit (reserve) effectively allows the banks to create 10 units of safe
assets, and therefore the central bank can issue (1/10) s¯1+λ permits to im-
plement the self-financing deposit-insurance program that mimics the fric-
tionless benchmark.
This discussion highlights an important role of the central bank. The
central bank policymatters in the economy because it has a special monopoly
power: it controls the quantity of safe (deposit-insured) securities the bank-
ing sector can create. Consequently, when the central bank creates addi-
tional reserves, it permits the banking sector to create more safe assets,
thereby lowering risk premia in the economy.
2.5.2 Limits of Central Bank Authority. — What if the parameters of the
model are such that the inequality (25) does not hold? In this case, the
only way the central bank can make the deposit-insurance program self-
financing (i.e. not tax the households) is by constraining the safe security is-
suance to be at a lower level than in the frictionless benchmark. In this case
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the central bank cannot restore the frictionless benchmark (first best) using
the instruments discussed above. If the central bank allows the banks to cre-
ate as many safe securities as they want and it provides deposit insurance
on all these securities, then there exist states in which it has to tax the house-
hold to finance the deposit-insurance program. In particular, the household
will have to pay a tax in period 2 of the size V = max f0, k [(s¯+ v)  t]g, or
plugging in the appropriate values:
V = max

0, (s¯+ v)

wH + wB

 

(1  λ)  1+ (λ) v
E [v]

wH

(26)
Note that this tax is a random variable, and will effectively increase the
variance of household consumption. In fact, when the inequality (25) does
not hold, any increase in the permits issued by the central bank will have
no effect on risk premium. This is because the central banks will be taxing
households to pay households, so the net effect is a wash.
In practice, how might the government levy this tax on households to
raise the additional financing it needs for the deposit insurance program?
The government might explicitly implement this tax by increasing the level
of income taxes. The other possibility for the government is to induce an
inflation which reduces the real value of the nominal government debt out-
standing. Consequently, in a nominal economywhen the government offers
excessive deposit insurance, by increasing the degree of permits in the sys-
tem, it might be associated with an increase in inflation uncertainty. These
considerations are considered more explicitly below.
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2.6 Central Bank Policy with Nominal Contracts
This section briefly considers the case in which contracts are denom-
inated relative to the value of some government debt (e.g. government
money). The key idea here will be to capture the general equilibrium ef-
fects of inflation uncertainty.
Consider the case in which households have an endowment of M units
of debt issued by the government, such that each unit will pay PM units of
consumption goods in period 2. For simplicity assume that the household
sector holds this debt (i.e. I shut down trading between banks and house-
holds with respect to government debt). The government finances this debt
by taxing households in period 2. The government imposes a fixed period
2 tax, Tax, and after paying off V (as specified in (26)) pays the residual to
the debt holders. The payoff to the holder of each unit of this debt in period
2 is net tax revenue divided by total quantities outstanding:
PM =
Tax V
M
Then each unit of government debt M, can buy 1/PM units of period
2 consumption. This allows us to define the price level as the price of con-
sumption goods relative to the value of government debt:
price level =
1
PM
=
M
Tax V
This looks like the quantity equation of money, except instead of out-
put, here we have net tax revenues. Note that if V is constant, then the price
level will be constant. Equivalently, any variation in V will translate into
107
variation in the price level. Therefore when V is uncertain, the price level in
period 2 is also uncertain. Also, any increase in M leads to a proportional
increase in the price level.
In this case, if (25) does not hold, and the central bank insures all safe
securities, V will be a nonnegative random variable. This is because under
this condition there exist states in which the bank has no resources which
the government can tax, and therefore has to turn to the household sector
to raise finances. This effectively makes the period 2 price level uncertain
from the perspective of period 1.
Now consider the case in which the contracts between households and
banks are nominally-denominated. That is, the only tranches that banks
can sell households will have the following payoff in units of period 2 con-
sumption goods:
t˜  price level = t˜  M
Tax V
Then any uncertainty in the price level, translates into uncertainty in pay-
off of the tranches sold by the banks to households. This will therefore
make even the safest tranches issued by the bank unsafe, thereby limiting
the degree of risk sharing in the economy. In this model, with nominally-
denominated contracts it will be optimal for the central bank to limit offer-
ing deposit insurance (by limiting how many safe securities they insure) so
as to minimize price-level uncertainty in the economy.
This then predicts that for a given quantity of nominally-denominated
safe assets, an increase in inflation uncertainty leads to an increase inmacro-
economic risk premia for the same reasons laid out above. This then gives
us a prediction about the interaction of nominal-denominated safe asset as-
sets, inflation uncertainty and observed risk premia in asset prices.
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3 Central Bank Policy with Shadow Banks
3.1 A Simple Example of Monetary Policy with Shadow Banks
In reality, the central bank only regulates a fraction of the banks in the
economy. A large quantities of money-like instruments are created in the
shadow banking sector, which are not directly regulated by the central bank.
We can create a simple analogue of our model to fit this feature of the mod-
ern banking system.
Let’s continue to consider the model with frictions summarized in A1-
A2, and in addition consider the following constraint on central bank policy.
Assumption (A4). The government has regulatory authority only over a frac-
tion ρ of the banks. Label the regulated banks as ‘traditional banks,’ and the unreg-
ulated banks as ‘shadow banks.’
This assumption essentially implies that for a fraction (1  ρ) of the
banks operating in the shadow banking sector, the government has no abil-
ity to offer deposit insurance or regulate the quantity of safe securities is-
sued. To map to reality, you may think of the securities issued by these
banks as asset backed commercial paper, which households hold via money
market funds.
The only difference this has on the solution is that now there will be
two types of banks. The shadow banks, will freely choose the tranche they
sell, and will continue to choose t = (1  λ) ssh + λssh1 s¯ v, exactly as in the
previous section (here I use ssh to denote the safe component offered by the
shadow banks). The traditional banks on the other hand will be subject to
the constraint imposed by the central bank. Since they will be regulated
(exactly as in the previous section) they will be able to commit to sell safe
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securities. Suppose the restriction imposed by the central bank binds on
them, then they will choose t = str < s, where str is the restriction imposed
by the central bank. Then household’s budget constraint (16) is given by
wH = p
 
str

z
 
str

+ p (t) z (t) (27)
where str is the safe tranches with deposit insurance purchased from
traditional banks, and t = (1  λ) ssh + λssh1 s¯ v are quasi-safe tranches pur-
chased from the shadow banks. Plugging in the appropriate values33 into
the budget constraint (27) uniquely solves for ssh :
ssh =
wH   ρ

wBstr
1 str

wH   ρ

wBstr
1 str

+ (1  ρ)wB
It can be checked that ∂ssh/∂str < 0. That is, when the central bank
reduces permits by lowering str, it must be the case that revenue of the
traditional banks (given by p
 
str

z
 
str

) shrinks, and that of the securi-
tized banks (given by p (t) z (t)) expands. This effectively implies that now
households have to hold more quasi-safe securities and less safe securities,
which in turn makes their consumption riskier. Hence, a contraction by the
central bank leads to an increase in risk premia. In fact, in this case, due to
the symmetry, a decrease in str that leads to a reduction of x units of total
safe securities from the traditional banking sector, corresponds to a one-for-
one increase of x units of total quasi-safe securities by the shadow banking
33In equilibrium z
 
str

, z (t) have to equal the securities created by the banks, and the
banks make zero profits. This implies p
 
str

= str, and p (t) = ssh, and correspondingly,
z
 
str

= ρwB/
 
1  str, and z (t) = (1  ρ)wB/ 1  ssh.
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sector. This is simply saying that
wH =

p
 
str

z
 
str
  x	+ fp (t) z (t) + xg
But since the shadow banks create quasi-safe securities there is a loss of
λx quantities of total safe tranches from the household’s portfolio. Thus, by
reducing permits for creating safe security from the hands of the traditional
banking sector, the central bank effectively reduces the total quantities of
safe securities available to the households, since the shadow banking sector
is ineffective in producing completely safe securities. This leads to a reduc-
tion of money-like securities in the economy, thereby leading a rise in the
risk premia. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present a numerical example.
Figure 2.1: Time 0 — Balance Sheets before contracting reserves.
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Figure 2.2: Time 1 — Balance sheets after reserve contraction.
4 Quantitative Effects and Implications for Asset
Prices
So far we did not make any stringent functional form assumptions, and
therefore the results were mostly qualitative. In this section the goal is to
quantitatively assess the effect of safe assets supply on equilibrium risk pre-
mium. To do that I begin with the basic asset pricing setup.
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4.1 Basic Asset Pricing
The model in this paper effectively takes consumption-savings deci-
sion as given, and focuses on the portfolio choice problem. The structure of
my model, therefore, is similar to the Lucas-tree environment, which takes
consumption endowments as given, and solves for asset prices. The novel
feature here is that given total resources, the quantity of safe assets that
end up in household portfolio will depend on frictions and regulation of
the banking sector. In what follows I will use the same approach as in the
Lucas-fruit-tree framework, and examine how changing the nature of fric-
tions and regulatory response from the government affects asset prices. This
will allow us to identify conditions under which the mechanisms described
in this paper are quantitatively relavant.
Typically households have access to other assets other than just bank
securities. The setup so far had abstracted away from such considerations.
Here I introduce this feature by expanding household’s endowment to in-
clude L units of assets with payoff (s¯out + vout) , such that s¯out is a constant.
For simplicity assume that vout =

1 s¯out
1 s¯

v , such that vout is a nonnegative
random variable with E [vout] = 1  s¯out. To retain simplicity I restrict the set
of contracts that banks can write to be the same (T) as in previous sections.
This is not a trivial assumption since I am preventing the banks from writ-
ing derivative contracts with households that are contingent on the payoff
of these L units of assets. In other words, these L units cannot be pledged.
However, allowing such contracts will not substantially alter the main in-
sights of this section, and hence are precluded. Under these assumptions,
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we can represent household’s period 2 consumption as
cH = L (s¯out + vout)| {z }
Outside Endowment
+ K

(1  ψ) + ψ v
E [v]

s| {z }
Bank Securities
= [L+ Ks]

(φ)  1+ (1  φ) v
E [v]

such that ψ is the fraction of securities that is effectively replaced (by
unregulated banking), and φ  Ls¯out+K(1 ψ)sL+Ks represents fraction of house-
hold consumption that is safe. Here asset prices will correspond to the case
in which household’s first order condition will hold with equality. There-
fore the asset prices derived here will correspond to the interim period trad-
ing, rather than period 1 trading (since in period 1 households were at a
corner solution). Normalizing period 1 marginal utility of consumption as
1, we can represent the stochastic discount factor as
M¯ = βu0

cH

such that 0  β  1 is the time-discount factor. This allows us to
represent the price of any asset with payoff d, as
p (d) = E [M¯d]
Using this fundamental pricing equation we can represent the price of
any security in this economy. The price of a money-like claim which pays
off 1 unit for sure in the next period is given by
p (1) = E [M¯]
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while the gross one-period return on the risk-free asset R f is 1/p (1) .
Analogously, a one-period equity is a hypothetical asset that pays next
period’s consumption. The price of this asset is
p

cH

= E
h
M¯cH
i
while the gross one-period return is Re = cH/p
 
cH

.
Let’s define the equity premium as ep  ln Re/R f , and plugging in
appropriate values we get
ep = ln E
h
cH
i
+ ln E
h
u0

cH
i
  ln E
h
u0

cH

cH
i
and the log riskfree rate is
r f = ρ  ln E
h
u0

cH
i
such that ρ    ln (β).
The standard convention in the asset-pricing literature is to use power
utility with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. Define X  ln cH, and
we get
ep = ln E [exp (X)] + ln E [exp ( γX)]  ln E [exp ((1  γ)X)]
r f = ρ  ln E [exp ( γX)]
It can be checked that the equity premium rises, and the risk-free rate
falls when φ falls. The factors that lead φ to fall are:
1. The size of replacement friction in the banking sector rises (ψ increases)
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2. The share of safety in aggregate assets falls (i.e. when s¯ or s¯out falls)
3. The aggregate endowment become riskier (i.e. v becomes riskier)
The general principle here is that whenever aggregate non-diversifiable
uncertainty increases, there is a flight-to-safety to money-like instruments.
Consequently, for a given supply of such instruments, asset market clearing
leads to an increase in the premium households are offered to hold non-safe
instruments (i.e. a rise in the risk premium).
A similar effect happens when the central bank drains reserves (as in
the shadow banking section above). This forces households to rely on the
unregulated banking sector, thereby making consumption riskier, leading
to a rise in equity premium, and a decline in the riskfree rate. The following
subsections presents a calibration of the model to assess the magnitude of
these effects.
4.2 The Effect of Money on Risk Premium in a Safe World
For what follows the key parameter I will work with is φ, which mea-
sures the fraction of consumption that is safe. First, I consider a parameter-
ization of the model that corresponds to the baseline textbook case—when
v is lognormally distributed. In this case, as φ converges to zero, we get
the ubiquitous result that under power utility the equity premium equals γ
times the variance of v : i.e. ep ! γσ2 as φ ! 0. The other extreme here is
when φ ! 1, in which case ep ! 0, since household consumption is com-
pletely safe. Reasonable values of γ range between 1 and 3, and the standard
deviation of aggregate consumption growth in the US has been between 1-
2%. The risky component of consumption will have higher variance. As
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a benchmark I consider this to be more than double that of consumption,
such that σ = .04. Consequently, by setting γ = 2 and σ = .04, we get the
equity premium ranges between 0 and .0032 (i.e. .32%) as a function of φ.
This effectively implies that in the extreme case of making household con-
sumption completely risky from completely safe, will increase the equity
premium by at most .32%. This effect compared to actual observable values
of equity premia (upwards of 6%) is relatively small.
The main result here is that the quantitative effect of safe assets and
the sensitivity of risk premium with respect to φ is relatively small in an
environment with longnormally distributed risky assets. This, however,
changes drastically when we consider the possibility of catastrophe risk,
which I turn to next.
4.3 The Effect of Money in a World with Disaster Risk
4.3.1 Baseline. — Recent work by Weitzman (2007) and Barro (2006) has
highlighted the importance of tail risk in explaining large observable risk
premia. The tail risk effectively captures the possibility of large contrac-
tions by assigning such episodes non-negligible probabilities. In Weitz-
man’s framework, such tail-thickening arises from subjective uncertainty
about the scale parameters of the distribution of log consumption. Analo-
gous to these recent papers, this section will work with cases in which the
distribution of log (v) is thick-tailed. The key difference here will be that
unlike in previous papers, I assume that only a fraction of consumption is
subject to such disaster risk. This will allow me to characterize how chang-
ing the fraction of safe assets will influence risk premia. It will turn out
that in a framework with thick-tails, risk premium will be very sensitive to
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changes in φ.
Recall household consumption can be represented as a constant times
a weighted average of unity and a random variable with mean one34:
cH = [L+ Ks]

(φ)  1+ (1  φ) v
E [v]

Let the distribution of log (v) be given by Student’s t distribution. The
left tail of log consumption is governed by the fraction of consumption aris-
ing from the safe assets, and the properties of the tails of the risky tranche
v. The following basic proposition establishes a crucial insight for the rest
of the results that follow.
PROPOSITION 5 Under constant relative risk aversion, E

u
 
cH
! u (L+ Ks)
as φ! 1, and E u  cH!  ∞ as φ! 0.
PROOF. See appendix.
This proposition essentially implies that expected utility converges to
a constant when the share of safe assets is large in household portfolio, and
diverges to negative infinity when share of safe assets become negligible.
A related result about the menacing effects of thick-tails on utility functions
that represent decreasing absolute risk aversion was independently pointed
out by Geweke (2001) and Weitzman (2007). The key intuition behind this
result is that under power utility, u (0) is a drastically perverse state, which
households would like to avoid at all costs (since the utility at zero con-
sumption diverges to negative infinity). Correspondingly, whenever log
consumption is distributed with thick-tails, the probability weight around
zero consumption is non-negligible, thereby inducing expected utility to di-
34The results of this section is not going to changemuch if insteadwe considered a case in
which the payoff of the safe assets were lognormally distributed instead of being constant.
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verge to negative infinity.
When there is a sufficiently large quantity of safe assets in the portfolio,
the total portfolio is no longer exposed to the menacing effects of the tails.
This is becausemixing sufficiently large quantities of assets distributedwith
constant returns (or thin-tailed returns) makes the distribution of the total
portfolio returns thin-tailed. This effect is captured in Figure 2.3, which
plots the expected utility of this mixed portfolio as a function of the share of
safe assets, φ. The benchmark line which is the horizontal line is expected
utility when φ = 1. There are two key points to note from this figure:
1) when share of safe assets (φ) is small, expected utility and marginal
utility are very sensitive to changes in the share of safe assets in household’s
portfolio.
2) when share of safe assets is sufficiently large (say greater than 20
percent) household’s expected utility is not going to be very sensitive to
changes in higher moments of log consumption.
Figure 2.3: Expected Utility as a function of Fraction of Safe Assets, φ. The
dashed line represents expected utility when the entire portfolio is riskless.
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The following corollary summarizes the asset pricing implications of
this result.
COROLLARY 5.1 ep! 0 as φ! 1, and ep! ∞ as φ! 0.
To understand this qualitatively, note that ep is an inverse-function of
the supply of safe assets as measured by φ in this specification. This is
because an increase in supply of safe assets decreases the marginal utility
in disaster states, thereby lowering the value of the riskfree asset which
pays off in these disaster states. This makes the difference between the two
securities smaller, thereby lowering the equity-risk premia. This difference
widens whenever there is greater mass in the left tail of the unconditional
distribution of log consumption growth. This happens when the fraction
of safe assets (φ) contracts. The opposite happens when φ expands. This
generates an inverse relationship between money supply and the equity
risk premia. Appendix (...) discusses the mathematical underpinnings of
the quantitative effect. Those who are familiar with the use of moment-
generating functions in asset pricing may find this appendix useful. Below
I present an example which illustrates what is driving the quantitative effect
behind this corollary.
4.3.2 Pricing of Tail Risk.— Introducing safe assets in household portfolio
effectively truncates the left tails of consumption. This positive effect of
truncation on risk premia, competes with the negative effect of thick-tails
on risk premia. Note we will achieve this tail-thinning effect also when we
consider lognormally distributed assets (as opposed to completely riskless
assets). The tension between these two effects is what generates the large
sensitivity of risk premium with respect to safe assets. To see this cleanly
here I present a simple case that will highlight how tail risk gets priced, and
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under what conditions households will be less bothered by tail properties
of traded assets.
Consider two assets A and B which are identical, except that asset A
pays off 1 unit surely in disaster states, and asset B pays off zero in disaster
states. You may think of asset B as a MBS with some tail risk, and asset A
as a riskfree security. The payoffs of asset i 2 [A, B] is denoted by di, and is
given by
dA =

1 i f v > v
¯
1 i f v  v
¯
and
dB =

1 i f v > v
¯
0 i f v  v
¯
Define q  Pr [v  v
¯
]. Then the price of each asset is given by
p

dA

= (1  q) E [M¯ j v > v
¯
] + qE [M¯ j v  v
¯
]
p

dB

= (1  q) E [M¯ j v > v
¯
]
The spread of these two assets, ln

p
 
dA

/p
 
dB

, is given by
ln
"
p
 
dA

p (dB)
#
= ln

1+

q
1  q

E [M¯ j v  v
¯
]
E [M¯ j v > v
¯
]

(28)
The question we are after is ‘when do agents in the economy start car-
ing about tail risk of any asset being traded in the economy?’ In the context
of this example, this question translates into asking ‘when does the differ-
ence in these two assets matter?’ If the spread in the valuation of these
two assets ln

PA/PB

is ‘almost’ zero, then these two assets will appear
roughly similar to the agents. From examining (28), it is evident that the
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difference between the two will matter whenever conditional expectation
of marginal utility is high, or whenever q is high. However, since we are
focusing on disaster states we can restrict attention to the cases in which q
is very low – to be precise less than .005. Then whenever expected marginal
utility in disaster states is not much larger than expected marginal utility
in non-disaster states the two assets will be valued almost identically (i.e.
when E [M¯ j v  v
¯
] is not too large relative to E [M¯ j v > v
¯
]). On the other
hand whenever E [M¯ j v  v
¯
] is large, the valuation of the two assets di-
verge. Under our assumption of power utility with log (v) distributed with
a student-t distribution, E [M¯ j v  v
¯
] diverges to positive infinity when-
ever the fraction of safe assets go to zero (such that the distribution of log
consumption converges to a student-t). Having sufficiently large fractions
of safe assets ensures that the expected utility is finite and small. This is
summarized in the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.2 The tail properties of any asset traded has vanishingly neg-
ligible effect in the pricing of assets as φ! 1.
This sensitivity can be seen in Figure 2.4. This result may give an in-
sight into why we witnessed large spikes in spreads of relatively safe se-
curities (e.g. LIBOR-OIS) between August 2007 and January 2009. Dur-
ing these episodes we had a massive contraction in safe securities, such as
asset-backed commercial paper, and repo, which according to the logic of
this model may lead to an increase in bond risk premia between two almost
identical securities: one safe, and the other quasi-safe.
The general message of the calibration subsections is that the quantita-
tive effect of safe assets on risk premium is relatively small in an environ-
ment with no disaster risk. But as soon as we introduce disaster risk, small
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changes in quantity of safe assets can have a large effect on equilibrium risk
premium.
Figure 2.4: Bond Risk Premia as a function of Fraction of Safe Assets (φ).
5 Extension: Shadow Banking Shut-Down and Un-
conventional Policy
The discussion thus far was restricted to how monetary policy works
during ‘normal’ times. We are, however, also interested in understanding
the role of central bank policy in ‘abnormal times’. To do so we need to
first define what ‘abnormal times’ exactly means. The most interesting case
is when the shadow banking sector (or in general the unregulated banking
sector) shuts down. In reality, various micro-mechanisms may lead to such
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a shut down. For the purposes of this paper I consider one fundamental
micro-friction to capture such states: counterparty risk in distress states.
The following assumption summarizes this friction:
Assumption (A5). After the realization of outcomes, if v v
¯
(i.e. in distress
states), a bank that chooses t = s˜ 2 [0, s¯] fails to pay with probability w.
This is the classic agency problem of post-contractual opportunism, in
which self-regulation breaks down when the banks themselves lose most
of their capital and enter distress states. The real-world analogue in terms
of safe securities issued by ABS conduits is when the sponsoring banks get
distressed and refuse to assume rollover risk or even credit risk of the con-
duits. Since the traditional banks have deposit insurance, the mechanics
will be similar with or without counterparty risk. Therefore for simplicity I
assume that only shadow banks are subject to counterparty risk.
In this case, it can be checked under our parametric assumptions that
there exists a 0 < w < 1 and v
¯
such that the household’s willingness to pay
for any security t issued by the shadow banks will be below s. That is, for
all t,
p (t) < s
Then the shadow banks will make negative profits if they issue any
security, and consequently will chose to shut down. Thus, possibility of de-
fault in disaster states can undo the shadow banks ability to sell insurance
to households. The fundamental insight here is that under this ‘safety trans-
formation’ view of banking, the key role banking sector plays is to provide
insurance to households. Consequently, any possibility of the banks fail-
ing in disasters states (systemic risk) can undo their advantage and render
them unprofitable. Hence, in such an economy, households will transact
124
with shadow banks only when they are sure that the banks will payout in
high marginal utility states.
When the shadow banking sectors shut down, what can the central
bank do? Consider one policy: the government enters a swap agreement
with the traditional banks in which they buy the claims to the payoff of
the risky investment project, s¯+ v. In turn the banks receive a riskfree claim
from the central bank. How can the central bank create riskfree claims? Sup-
pose the government exchanges one unit of investment payoff (s¯+ v) for f
riskless units, and buys G quantities of such exchange-claims. The risk-
neutral banks will be willing to enter this trade as long as f > E (s¯+ v) = s¯.
Then in period t + 1, whenever s¯ + v  f , the government just takes the
proceeds from the payoff of each exchange-claim they own to pay the bank
G f units. On the other hand, when s¯+ v < f , the government has to rely
on its power of taxation to pay the difference: G [ f   (s¯+ v)] .
Can this policy affect the risk premia and investment in the economy?
The answer to this question depends on who the government will tax. Let’s
first consider the case in which the government taxes the households. In this
case it can be shown that the government policy will have no effect or will
increase risk premia (but not decrease it). This is because the government
will force households to hold more risk (in the form of taxation) than they
want.
What if the government taxes a group other than households in the
states of the world they have a shortfall of magnitude f   (s¯+ v)? The only
group in this economy other than households who will have riskless quan-
tity of resources in time t+ 1 is the bankers who own the securitized banks,
and are currently shut down. In the state of shut down, they are using their
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wealth (1  ρ)wH to invest in projects, and each unit gives them s¯ units
of certain resources. In this case of taxing the shadow bankers, the gov-
ernment’s asset swap has a direct impact on asset prices, risk premia, and
investment. In particular this asset swap makes the traditional banks’ port-
folio safer, which in turn allows them to issue more riskless claims to the
households, which reduces the risk premia in the economy. The government
can restore optimal allocation as long as f G = (1  ρ)wBssh/  1  ssh. The
government brings about this Pareto improvement by using its power of
taxation and enabling the banking sector to credibly expand its creation of
safe assets, which satiates households desire to risklessly transfer resources
intertemporally.
What does this asset swap look like in practice? This effectively mirrors
an asset purchase by the Federal Reserve, which they pay for by printing
reserves under the auspices of a ‘quantitative easing’ program. The analysis
above yields an important insight about such programs. The central bank,
or more generally the government, has a special power of taxation which
allows them to create safe assets. However, the only way this can have a real
positive effect on the economy is when they transfer the burden of taxation
in disaster states onto some agents who are not the marginal investors in
asset markets, and are willing to bear the risk of taxation (shadow banks in
the example above).
The government’s action of quantitative easing can be thought of as a
case in which the government forces a disaster insurance contract between
two groups of agents. If the central bank incurs losses on its asset purchase
they will impose a tax on a group of agents (either an inflation tax or one
directly levied through the Treasury). Consequently, this group of agents
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is effectively selling disaster insurance to those who rush to deposit money
in commercial banks, which in turn increase their holdings of the reserves
issued by the central bank. Equivalently, the U.S. government’s doubling
of Treasury Bills debt in September 2008 (from $1 trillion to $2 trillion) and
using the proceeds to finance various funding facilities (either directly or
through the Federal Reserve) can be thought of as one such forced-trade of
disaster insurance.
The behavior of agents after Lehman’s failure mirrors the one predicted
by this model. In the week of September 15th, 2008, after Primary Reserve
Fund ‘broke the buck,’ there was a massive run on prime money market
mutual funds, and in general on anything that was not deemed safe. House-
holds increased their holdings of various instruments offered by commer-
cial banks as long as they were federally insured. Similarly, there was a flow
of money into money market mutual funds that only invested in Treasury
and agency debt. These commercial banks and governmentMMMFs in turn
were looking for safe havens to park this newly-found influx of cash. The
government satiated this appetite by issuing reserves that paid interest, and
substantially increasing the quantity of Treasury debt outstanding.
Lastly, by following the logic of the model it also becomes clear we will
observe ‘monetization’ of central bank’s losses (i.e. an inflation tax) only if
the risky assets they hold have bad realizations.
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Chapter 3: What Drives Global
Asset Allocation Across Countries?
1 Introduction
Asset allocation decisions of global investors lie at the heart of financial
flows between markets, currencies and countries. The paper takes as its
point of departure the asset allocation decision of the individual investor.
This sets it apart from much of the existing literature, which focuses on
investment flows from a macroeconomic point of view, and derives most
of its analysis from balance of payments data (Forbes and Warnock (2011);
IMF (2011b); IMF (2011c)). In this paper’s more integrated view, changes
in risk and return preferences of individual investors are the fundamental
driver of asset allocation over time and, consequently, financial flows into
and out of markets, currencies, and countries.
This paper aims to understand recent trends in global asset allocation
across countries and their determinants. First we focus on the unleveraged,
real-money investors, including individuals, public and private pension
funds, insurance companies, as sizable sources of underlying capital flows.
Then we turn to the decisions of central banks with respect to their reserve
allocation. While the overwhelming majority of financial assets is owned
and managed by private investors, sovereign investors have grown to be-
come important players in international capital markets. Sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs) hold some $4 trillion in assets, while international reserves
amount to $10 trillion. Their combined assets amount to about a quarter
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of the assets under management of private institutional investors. Their in-
creasing size makes sovereigns important investors in international capital
markets.
An extensive literature links asset allocation to an investor’s objectives
and the risk and return characteristics of individual assets. It is assumed
that investors behave predictably when such characteristics change; when
the expected return of an asset increases without changes in its riskiness,
investors are expected to want to hold more of that asset. Similarly, when
an asset becomes more risky (because its return is more variable or the risk
of default is higher), investors would want to hold less of it, unless the asset
offers a higher return.
The global financial crisis has raised the possibility that some of the pa-
rameters in these relationships may have changed, including investor’s ob-
jectives themselves. Anecdotal evidence abounds and can sometimes seem
contradictory. For example, investors, spooked by the financial turmoil, are
said to have become much more sensitive to risk, in particular to events
with small probability but large adverse effects (“tail event”). They are now
seeking more protection against such events. Similarly, after disruptions in
some markets during the height of the financial turmoil, investors are said
to bemuchmore focused on liquidity risk. These structural changes interact
with cyclical factors: despite increased sensitivity to risk, the low-interest
rate environment may push some investors, especially those with the need
to earn a certain minimum return to match expected payouts on their lia-
bilities, to take on more risk in alternative assets and less liquid markets to
increase returns on their assets.
In this context, the paper focuses on the following questions:
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 What are the trends in global asset allocation since 2005, and what are
their determinants? Do trends and determinants differ by country or
region?
 Have the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and low
interest rates in advanced economies fundamentally altered invest-
ment decisions, perhaps pressing long-term investors toward riskier
investment to augment their poor returns in advanced economies?
 Are there growing risks for a reversal of investment flows to emerg-
ing economies, and if so, how would that affect capital flows? In the
longer term, is financial stability compromised as a result of these de-
velopments?
The analysis shows that global asset allocation is driven most strongly
by growth prospects and risks in the recipient countries, while interest rate
differentials between countries play a lesser role. The analysis does not,
however, imply that capital flows in general do not respond to interest rate
differentials, since other components, including investment flows of short-
term leveraged investors (such as those from the carry trade)—which this
paper does not examine—might still be affected by changes in interest rates.
Beyond these long-term trends, the empirical results indicate that asset-
allocation strategies of real money investors have changed since the on-
set of the global financial crisis. Most importantly, investors are more risk
conscious, including regarding the risks associated with liquidity and sov-
ereign credit. Also, the structural trend of investing in emerging market as-
sets has accelerated following the crisis; and with many first-time investors
taking advantage of the relatively better economic performance of these
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countries, the risk of a reversal cannot be discounted if fundamentals (such
as growth prospects or country or global risk) change. For larger shocks, the
impact of such reversals could be of the same magnitude as the pull-back in
flows experienced during the financial crisis.
With respect to reserve allocation of central banks we find a stronger
role for interest rates. Reserve managers appear to respond to U.S. interest
rates: increases in the U.S. dollar interest-rate are associated with a rebal-
ancing away from euro and towards the U.S. dollar.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature.
Section 3 discusses data and methodology. Section 4 provides stylized facts
and Section 5 summarizes empirical results. Section /6 concludes with im-
plications of our findings.
2 Literature Review
This section discusses the relationship of our analysis to existing litera-
ture on portfolio investment flows and global asset allocation.
Several studies have looked into the relationship between international
portfolio flows and local market returns: Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes
(2001), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002), and Froot and Ramadorai
(2008) document significant effects of portfolio investment flows on local
market equity and bond returns.
Other studies have looked at the reverse relationship between local
market returns and subsequent international flows. This literature finds
some evidence of “performance chasing” behavior. Such behavior is doc-
umented at both the domestic level (see Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
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(1995), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)) and the international level. In the
international context, Brennan and Cao (1997) find that portfolio flows are
associated with returns on national market indices. They attribute this to in-
formational differences between foreign and domestic investors. For emerg-
ing markets they find that in addition to contemporaneous returns, lagged
local market returns are a strong predictor of portfolio flows. Froot and Teo
(2004) attribute such behavior to behavioral factors and style investing.
A separate literature looks at the international allocation of domestic in-
vestors. This literature finds large home bias in portfolio holdings. French
and Poterba (1991) was an early paper to document too little cross-border
diversification, despite the large portfolio diversification benefits. Recent
papers continue to find home bias in portfolio allocation at both the indi-
vidual and institutional level. Hau and Rey (2008) find that there is large
heterogeneity in home bias across mutual funds. They also document that
a representative fund usually invests in a limited number of countries, al-
though fund size is positively related to number of countries in which funds
invest.
This paper adds another important dimension to this literature, focus-
ing on the link between asset allocation decision of institutional investors
and international portfolio flows. This paper also relies on a relatively high
frequency public dataset. Most of the other studies use either (quarterly)
balance of payment data or propriety data maintained by large custodian
banks. In our framework, we focus on the international portfolio flows that
result from the choices made by institutional investment managers. This
approach is desirable since a substantial body of already theoretical litera-
ture deals with the optimal portfolio choice at the individual or institutional
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level. Correspondingly, we first write down a simplemodel of optimal port-
folio choice that is motivated by the recent literature in portfolio choice. The
model then guides our empirical investigation about the determinants of in-
ternational portfolio flows.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
For our empirical investigation, we use a dataset compiled by Emerg-
ing Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR). EPFR provides global fund flows and
asset allocation data from some 20,000 equity funds and 10,000 bond funds
with $14 trillion in total assets. The investors are a mix of retail and insti-
tutional investors; EPFR estimates that 70 percent of assets are institutional,
mainly from pension funds and insurance companies. It covers funds regis-
tered in most major developed market jurisdictions and offshore domiciles.
EPFR samples a subset of funds to give insights into the destination coun-
tries for equity and bond investments. Data at the monthly frequency are
used below, covering the period from January 2005 to May 2011. EPFR has
widened its coverage of fund flows over time, which may raise data consis-
tency issues; the period of study was chosen to minimize these concerns.
Capital flows in and out of countries may include other types of in-
vestments, such as bank loans or FDI, that are not tracked by the EPFR
dataset. However, since we are mainly interested in the decisions of long-
term portfolio investors, the EPFR data suits our purposes better than the
standard balance of payments data that includes these other types of in-
vestment. Also, for some countries, especially emerging markets which are
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traditionally underweighted in portfolios of international investors, flows
in and out of bond and equity funds may to a considerable extent capture
the corresponding cross-border flows.35
3.2 Methodology
Using the EPFR data, this section addresses the following questions:
First, what global and domestic factors have driven the asset allocation of
international bond and equity fund investors? Second, has their investment
behavior changed fundamentally after the global financial crisis? To cap-
ture the truly global picture, a panel regression is estimated covering 50 ad-
vanced and emerging market economies for which we have complete and
consistent data. The regressions are run separately for equity funds and
bond funds, and are estimated for the whole sample and for five geographic
groupings separately.36
The theoretical setup is based on an optimal portfolio problem with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. This allows the portfolio de-
cision to be derived from microeconomic foundations. The CRRA function
has a constant parameter of risk aversion, which implies that risk aversion
does not change with investor’s wealth. Furthermore, the CRRA utility
function is time separable, which means that total utility is a simple sum
of utilities in each separate period.
35Specifically, reducing their underweighting in international capital market indices may
lead to increased portfolio flows into emerging markets, with corresponding capital in-
flows.
36The regressions are run on flow data, since the stock data are generally nonstation-
ary. The dependent variables are defined for each country as the valuation-adjusted flows
into equity and bond funds in the country, divided by the stock at the beginning of the
month. All variables are used at a monthly frequency. For variables of higher frequency,
the end-of-month value is used. All regressions include country-fixed effects to account
for any country specific factors not identified by the other explanatory variables. Drop-
ping country-fixed effects does not alter the signs or statistical significance of the results.
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Using a CRRA utility function, the portfolio decision can be repre-
sented as follows:
max Et
"
∞
∑
i=0
δiU (Ct+i)
#
= Et
"
∞
∑
i=0
δi
C1 γt+i   1
1  γ
#
(29)
where U (.) is the CRRA utility function, Ct+i is
consumption at time t+ i, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ is
a discount factor, and Et [.] is the expectations operator taking into account
all information up through period t.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the investor is given by
Wt+1 =
 
1+ Rp,t+1

(Wt   Ct) (30)
where Rp,t+1 is portfolio return between period t and t + 1, and Wt+1 is
wealth in period t+ 1.
Regarding the portfolio, suppose the investor can choose from N risky
assets and one risk-free asset. Rt+1 is a vector of risky returns with N ele-
ments. It has a mean vector EtRt+1 and a variance-covariance matrix Σt+1.
αt is a vector of allocations to the risky asset. The riskless asset has return
Rt+1 from time t to t+ 1.
The portfolio manager’s decision, therefore, is to optimally choose αt
to maximize his utility (1) subject to his budget constraint (2).
Unfortunately, a closed-form solution to this investment problem does
not exist. However, based on a linearized approximation, the following
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solution can be derived (see Campbell and Viceira (2002) for details):
αt =
1
γ
Σ 1t+1

Etrt+1   r f ,t+1 + σ2t/2

+

1  1
γ

Σ 1t+1σht (31)
σht =  Covt
"
rt+1, (Et+1   Et)
∞
∑
j=1
ρjrp,t+1+j
#
Where σ2t is the portfolio variance, σht is the vector of covariances of
each risky asset return with revisions in expected future portfolio returns,
and ρ is a a parameter of the linearization. When the consumption-wealth
ratio is constant, ρ can be interpreted as the ratio of reinvested wealth to
total wealth.
Equation (31) shows that the optimal weight for each asset in the port-
folio is a function of two terms: (i) the asset’s risk premium, based on its
excess return, variance, and covariance with other assets; and (ii) the asset’s
covariancewith revisions in expected portfolio returns, i.e. its hedge against
future declines in portfolio returns (intertemporal hedging component).
Theweights placed on these two terms are proportional to the investor’s
risk tolerance (1/γ). At one extreme, when the investor has a risk tolerance
of 1 (or “log utility”), asset weights are determined solely by the risk pre-
mium of each asset. At the other extreme, when the investor has a risk tol-
erance of zero, asset weights are only a function of the intertemporal hedge
provided by each asset.
This result, therefore, predicts that an investor will choose to allocate
more of his portfolio to a given asset i when:
 it is expected to generate high excess returns, that is, the ith term in
Etrt+1   r f ,t+1 is high;
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 it has low variance, that is, the ith diagonal term in Σ is low;
 it has low covariance with other assets, that is, the nondiagonal terms
in Σ are low; and
 it offers a hedge against future declines in portfolio returns, that is, σht
is high
Furthermore, when risk-aversion γ increases, an investor will shift his
portfolio toward less risky assets, or more precisely, to assets that offer a
better hedge against future declines in portfolio returns. Therefore, in pe-
riods of elevated risk aversion, investors will move out of risky bonds and
equities to “risk-free” instruments.
On the basis of this model, the following factors are used in the regres-
sion analysis to explain global asset allocation:
 Return factors: (i) policy rate differentials of countries relative to the
simple G-4 average; and (ii) the one-year-ahead GDP growth forecast
from Consensus Economics.
 Volatility factors: these represent the variance of returns as measured
by (i) the volatility of host country expected inflation; (ii) the volatility
of GDP growth; and (iii) the volatility of the exchange rates.
 Risk tolerance: perceptions of risk are (i) country risk, as proxied by
the measure of country risk compiled by the International Country
Risk Group; and (ii) global risk, as proxied by the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange Volatility Index (VIX).
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 Other variables of interest: (i) an IMFmeasure of capital controls (both
on inflows and outflows)37, (ii) the covariance between country re-
turns and world portfolio return (to capture the diversification effect),
(iii) the covariance between country returns and changes in world
portfolio return (to capture intertemporal hedging demand), and (iv)
dummies to account for any structural changes in investor behavior
that may have occurred after the global financial crisis.38
The variables that are used as a proxy for the various determinants
above are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Determinants of Equity and Bond Flows.
The regions we examine are based on the Morgan Stanley Capital In-
ternational (MSCI) regional classification and are as follows:
 Asia-Pacific (excluding Australia, Japan, New Zealand): China, Hong
Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand (9)
37The model employs a six-month lagged capital control measure, for two reasons. First,
capital control measures are expected to take effect with a time lag. Second, large flows
could in fact prompt the imposition of capital controls, forcing an opposite (positive) sign
as reflected in this type of the regression; the lagged capital control variable addresses this
concern of reverse causality.
38Two crisis dummies are included, one for the period between June 2007 and August
2008 (global credit crunch) and one for the period after September 2008 (Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy).
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 Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA): Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa (17)
 Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela
(6)
 G7 : United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, UK (7)
 Non-G7: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand (15)
As a preliminary analysis, we examine the relationship between equity
flows and GDP. Figure 3.1 shows the positive relationship between equity
flows and GDP growth since March 2009. An interesting case is China,
which was forecast to have high GDP growth compared to peers, but re-
ceived relatively lower equity inflows. This may reflect the existence of
capital controls in China. A flip side of the story is Turkey, which has at-
tracted more equity flows, despite a lower projected GDP growth rate.
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Figure 3.1: Expected GDP Growth and Equity Flows
5 Empirical Results
The analysis yields the followingmain results about the drivers of flows
into equity and bond funds (Tables 3.2 provides detailed results):
 Interest rate differentials in most cases have no effect on flows into
equity and bond funds. These flows generally do not respond to pol-
icy rate differentials in a statistically significant way. These results are
generally invariant to using policy rate differentials relative to the G-4
(as used in the baseline regression), nominal policy rates, nominal or
real long-term interest rates (for countries where long-term rates are
available), nominal or real long-term interest rate differentials relative
to the G-4, and lagged policy rate differentials.39 The implications of
39Because policymakers may use policy rates to dampen undesirable capital flows
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this finding are discussed further below.
 Improving GDP growth prospects in general positively affect flows.
Globally, an increase in the forecast GDP growth rate in the investment
destination country leads to an increase in bond and equity invest-
ments. GDP growth is important for equity investors because higher
GDP would lead to higher corporate earnings growth, making equi-
ties more attractive. It could also affect bond investors if higher GDP
growth reduces credit risk, making bond investments more attractive.
 A rise in country risk generally reduces flows. The regression analysis
confirms that, in many cases, an increase in country risk in emerging
markets reduces their attractiveness for equity and bond investors.
The effect is not statistically significant in advanced economies, per-
haps partly because these showed little variation in country risk until
recently.
 A rise in global risk generally reduces flows. Globally and for all re-
gions, an increase in global risk (proxied by the VIX variable) discour-
ages flows into equities and bonds.
 Lower return covariance generally leads to increased flows. In many
cases, lower covariance of a country’s equities and bonds leads to
higher flows into these investments. This is as expected, since an as-
set that tends to have low covariance to other assets in the portfolio
reduces the risk of the overall portfolio.
(which may partly flow into bond and equity investments), the regression may suffer from
an “endogeneity” problem. To get around this issue, as noted, a regression was run with
lagged policy rate differentials. Expected changes in foreign exchange rates (proxied by the
forward less the spot rate) are not included in the regression because any expected change
would be captured by the interest rate differential through covered interest parity.
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 Higher uncertainty tends to reduce flows. Uncertainty about future
exchange rates and GDP growth, measured by changes in the volatil-
ity of exchange rates and GDP forecast, are found in general to reduce
flows into equities and bonds.
 Capital control measures show onlyweak effects. Capital control mea-
sures negatively affect bond flows on a global scale but not in most of
the regressions for emerging markets. This weak finding may result in
part because such controls are usually placed on money market and
exchange rate instruments and not on longer-term equity and bond
investments, where the interests of real-money investors lie; this is
consistent with findings in other IMF studies (IMF (2010), in partic-
ular). Also, there is evidence that controls tend to lose effectiveness
as market participants find ways to circumvent them, which occurs
as long as the return on the controlled transaction exceeds the cost of
circumvention.
 The crisis appears to have had an enduring effect on investor behavior.
We find structural breaks in investor behavior after the global financial
crisis. After the initial stage of the crisis (June 2007 to August 2008),
there was a general slowdown in both equity and bond flows to all re-
gions. However, after the second stage (beginning in September 2008),
there was an increase in equity flows to Latin America (although there
was no effect on Asian equity investments). There is for now no firm
evidence that these effects have faded.40
40Specifically, the explanatory power of the crisis dummy variables do not improve sig-
nificantly if it is terminated before the end of the sample, suggesting that the alteration
during the crisis continues through the end of the sample.
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The empirical results show that investors’ asset allocation behavior changed
at the time of the crisis. The dummies included in the regressions to capture
the effects of the crisis show that globally, and for most regions separately,
investors changed their behavior toward equities and bonds in a way not
captured by the regular drivers (that is, the other independent variables in
the regression). This “crisis effect” began, first, at the onset of the crisis,
in mid-2007, and continued around the time of the Lehman Brothers bank-
ruptcy, in September 2008. These were statistically significant changes in
behavior.
A useful metric is the Z-score, which relates the size of the change in
asset allocation at the time of the crisis to shocks that would normally have
been experienced before the crisis. The Z-score is the size of the change
in allocation implied by the dummy coefficient, minus the pre-crisis mean,
divided by the pre-crisis standard deviation. Note that the Z-score is mean-
ingless if the dummy is not statistically significant, as in such cases there
was no statistically significant change at all in asset allocation at the time
of the crisis. Under the assumption of a normal distribution for shocks to
investment flows, a Z score of about 2 indicates that the shock would be
classified as among the 5 percent most severe.
The Z-scores indicate that the crisis effect was quite large for bonds and
advanced economy equities (Table 3.3). For bonds, the Z-score was in many
cases close to, or exceeded 2, so that the outflows from bond funds dur-
ing the crisis were among the 5 percent most severe compared to the pre-
crisis period. For equities, there is a distinction between emerging markets
and advanced markets. In emerging markets, even though the coefficients
for the first dummy (June 2007–August 2008) were generally significantly
144
negative, the effects were small (i.e., in line with usual volatility in the pre-
crisis period). In addition, the coefficients on the second crisis dummy (af-
ter September 2008) were not significantly different from zero, except for
Latin America, where the coefficient was positive and significant. In these
cases, the low Z scores imply that investors in emerging market equities
continued during and after the crisis to let themselves be guided by the es-
tablished drivers of asset allocation. Not so in advanced markets, where
the “crisis” effect on equity funds was large, with Z scores around 2, mean-
ing that the crisis-induced outflows from equity funds in advanced markets
were among the 5 percent most severe compared to the pre-crisis period.
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6 Currency Composition of Central Banks
6.1 Background
While the overwhelmingmajority of financial assets is owned andman-
aged by private investors, sovereign investors have grown to become im-
portant players in international capital markets. Sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) hold some $4 trillion in assets, while international reserves amount
to $10 trillion. Their combined assets amount to about a quarter of the as-
sets undermanagement of private institutional investors.41 Their increasing
size makes sovereigns important investors in international capital markets.
Management of international reserves are distinct from sovereignwealth
funds in that they are explicitly held for balance of payments or monetary
policy purposes, and as a result, the objectives of reserve managers may de-
part from pure return maximization. The asset allocation and management
of reserves can be different from other types of asset management: it is tra-
ditionally driven by safety, liquidity, and return, in that order (IMF (2011d)).
The requirement that reserves are available at short notice and at low cost
to meet balance-of-payments needs and financial stability objectives leads
to an allocation that is traditionally dominated by short-term government
bonds issued by only a few countries.
However, global foreign exchange reserve holdings (excluding gold)
have grown so fast in recent years that their size for many countries now ex-
ceeds the amount needed for balance of payments and monetary purposes.
After having expanded five-fold between 2000 and 2008, reserve levels saw
a brief decline during the global financial crisis, but rebounded quickly and
41Using the IMF’s definition of foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth funds;
see Section 6.2.
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accumulation has resumed. Today’s reserve levels in emerging and devel-
oping economies well exceed levels traditionally considered adequate IMF
(2011d)).
This means that an increasing share of reserves could be available for
potential investment in less liquid and longer-term risk assets. A new IMF
estimate puts core reserves needed for balance of payments purposes in
emergingmarket economies at $3.0-4.4 trillion, leaving $1.0-2.3 trillion avail-
able to be invested beyond the traditional mandate of reserve managers, i.e.
more like SWFs.42 Some central banks have facilitated this by splitting their
reserves into a “liquidity tranche” and an “investment tranche,” with the
latter aiming to generate a higher return over the long run (Borio and oth-
ers, 2008). In the aggregate, however, these investment tranches are, to date,
quite small, and government bonds remain the dominant asset class in re-
serves.
Before the financial crisis, concerns about high opportunity costs of
holding large reserves and a low interest rate environment pushed central
banks in the direction of expanding the investment tranche. Other factors
that contributed to this trend include the shrinking supply of government
debt (in the late 1990s, early 2000s) and the “learning by investing” argu-
ment for non-traditional asset classes. In the recent financial crisis, how-
ever, reserve managers interrupted their trend towards diversification of
the investment tranche, and central banks rapidly exited unsecured bank
deposits. The proportion invested in these deposits dropped rapidly from
its peak in July 2007 (17.2 percent of reserves including gold at market
prices) to less than 5 percent in June 2010. Several surveys, in particular
42Metric for reserve adequacy developed in IMF (2011d); the suggested adequacy range
is 100-150 percent of the metric, leading to the ranges given here.
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those conducted annually by Central Banking Publications, and other stud-
ies (Pihlman and Van der Hoorn (2010)) confirm (qualitatively) that reserve
managers’ risk aversion increased and that reserve managers participated
in the global flight to quality and liquidity.
Now as we emerge from the financial crisis and the European debt cri-
sis, the reserve managers are faced with another low-interest rate environ-
ment. Looking ahead, some reserve managers are rethinking their asset
allocation strategies (IMF (2011a)).
This raises an important set of questions: Will the reserve managers
deploy ‘excess’ reserves to buy riskier securities to seek higher yields? Will
they continue the pre-crisis trend of increasing the diversification of their in-
vestment tranche? The answer to this question has important ramifications
for global asset markets, since the size of reserve accumulation makes the
reserve managers an important player in a market where the private asset
allocators have become more risk averse and less willing to hold risky as-
sets. Also, given the unprecedented size of reserves held by central banks,
the opportunity cost of holding most of the reserve portfolio in securities
that offer close-to-zero yield, there is reason to believe that reserve man-
agers may consider such a shift.
A lack of detailed data on asset allocation by reserve managers makes it
difficult to investigate their investment behavior and answer this question.
Few countries publish details on the composition of their international re-
serves by currency (i.e., the destination country for reserve investments),
asset class, or maturity. In addition, transaction data for the buying and
selling of foreign exchange by central banks is also generally not publicly
available.
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However, the IMF collects data on the size and currency composition of
foreign exchange reserves of member countries in its Currency Composition
of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database that could be used
for a limited empirical analysis. These data are not published, and are not
available for all countries. Still, they may be used for a limited empirical
investigation of reserve management when we consider that the currency
composition of reserves is equivalent to the country destination of invest-
ment by reserve managers. While the choice of reserve currency is subject
to additional considerations of balance of payments need, in principle, re-
serve managers have a choice in which currency to hold their reserves, as
most reserve currencies have deep and liquid exchange markets and can
quickly be converted into a different currency if needed.
Given the data, we can answer the following question: do reserve man-
agers also respond to the incentives of private investors, such as risk and
return? Reserve managers are not expected to behave as fully return maxi-
mizing investors for their core reserves. Still, they may be more responsive
to risk and return incentives at the margin, i.e. for reserves that exceed
the core—their “investment tranche.” If we find reserve managers respond-
ing to such incentives, then the investment incentives that drive private in-
vestors may also induce reserve managers to be a potential source of longer-
term risk capital provision by sovereigns, in addition to SWFs.
6.2 Defining Foreign Exchange Reserves and Sovereign Wealth Fund
6.2.1 Foreign Exchange Reserves. — The IMF’s primary definition of re-
serves is contained in Chapter VI of its Balance of Payments and Interna-
tional Investment Position Manual, sixth edition (2009): “Reserve assets are
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those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by mone-
tary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for inter-
vention in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for
other related purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency and
the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing).”
The IMF defines reserve assets further by stating that “reserve assets
must be must be both denominated and settled in foreign currency” (para-
graph 6.71); that “reserve assets must be denominated and settled in con-
vertible foreign currencies” (paragraph 6.72); and that “reserve assets, other
than gold bullion, must be claims on nonresidents.” (paragraph 6.65). It
should be noted that there are not many restrictions on the asset classes
that can be used for reserve asset investments. The main constraints con-
cern liquidity (“readily available”) and theymust constitute claims on “non-
residents” in “convertible foreign currencies.”
6.2.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds. — SWFs are defined as follows: “SWFs are
defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by
the general government. Created by the general government for macroeco-
nomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve finan-
cial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include in-
vesting in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out
of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the
proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from
commodity exports.”
This definition excludes, inter alia, foreign currency reserve assets held
by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or mon-
etary policy purposes, operations of state-owned enterprises in the tradi-
151
tional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed for
the benefit of individuals.
Three key elements define an SWF:
 Ownership: SWFs are owned by the general government, which in-
cludes both central government and sub-national governments.43
 Investments: The investment strategies include investments in foreign
financial assets, so it excludes those funds that solely invest in domes-
tic assets.
 Purposes and Objectives: Established by the general government for
macroeconomic purposes, SWFs are created to invest government funds
to achieve financial objectives, and (may) have liabilities that are only
broadly defined, thus allowing SWFs to employ a wide range of in-
vestment strategies with a medium- to long-term timescale. SWFs are
created to serve a different objective than, for example, reserve port-
folios held only for traditional balance of payments purposes. While
SWFs may include reserve assets, the intention is not to regard all re-
serve assets as SWFs.44
Furthermore, the reference in the definition that SWFs are “commonly
established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency
operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts
43Note that the use of the word arrangements as an alternative to funds allows for a
flexible interpretation of the legal arrangement through which the assets can be invested.
SWFs vary in their institutional arrangements, and the way they are recorded in the macro-
economic accounts may differ depending on their individual circumstances. See also the
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual, 2001.
44Likewise, the intention is not to exclude all assets on the books of central banks: SWFs
can be on the books of central banks if they also are held for purposes other than balance
of payments purposes (e.g., as intergenerational wealth transfer).
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resulting from commodity exports” reflects both the traditional background
to the creation of SWFs—the revenues received from mineral wealth—and
the more recent approach of transferring “excess reserves.”
It should be noted that reserve assets and assets held by an SWF can
overlap. Reserve assets can be held within an SWF. This can only occur,
though, when the SWF is permitted to transact in such assets only on terms
specified by the monetary authorities or only with their express approval.”
(see Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual,
sixth edition (2009), paragraph 6.67).
6.3 Rise in Reserves and Change in Composition
Global foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) have grown five-
fold since end-2000, and now represent approximately 6.2 percent of global
debt and equity markets’ capitalization (end-2009). The growth of reserves
has been concentrated in emerging and developing economies, which have
accumulated reserves at a rapid pace in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis of the late 1990s. Following a brief decline during the recent global
financial crisis, reserve levels rebounded quickly and reserve accumulation
has resumed (Figure 3.2). Today’s reserve levels in emerging and devel-
oping economies well exceed levels traditionally considered adequate (IMF
(2011d)). These reserves are mostly managed by central banks, although in
some countries this is the responsibility of the ministry of finance.
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Figure 3.2: Foreign Exchange Reserves Excluding Gold (in trillion of U.S.
dollars). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Figure 3.3: Instrument Composition of Official Reserves Including Gold.
Source: IMF.
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The focus on safety and liquidity of reserves returned at the start of the
global financial crisis, when central banks rapidly exited unsecured bank
deposits (Figure 3.3). The proportion invested in unsecured bank deposits
dropped rapidly from its peak in July 2007 (17.2 percent of reserves includ-
ing gold at market prices) to less than 5 percent since June 2010, most likely
as a result of the increased perceived risk associated with this asset class.
At the same time, a previous trend of selling gold has been reversed: the
total holdings of gold among reporting central banks peaked at 25,353 tons
in October 2000 and dropped to 22,599 tons in March 2009. Since then, cen-
tral banks have purchased 367 tons of gold on a net basis. Given the recent
increase in the market price of gold, the proportion of reserves held in gold
has increased, despite the large increase in total reserves.
The currency composition of reserves changed with the introduction
of the euro, but has been fairly stable in recent years (Figure 3.4). The cur-
rency composition is closely related to the objectives for holding reserves.
Countries hold currencies in line with the composition of their short-term
external debt and/or import basket, which tend to change only slowly over
time. There may be an over-weighting of the U.S. dollar as the most liquid
and most widely-used currency in foreign exchange markets. The liquid-
ity of the U.S. dollar makes it therefore the preferred currency for foreign
exchange interventions.
155
Figure 3.4: Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves.
The stability of the currency composition in the face of large swings in
exchange rates indicates that central banks rebalance the currency composi-
tion of their reserves (see Lim (2007)). Figure 3.5 plots the annual change in
the relative share of euros versus U.S. dollars at constant exchange rates
against the annual change in the euro/dollar exchange rate. There is a
clear negative correlation indicating strong rebalancing effects: whenever
the euro appreciates, central banks sell euros against dollars and vice versa,
thereby reducing volatility in the foreign exchange markets. The negative
correlation persists in recent years; rebalancing strategies appear to have
been unaffected by the crisis.
Beyond these longer-term strategic asset allocation objectives of reserve
managers, do they also respond to the incentives of private investors, such
as risk and return? Since monetary authorities do not necessarily maxi-
mize returns, their sensitivity to interest rate changes may be fairly low. On
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Euro/Dollar Exchange Rate (in percent). Source: IMF, Currency Compo-
sition of Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER).
the other hand, foreign reserves are primarily invested in fixed-income se-
curities, with the bulk of these investments likely in short-duration liquid
instruments. Thus, it is plausible that reserve managers may be sensitive to
interest rate changes, analogous to carry traders in the private market.
6.4 Results
In what follows, this question is examined using the COFER database.
The database contains country-level currency composition data from the
1960s to the present. The investigation uses quarterly data from 1999 to
2011 for 102 countries that include a number of the variables we used for
the private mutual fund data above, in addition to variables to measure the
conventional objectives of reserve managers, including debt to GDP ratios
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Figure 3.5: Changes in Euro Holdings Versus Changes in the
and export and import propensities.45 The four dependent variables used
in this case are the shares of total reserves allocated to the four major cur-
rencies, the US dollar, euros, pound Sterling, and Japanese, which constitute
more than 90 percent of total reserve holdings for most of the countries in
our sample.
45Since the portfolio choice of reservemanagers is determined simultaneously, we jointly
estimate our system of regression equations using the seemingly unrelated regressions
model.
158
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.4 Regression Results for the Currency Composition of Reserves 
U.S. dollar share Euro share Pound sterling  share Yen share 
U.S. policy rate   0.0048*** -0.0029** -0.0008 0.0003 
Euro policy rate  -0.0016 0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0011 
U.K. policy rate  -0.0036 0.0018 0.0011 0.0009 
Japan policy rate  0.0146 -0.0112 -0.0015 0.0014 
Euro-U.S. FX volatility 0.0109*** -0.0061** -0.0008 0.0009 
U.K.-U.S. FX volatility -0.0058 0.0015 0.0016 0.0002 
Japan-U.S. FX volatility 0.0020 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0007 
U.S. GDP forecasts -0.0006 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0003 
Euro GDP forecasts 0.0010 -0.0029 0.0002 -0.0002 
U.K. GDP forecasts -0.0012 0.0021 0.0007 0.0001 
Japan GDP forecasts 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
Crisis indicator 1 -0.0158** 0.0013 0.0031 0.0029 
Crisis indicator 2 -0.0046 -0.0012 -0.0003 0.0043** 
Source: IMF staff estimates. 
Notes: The table presents results of a system of regression equations estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions. The dependent variables are  
shares of foreign reserves allocated to the four major reserve currencies. The ommited category is 'other' currencies, and the shares of the five  
categories add up to one. Data for the dependent variable is from the COFER statistical database, at a quarterly basis from Q1 1999 to Q1 2011 for 102  
countries. The policy rate variables measure the short-term policy rate for the four major currencies. The FX volatility is computed using the exchange  
rate volatility of each country (with U.S. dollar as base currency) over a rolling period of one year. GDP forecasts are mean forecasts of one-year GDP  
growth acquired from Consensus Forecasts. Crisis indicator 1 represents the period between June 2007 and August 2008 (global credit crunch). Crisis  
indicator 2 represents the period after September 2008 (Lehman's collapse). The regression also controls for total government debt to GDP ratio, real  
GDP per capita, import share of GDP, export share of GDP, and foreign exchange regimes. ***, ** & * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and  
10% level of confidence based on robust standard errors. 
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The key results of the analysis are as follows (Table 3.4):
 Reserve managers appear to respond to U.S. interest rates: as shown
in the first row of the table below, increases in the U.S. dollar interest-
rate are associated with a rebalancing away from euro and towards
the U.S. dollar.
 An increase in the volatility of the euro/dollar exchange rate tends to
favor the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, also at the expense of the
euro.
 The shares of the other two main reserve currencies, the pound and
the yen, appear not to be affected by interest rates or exchange-rate
volatility.
 Economic growth differentials (which are found to be important for
private asset allocation (IMF (2011a)) appear not to matter for the cur-
rency composition of international reserves.
 At the start of the global credit crunch in the summer of 2007, there
was a drop in the share of U.S. dollars in international reserves. This
may have been associated with central banks providing dollar liquid-
ity support to domestic banks.
6 Concluding Remarks
With respect to institutional investors, the above findings show the
main “pull” and “push” factors for these investors’ asset allocations. The
main “pull” factor is the long-term growth prospects in destination coun-
tries, which may be diminished to some extent by rising country risk. The
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main “push” factor is the risk appetite of global investors. These factors are
robust over the period studied (2005–11).46
The most notable of the above findings is that interest rate differentials
do not significantly affect real money investor flows. Neither bond nor eq-
uity flows respond to changes in interest rate differentials, globally or for
any of the regions. This result is not fully in line with previous findings
(see, for example, IMF (2011b)).47 A few of the possible explanations are the
following:48
 The result applies only to real-money flows in and out of bond and eq-
uity investment funds. Short-term flows, usually seen asmore interest-
sensitive, are less likely to be invested through these funds; leveraged
flows (including from the carry trade), which are not captured in these
data, may still respond to differentials in policy rates and other inter-
est rates.
 The EPFR data include bond funds that hold bonds with a wide range
of maturities, which respond differently to changes in rates at differ-
ent points along the yield curve. Therefore, the effect of short-term
rates on bond flows, presumably concentrated on short-term bonds, is
46These push and pull factors are also found to be important according to the IMF Survey
on Global Asset Allocation (IMF (2011a), Annex 2.2).
47Although Forbes andWarnock (2011) also found weak evidence for the effect of global
interest rates on gross capital flows using balance of payments data.
48One possible explanation was not borne out in the data. Countries with high interest
rate differentials may carry risks of large and sudden devaluations (the “peso problem”).
There may therefore be a heterogeneous impact of policy rate differentials on bond flows
that may increase the standard error of the estimated coefficient, rendering it insignificant.
To try to solve this potential problem, the regression was rerun including an interaction
term defined as the product of the policy rate differential and the county risk. Whereas
the interest rate differential was positively associated with bond flows when the interac-
tion term is included for the global sample, the results in the regional regressions were
unchanged, with bond flows not significantly positively responsive to interest rate differ-
entials.
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obscured by possible differing (and perhaps opposing) effects on long-
term bonds. The converse appears also to be true, as using long-term
rates in the regressions does not change the results. Thus, whereas dif-
ferent interest rates along the yield curve may affect flows into bonds
of different maturities, their effect on total flows into bonds of all ma-
turities is not statistically significant in these data.
The finding of this study that interest rate differentials do not affect
bond and equity flows should not be extended to capital flows in general,
for two reasons: First, flows in and out of bond and equity investments
may come out of domestic funds, and to the extent that they do, they would
not directly affect capital flows. Second, as noted, capital flows may be
dominated by other types of investments, including flows from leveraged
investors (such as the carry trade), which this analysis does not cover.
By contrast, we find a stronger role for interest rates with respect to
reserve allocation of central banks. Reserve managers appear to respond
to U.S. interest rates: increases in the U.S. dollar interest-rate are associated
with a rebalancing away from euro and towards the U.S. dollar. We also
find that at the start of the global credit crunch in the summer of 2007, there
was a drop in the share of U.S. dollars in international reserves. This may
have been associated with central banks providing dollar liquidity support
to domestic banks.
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Chapter 4: Dynamic Incentives
and Welfare Costs of Taxation
1 Introduction
Executive compensation in financial institutions has become a prime
target for criticism and regulation, in response to the turmoil of the finan-
cial crisis that begun in 2007. Much of this criticism is fueled by the enor-
mous growth in executive compensation in the past two decades. Since
the inception of the crisis, the US government and several other Western
nations have implemented various bailout plans, totalling several trillion
dollars, to prop up the financial system from failing. This expanded gov-
ernment role in financial institutions has allowed public policy participants
to prominently voice their criticism of excessively high executive compen-
sation. Consequently, several countries, like UK and France, have passed
legislation to tax executive compensation at financial institutions at very
high rates. Other countries are considering broader measures of taxing ex-
ecutives. Suchmeasures stemmostly from the notion that top executives are
being grossly overpaid, and the perception that there is a growing wedge
between compensation and actual value-added.
This paper informs this debate by analyzing the welfare losses of tax-
ation in a simple dynamic moral hazard model under symmetric informa-
tion. We analyze how the principal-agent relationship is affected by taxa-
tion, and the consequent welfare implications. We show that the strength of
incentives is central to understand the welfare costs of taxation. When ex-
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plicit incentives are chosen optimally in a compensation contract, then the
deadweight loss of taxation is proportional to the degree of high-powered
incentives. That is, thewelfare cost of taxationwill be higherwhen the agent
is incentivized to exert effort using very high-powered incentives. This is
because the elasticity of taxable income is proportional to the power of in-
centives. That is, when the power of incentives is high, an increase in tax
rate leads to a relatively greater reduction in taxable income. Hence, the
deadweight loss is higher when the power of incentives is higher.
Critics often argue, however, that the explicit incentives are chosen ex-
ogenously (or suboptimally). In particular, due to weak corporate gover-
nance, the compensation contracts may be such that executive compensa-
tion is not highly linked to performance (Bebchuk and Fried (2006)). In
such a case, the relation between explicit incentives and deadweight loss
need not hold. Instead the career concerns of executives become a key de-
terminant of the deadweight loss of taxation. This is because under such
contracts, the incentives to provide effort, in general, will arise from both
the exogenously-determined explicit incentives, and career concerns. Un-
der career concerns the incentives are such that the executive’s current effort
will improve the market’s perception of his talent, resulting in higher com-
pensation in the future. Hence, under such a setting, the deadweight loss of
a tax in period twill depend on the sensitivity of market’s perception of the
executive’s talent in period t to his current effort.
This paper is related to several literatures in the economics of organiza-
tions, corporate finance and public finance. Relatively few papers exist that
introduce taxation in a principal-agent setup. From a contract theoretic per-
spective the results of this exercise is useful in understanding the effect of
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taxation on the principal-agent relationship and the consequent changes in
the incentive structure. A huge literature in corporate finance deals with ex-
ecutive compensation, and a few papers have explored the impact of taxes
on executive compensation. Holte (2007) is a recent paper that explores this
linkage. Using amodel of career concerns, he argues that lowering of top in-
come tax rates over the past decades, strengthened career incentives, which
in turn led to better talent identification and hence greater top income in-
equality. Katuscak (2005) develops a theoretical model in which an increase
in the marginal tax rate decreases the equilibrium level of managerial effort
and the after-tax pay-to-performance sensitivity. He subsequently tests this
model and finds some empirical support for it. Hall and Liebman (2000) ex-
plore the implications of tax changes over the past decades. They argue that
the tax changes cannot explain the dramatic increase in the share of execu-
tive compensation paid through stock options. Related to this, recent work
by Frydman andMolloy (2011) use a sample of top executives in large firms
from 1946 to 2005, and find little response in the mix of executive compen-
sation to changes in taxes.
This paper differs from this existing literature on several margins. Pri-
marily, this paper focuses on deriving the welfare implications of taxing ex-
ecutive compensation, which is governed by a principal-agent relationships
between the executives and the corporate board. It is crucial to understand
the welfare costs imposed by such the new legislations introduced in sev-
eral countries that impose substantially high taxes on executives. The paper
also derives sufficient statistics for welfare costs of taxation under principal-
agent relationships. This allows for potential empirical investigation of such
welfare costs. The next section details the model.
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 Our model also has implications for optimal taxation in the presence
of endogenous effort choices. We rely on a model of symmetric uncer-
tainty (between an employee, an employer, and the market). While
understanding the effects of taxation in models of asymmetric infor-
mation is important, such a model captures some important aspects
of the labor market. We feel that this model is especially informative
about settings in which a worker is recently promoted to or hired into
a job with significantly different demands than his previous job.
 It has been a challenge to quantify the dynamic efficiency loss of tax-
ation in the public finance literature. While in general, it is impossi-
ble to know exactly what these effects are, the contracting literature
proposes several models of dynamic incentives. To the extent that
one believes that such a model captures the important determinants
of compensation practices, it is possible to compute the welfare im-
pacts of taxation within the context of such a model. Further, for
the models we consider in this paper, the welfare loss depends only
on a single economic parameter [Chetty (2009)]. In the case of the
mixed-incentives model of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), this parame-
ter is also a measure of the quality of the contracting environment.
In the pure career-concerns model of Holmström (1999), this parame-
ter is a measure of how informative the market perceives a worker’s
current performance is about his ability. It turns out that in each of
these models, given only data on the cross-sectional distribution of
wages within a cohort in a particular career, these parameters can be
extracted from the evolution of cross-sectional inequality, potentially
allowing for empirical analysis.
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 Frydman andMolloy (2011) find that there are little changes in observ-
able compensation practices following an increase in tax rates. In our
model, performance pay is independent of the tax rate. However, tax-
able income is not, to the extent that performance pay is an important
determination of effort. To the extent that career concerns are impor-
tant, it is not the current tax rate that is important in determining the
before-tax wages, but rather the market’s beliefs about the worker’s
beliefs about future tax rates. Thus, our model explains why a change
in the tax rate need not result in a change in the observed performance
pay component, nor even in a change in taxable income.
In the following two sectionswe derive simple expressions for the dead-
weight loss of taxation under two cases of the model: one in which the
strength of explicit incentives is determined endogenously as above, and
one in which the strength of incentives are exogenously fixed to zero. The
latter case is the pure career-concernsmodel analyzed byHolmström (1999).
2 Model with Endogenous Explicit Incentives
2.1 Setup
Our setup closely follows the framework of Gibbons andMurphy (1992)
who analyze the optimal provision of explicit performance-based incentives
when workers are motivated by career concerns (Holmström (1999), De-
watripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999)). In order to simplify the analysis, we
assume that workers are risk neutral, which necessitates a multitask (Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991), Baker (1992), Baker (2002)) model of the agency
problem as opposed to the standard risk-incentives tradeoff of Holmstrom
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(1979) and others. In the appendix, we analyze a similar model with risk
averse agents. For clarity, we will focus on a two period problem, though
extending the model to T periods is possible under restrictive assumptions
about the distribution of noise terms.
There are a continuum of principals and a single agent who, at time t,
chooses an effort vector at 2 RN+ , where N  2 at cost c (at) = 12 ∑N`=1 a2`t.
Output, which is unobservable by all parties and non-contractible, is given
by
yt =
N
∑
i=1
fiait + η + εt,
where η is the agent’s ability and is symmetrically unobservable by the
agent and all the principals. While principals care about yt, neither they
nor the market can observe it in the time frame the agent works for them.
However, there is an observable performance measure which is commonly
observed by all principals and is verifiable by a court, given by
pt =
N
∑
i=1
giait + η + εt.
Throughout, we will assume that jj f jj = jjgjj = 1, which is akin to
assuming that the marginal impact of effort on the performance measure
and on the output of the firm is of similar magnitude as the impact of ability.
This is not without loss of generality, but we will indicate later where it can
be relaxed. We assume that the principal can write enforceable contracts
contingent on the performance measure but not on the actual output, and
it can be shown that under risk neutrality, linear contracts of the form wt =
st+ btpt are optimal. These wages are taxed at rate τt, which is exogenously
imposed by the government. Agents care about the discounted sum of their
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flow wages minus effort costs
U (fwtg , fatg) =
2
∑
t=1
δt 1 (wt   c (at)) ,
where δ  1 is the discount factor.
The timing is as follows. For each period t, there are four stages. In
the first stage, a continuum of principals offers contracts (st, bt) to the agent.
In the second stage, the agent chooses which contract (of any) to accept. In
stage three, if the agent has accepted the contract, he chooses effort vector at
at private cost c (at) . Finally, in the fourth period, the performance measure
pt is realized, and the agent receives wage wt = (1  τt) (st + btpt).
Ability is unobserved by all, but the principals and the agent have a
common prior η  N

m1, h 11

, where h1 is the precision of the prior.
We also assume that εt is distributed according to N
 
0, h 1ε

. If we let
ϕ = hεh1+hε denote the signal-to-noise ratio, then a principal who observes
p1 and conjectures that the agent chose effort vector aˆ1 believes ηj p1 
N

m2, (hε + h1)
 1, where m2 = (1  ϕ)m1 + ϕ (p1   g  aˆ1) is a weighted
average of two estimates of the agent’s ability, the prior mean and the per-
formance measure in excess of expected effort.
2.2 Equilibrium
Letting Ht 1 denote the history of performance measures observed up
to time t, perfect competition among principals yields a zero profit condi-
tion E

ytjHt 1

= E

wtjHt 1

in which expected wages are paid accord-
ing to the expected marginal product of the worker. Substituting yt and wt
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into these expressions yields
wt = ( f   btg)  aˆt + (1  bt)mt + btpt,
so that wages in period t are a weighted average of the market’s per-
ception of the agent’s ability based on his past performance (mt) and on
the measure of his current period performance (pt) plus an additional term
which is constant with respect to the agent’s effort choice in each period.
Of these wages, the agent receives (1  τt)wt.
To solve this problem, we work backwards, as in Gibbons-Murphy. At
time t = 2, taking b2 as given, the agent chooses an effort vector
max
a2
(1  τ2) E2 [w2j a1, p1]  c (a2) ,
which yields
a`2 = (1  τ2) b2g` for ` = 1, . . . ,N.
In particular, in the second period, absent explicit incentives based on the
performance measure (i.e. if b2 = 0), the agent would put in no effort. At
the beginning of t = 2, principals compete to offer (s2, b2) to the agent,
which ensures that (s2, b2) will be chosen to maximize the agent’s equilib-
rium expected utility, or
max
b2
(1  τ2) (m2 + f  a2 (b2))  c (a2) .
Some simple computation shows that b2 =
∑Ni=1 figi
∑Ni=1 g
2
i
= ρ f g, where ρ f g is
the correlation coefficient between the vectors f and g. Note that b2 is
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independent of the tax rate.
Next, from the perspective of the first period, taking b2 , a2 (b2), and b1
as given, the agent chooses effort to
max
a1
E1 [(1  τ1)w1   c (a1) + δ ((1  τ2)w2   c (a2 (b2)))]
which yields
a`1 = (1  τ1)

b1 + δ
1  τ2
1  τ1 (1  b2) ϕ

g`
= (1  τ1) B1g` for ` = 1, . . . ,N
The first term in B1 is the standard pay-for-performance component, and the
second captures the career-concerns component of incentives, which incen-
tivizes a worker to exert effort in order to increase the market’s perception
of his ability and hence his second-period expected wages.
Finally, principals compete at the beginning of t = 1 to offer an equilib-
rium expected utility-maximizing contract (s1, b1), which solves
max
b1
E1 [(1  τ1)w1   c (a1) + δ ((1  τ2)w2   c (a2))] .
The solution to this problem is for the principal to choose explicit incentives
in order to keep total incentives constant across periods, because effort costs
are convex. That is, B1 = ρ f g and hence
b1 = B

1   δ
1  E1 [τ2j τ1]
1  τ1 (1  b

2) ϕ,
where E1 [τ2j τ1] is the agent’s beliefs about the future tax rate from the
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perspective of the first period. Note that if he believes that tax rates follow
amartingale, then b1 is independent of both the first- and second-period tax
rates. This leads to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 8. In this model, if the agent believes that tax rates follow a
martingale, then both b1 and b

2 are independent of tax rates.
This proposition helps us understand why we might not expect en-
dogenous performance pay to vary with the tax rates, a finding confirmed
inmuch of the literature on CEO compensation. (See, for example, Frydman
and Molloy (2011).)
2.3 Welfare
In order to compute the welfare loss of taxation, we follow Chetty
(2009). The social surplus from the perspective of period 1 is the expected
discounted net utility plus tax revenues, assuming these tax revenues will
be redistributed back to the agent in a lump-sum fashion. That is,
W1 = E1
"
2
∑
t=1
δt 1 ((1  τt)wt   c (at )) +
2
∑
t=1
δt 1τtwt
#
.
Since at is chosen optimally, the envelope theorem gives us
dW1
dτt
= δt 1τt
∂E1 [wt ]
∂τt
=  δt 1τtρ2f g.
That is, the marginal increase in deadweight loss as a result of an increase
in taxes is proportional to the correlation between the f and g vectors. To
the extent that we believe explicit incentives are chosen optimally and com-
petitively, then the dynamic inefficiencies resulting from an increase in the
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tax rate depend critically on the quality of the contracting environment.
The loss or gain in efficiency from a discrete change in the proposed tax
system from τ0 =

τ
0
1, τ
0
2

to τ00 = (τ001 , τ
00
2 ) is then W (τ
00)  W (τ0) =
 ρ2f g
R τ001
τ01
τdτ   δρ2f g
R τ002
τ02
τdτ
In order to quantify this, one would need a measure of the quality of
the contracting environment. While it may be possible to compute this di-
rectly from performance reports and accounting records of individual firms,
it may be possible to get at this number using less direct means. Suppose
there are several agents who are all drawn from the same commonly known
distribution of ability N

m1, h 11

and who all begin working at the same
time. It turns out that ρ f g can be backed out from the growth rate in income
variance between the two periods. In the appendix, we show that if we let
I1 = Var (w1) and I2 = Var (w

2), then
ρ2f g = 1 
2h21 I1 (I2   I1)
1 
q
1  4h21 I1 (I2   I1)
ϕ =
1
2h1 I1
  1
2h1 I1
q
1  4h21 I1 (I2   I1).
Thus, given knowledge of the prior distribution h1 and measures of income
inequality within a given cohort in the experience cycle over two periods,
we can back out the structural parameters of interest. In a three-period
model, inequality in the three periods can be used to also back out h1. In
a model with more than three periods, the structural parameters are overi-
dentified.
The intuition here is the following.
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3 Pure Career Concerns
3.1 Setup
In the previous section we derived expressions for the deadweight loss
of taxation under the case in which in which the strength of explicit incen-
tives is determined endogenously. By contrast, in this section the strength
of incentives are exogenously fixed to zero. This case is the pure career-
concerns model analyzed by Holmström (1999).
There is a single agent and a continuum of principals. Time is indexed
by t = 1, . . . , T, and in each period, the agent chooses an effort level at 2
RN+ , where N  2, at cost c (at) = 12at  at. Effort generates output for the
principal for whom the agent works at period t according to
yt = f  at + η + εt,
where η is the agent’s innate ability, f 2 RN+ is a vector of weights, and
εt is an error term. The agent and all the principals are uninformed about
the agent’s ability. Throughout, we will assume η  N

m1, h 11

, where
h1 is the precision (ex ante uncertainty) of the distribution of ability in the
population, and εt  N
 
0, h 1ε

, where hε is the precision of the error term.
Throughout, wewill assume that output is commonly observed by the agent
as well as all principals.
The timing of the game is follows. In each period t, there are four
stages. In the first stage, each principal offers the agent a wage wPt . Af-
ter observing the offers from each principal, the agent chooses which to
accept, and receives after-tax wage wAt = (1  τt)wPt . If the agent has ac-
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cepted, he chooses an effort vector. Output is then publicly observed. De-
fine Ht = (y1, . . . , yt 1) to be the public history of output.
Given a sequence of wage payments

wAt
	T
t=1 and a sequence of effort
choices fatgTt=1, the agent’s preferences are given by
U =
T
∑
t=1
δt 1

(1  τt)wAt   c (at)

,
and the principal that employs the agent in period t receives expected prof-
its
pit = E [ytj µt]  wPt ,
where µt is the (public) belief about the agent’s ability, which depends on
the history of realized output prior to t. If τt = 0 for each t and N = 1, this
model would be identical to Holmstrom’s career concerns model.
3.2 Equilibrium
DEFINITION 9. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with competition is a se-
quence of effort choices fat gTt=1, a sequence of public beliefs µt
 
Ht

, a se-
quence of wage functions wPt (µt) and wAt (µt) such that
1. Given µt and at , wages are determined by the zero-profit condition
2. Given wPt
 
µt
 
Ht

, the agent optimally chooses fat gTt=1
3. µt
 
Ht

is determined by Bayes’s Rule
It is important to note that the optimal sequence of effort choices will
be history-independent in this model, because output is additively separa-
ble in ability and effort. This in turn implies that the marginal returns to
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effort are independent of ability, and therefore the agent does not have an
additional direct motive for signalling about past effort through current ef-
fort choices. We now solve for the equilibrium. Given a history Ht, by the
normal updating rule, the public beliefs about the agent’s type are given by
ηjHt  N

mt, h 1t

,
where
mt =
h1
ht
m1 +
hε
ht
t 1
∑
s=1
(ys   f  as )
ht = h1 + (t  1) hε.
The wages are given by wPt = E [ytj µt , at ] = f  at +mt and thus at t,
the agent’s problem is to
max
at
T
∑
s=t
δs t (1  τs) E
h
wPs
Hti  c (at) ,
which gives us, for i = 1, . . . ,N,
ait =
 
T
∑
s=t+1
δs t (1  τs) ∂E

wPs
Ht
∂ait
!
=
 
T
∑
s=t+1
δs t 1  τs
1  τt
hε
hs
!
fi  Bt fi.
We can think of Bt as capturing the total incentive strength in period t that
is derived from career concerns.
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3.3 Welfare
Define ex ante expected equilibrium discounted welfare as
W1 = E1
"
T
∑
t=1
δt 1

(1  τt)wPt   c (at )

+
T
∑
t=1
δt 1τtwPt
#
.
Fix τt = τ and consider an increase in τk. By the envelope theorem, we
have
dW1
dτk
=
T
∑
t=1
τtδ
t 1 ∂E1

wPt

∂τk
.
It is easy to show that
δ (k 1) dW1
dτk
=  τ hε
hk
(k  1) ,
where ϕ = hεhε+h1 is the first-period signal-to-noise ratio. Welfare losses due
to taxation are proportional to the tax level τ. They are increasing in ϕ and
k.
A sufficient statistic for computing the welfare loss of taxation in this
model, then, is ϕ. This is a theoretical object that does not necessarily
have an observable real-world counterpart. However, given panel data on
wages, and viewing the world through the lens of this model, we can back
out ϕ as a function of the growth-rate of wage dispersion for a given cohort
(conditional on observables). That is, since
It = Var

wPt

= Var (mt) =
1
h1
  1
ht
,
given data on the pre-tax wage distribution for at least three periods, a re-
searcher can back out h1 and hε. Since hk = h1 + (k  1) hε, then, h1 and hε
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are sufficient statistics for estimating the welfare losses of increasing taxes k
periods from now.
4 Conclusion
This paper informs this debate by analyzing the welfare losses of tax-
ation in a simple dynamic moral hazard model under symmetric informa-
tion. We analyze how the principal-agent relationship is affected by taxa-
tion, and the consequent welfare implications. We show that the strength of
incentives is central to understand the welfare costs of taxation. When ex-
plicit incentives are chosen optimally in a compensation contract, then the
deadweight loss of taxation is proportional to the degree of high-powered
incentives. That is, thewelfare cost of taxationwill be higherwhen the agent
is incentivized to exert effort using very high-powered incentives. This is
because the elasticity of taxable income is proportional to the power of in-
centives. That is, when the power of incentives is high, an increase in tax
rate leads to a relatively greater reduction in taxable income. Hence, the
deadweight loss is higher when the power of incentives is higher.
Critics often argue, however, that the explicit incentives are chosen ex-
ogenously (or suboptimally). In particular, due to weak corporate gover-
nance, the compensation contracts may be such that executive compensa-
tion is not highly linked to performance (Bebchuk and Fried (2006)). In such
cases, the relation between explicit incentives and deadweight loss need not
hold. Instead the career concerns of executives become a key determinant of
the deadweight loss of taxation. This is because under such contracts, the in-
centives to provide effort, in general, will arise from both the exogenously-
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determined explicit incentives, and career concerns. Under career concerns
the incentives are such that the executive’s current effort will improve the
market’s perception of his talent, resulting in higher compensation in the
future. Hence, under such a setting, the deadweight loss of a tax in period
t will depend on the sensitivity of market’s perception of the executive’s
talent in period t to his current effort.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1: Updating rule for the terminate policy
Given themarket’s conjecture that the firm has adopted the efficient pol-
icy, Dˆ = 0, the conditional distribution of η given that the project failed is
given by Bayes’ Rule:
f (ηjProj. Fails) = f (η)Pr (Proj. Failsjη)R
ηˆ f (ηˆ)Pr (Proj. Failsjηˆ) dηˆ
=
f (η) [pi (1  η(1  δ)) + (1  pi) (1  η)]
pi (1  µ(1  δ)) + (1  pi) (1  µ)
=
f (η) [1  η(1  piδ)]
1  µ(1  piδ)
Therefore, we can calculate the conditional expectation of η as:
Emkt [ηjProj. Fails] =
Z
η
η f (ηjProj. Fails) dη
=
1
1  µ(1  piδ)
Z
η
η [1  η(1  piδ)] f (η) dη
=
µ  E η2 (1  piδ)
1  µ(1  piδ)
=
µ  (µ2 + σ2η)(1  piδ)
1  µ(1  piδ)
= µ  σ
2
η(1  piδ)
1  µ(1  piδ)
Similarly, the conditional distribution of η given that the project suc-
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ceeded is given by the Bayes Rule:
f (ηjProj. Succeeds ) = f (η)Pr (Proj. Succeedsjη)R
ηˆ f (ηˆ)Pr (Proj. Succeedsjηˆ) dηˆ
=
f (η) [piη(1  δ) + (1  pi) η]
piµ(1  δ) + (1  pi) µ
=
f (η) [η(1  piδ)]
µ(1  piδ)
= f (η)
η
µ
Therefore, conditional expectation is
Emkt [ηjProj. Succeeds] =
Z
η
η. f (ηjProj. Succeeds) dη
=
Z
η
η2
µ
f (η) dη
=
E

η2

µ
=
σ2η + µ
2
µ
= µ+
σ2η
µ
Appendix A.2: Updating rule for the delay policy
Given the market’s conjecture that the firm has adopted the defensive
policy, Dˆ = 1, the outcome of observing layoffs would be off the equilib-
rium path and Bayes’ Rule would not apply. However, as specified in the
main text, introducing trembles to the model allows for a positive proba-
bility of observing layoffs. Further, because the manager only has a deci-
sion point when the project fails, the observation of layoffs in this setting is
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equivalent to observing project failure. Thus, the application of Bayes’ Rule
is identical to the case of the terminate policy:
f (ηjProj. Fails) = f (η)Pr (Proj. Failsjη)R
ηˆ f (ηˆ)Pr (Proj. Failsjηˆ) dηˆ
=
f (η) [1  η(1  piδ)]
1  µ(1  piδ)
Again, we calculate the conditional expectation of η as:
Emkt [ηjProj. Fails] =
Z
η
η f (ηjProj. Fails) dη
= µ  σ
2
η(1  piδ)
1  µ(1  piδ)
For the case of no layoffs, because the market expects firms to never
announce a layoff when Dˆ = 1, the observation of no layoffs should not
lead to any updating. This is exactly what we find:
f
 
ηjNo Layoffs, Dˆ = 1 = f (η)Pr (No Layoffsjη)R
ηˆ f (ηˆ)Pr (No Layoffsjηˆ) dηˆ
=
f (η) [pi (η(1  δ) + (1  η(1  δ))) + (1  pi) (η + (1  η))]
pi (µ(1  δ) + (1  µ(1  δ))) + (1  pi) (µ+ (1  µ))
= f (η)
By inspection, the posterior distribution is identical to the prior, so the
market’s expectation of talent remains at µ.
189
Appendix A.3: Updating rule for a mixed-strategy policy
For the case where the market observes layoffs, the signal is once again
equivalent to observing project failure. Thus, the calculation proceeds as in
the previous sections, and yields the posterior expectation:
Emkt [ηjProj. Fails] =
Z
η
η f (ηjProj. Fails) dη
= µ  σ
2
η(1  piδ)
1  µ(1  piδ)
For the case of no layoffs, themarket expects firms to announce “no lay-
offs” with probability Dˆ conditional on project failure, and with probability
1 conditional on project success. The updating rule proceeds as follows:
f
 
ηjNo Layoffs, Dˆ = f (η)Pr  No Layoffsjη, DˆR
ηˆ f (ηˆ)Pr
 
No Layoffsjηˆ, Dˆ dηˆ
=
f (η)

pi
 
η(1  δ) + Dˆ(1  η(1  δ))+ (1  pi)  η + Dˆ (1  η)
pi
 
µ(1  δ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  δ))+ (1  pi)  µ+ Dˆ (1  µ)
=
f (η)

η(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  η(1  piδ))
µ(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  piδ))
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Therefore, conditional expectation is
Emkt

ηjNo Layoffs, Dˆ = Z
η
η f
 
ηjNo Layoffs, Dˆ dη
=
R
η η

η(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  η(1  piδ)) f (η) dη
µ(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  piδ))
=
E

η2

(1  piδ) + Dˆ(µ  E η2 (1  piδ))
µ(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  piδ))
=
(µ2 + σ2η)(1  piδ) + Dˆ(µ  (µ2 + σ2η)(1  piδ))
µ(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  piδ))
= µ+
σ2η(1  piδ) + Dˆ( σ2η)(1  piδ)
µ(1  piδ) + Dˆ(1  µ(1  piδ))
= µ+
(1  Dˆ)(1  piδ)σ2η
Dˆ+ (1  Dˆ)(1  piδ)µ
Appendix A.4: Proof for proposition 1
Taking the total derivative of equation 12 with respect to both Dˆ and pi,
we find:
∂Dˆ
∂pi

(1  µ(1  piδ)) C
γσeta2

=  δ
"
1
[1  µ(1  piδ)]2
  µ(1  Dˆ) C
γσeta2
#
Next, we know that the probability of observing a layoff is (1  Dˆ)(1 
η(1 piδ)), or (1  Dˆ)(1  µ(1 piδ)) in expectation. Taking the total deriv-
ative with respect to pi yields:
∂Pr[Layoffs]
∂pi
=  ∂Dˆ
∂pi
(1  µ(1  piδ)) + (1  Dˆ)µδ
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Combining the two results above and simplifying, we find:
∂Pr[Layoffs]
∂pi
=
δγσ2η
C [1  µ(1  piδ)]2
> 0
Appendix A.5: Proof of proposition 2
We can rewrite ∆Pr [Layoffs] /∆ (Large Firm Layo f f ) as
∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )
=
∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (pi)
∆pi
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )
From Proposition 1 we know ∆Pr[Layoffs]∆(pi) > 0. Also from equation (13)
we know that
∆pi/∆ (Large Firm Layo f f ) > 0. These two inequalities imply
∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )
> 0.
Appendix A.6: Proof of corollaries 3-5.
Following from appendix A.5, we can write the following derivative as:
∂

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Macro Event)

/∂

∆pi
∆ (Macro Event)

=
∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (pi)
From appendix 4, we know the right hand side is positive. Therefore,
∂

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Macro Event)

/∂

∆pi
∆ (Macro Event)

> 0
Similarly from appendix 4, we know
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∂
h
∆Pr[Layoffs]
∆(pi)
i
/∂σ2η > 0 and ∂
h
∆Pr[Layoffs]
∆(pi)
i
/∂γ > 0. Therefore we get:
∂
∂σ2η

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )

=
∆pi
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )
∂

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (pi)

/∂σ2η > 0
∂
∂γ

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )

=
∆pi
∆ (Large Firm Layo f f )
∂

∆Pr [Layoffs]
∆ (pi)

/∂γ > 0
Appendix A.7: Dynamic Version of the Model with Exogenous Updating
Rule
In this appendix we present a simple dynamic extension of our model
based on McCall’s (1970) model of intertemporal job search. At date 0 there
is a continuum of managers who evaluate their investment opportunities
and hire a worker to engage in production. Thereafter in each period t, the
project has a positive chance of failure, which depends positively on both
the manager’s quality given by ηi, and the time-varying aggregate state,
given by λs,t. The states can be normal (N) or adverse (A), such that such
that λN,t = 1, and λA,t = δ. After observing the realization of the project on
each date, each firm has to decide whether to continue or terminate produc-
tion. Given the parameters of this model, it will always be optimal for firms
to continue if their projects do not fail. Therefore, the key decision has to be
made after the project fails.
The main cost of announcing a layoff is that the market’s belief about
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the manager type is adversely affected when they observe a layoff. This
is what we call reputation cost. In each period nature draws a reputation
cost z (pi) for the manager. For simplicity, we take this reputation cost to
be exogenously given. The market’s belief that the aggregate is in a normal
state at time t is given by pit. The key assumption about the reputation cost is
that z0 (pi) > 0, i.e. when themarket thinks the aggregate state is more likely
to be normal, then their posterior beliefs about manager talent will be more
pessimistic after they observe a layoff. In each period there is a random
draw of pi, which maps 1-to-1 into a reputation cost. Let the distribution of
reputation cost be given by F (Z) = Pr [z  Z] , with F (0) = 0, F (B) = 1
for B < ∞. The manager has the option of not engaging in a layoff, in which
case he pays c in this period and waits until next period for another draw
of reputation cost from F. The per-period cost c is the net loss the firm bears
every period by keeping the worker at a failed project for an additional
period.
Let yt be the manager’s payoff in period t. To be consistent with the
pre-existing search models it is convenient to characterize the payoff as
yt =  γz (pi) if the manager with a failed project decides to layoff when
the reputation cost is z (pi), and yt =  c when then manager decides to
delay layoff. Here γ again measures the degree of reputational concern a
manager has. The managers devise a strategy to maximize E∑∞t=0 β
tyt, such
that 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
Let v (z (pi)) be the expected value of∑∞t=0 β
tyt for an optimally-behaving
manager who faces a reputation cost of z (pi), and is deciding whether to
layoff or not. In thismodel we assume no recall. The value function v (z (pi))
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satisfies the Bellman equation
v (z (pi)) = max

 γz (pi)
1  β , c+ β
Z
v
 
z
 
pi0

dF
 
pi0

There exists a threshold reputation z (p¯i), such that if the manager is
facing a reputation cost z (pi)  z (p¯i), he should layoff, and delay other-
wise. Solving for the threshold reputation, we can characterize his strategy
as
γz (p¯i)  c = βγ
1  β
Z p¯i
0
[z (pi)  z (p¯i)] dF  pi0
Further rewriting and by applying integration by parts we can charac-
terize the reputation cost threshold as
γz (p¯i)  c = β (γE [z (pi)]  c) + βγ
Z ∞
p¯i
F
 
pi0

dpi0
Thus, in this economy, managers whose project fails, will delay an-
nouncing layoffs until he faces a sufficiently high market-wide belief of be-
ing in an adverse aggregate state (i.e. a low value of pi). This effectively
generates periods of no or little layoffs, and large number of layoffs when
market’s belief about the aggregate state is adverse with high likelihood.
In this model the firms need not all layoff in the same period. Their de-
cision rule will depend on their degree of reputational concerns, γ. For a
large class of functional forms for z (.) it can be shown that the threshold p¯i
is a decreasing function of γ. This suggests that when managerial reputa-
tional concerns rises (i.e. high γ), their threshold for waiting becomes more
restrictive (i.e. lower p¯i), as these managers are waiting to engage in lay-
offs in periods when the market’s belief puts a very high probability on the
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aggregate state being adverse. As an example consider the case in which
F is a uniform distribution with support [0, B]. Additionally assume that
z (x) = φx. Under this example, we can characterize the threshold as
p¯i =
β fB+ φE [pi]g
φ+ β
+
(1  β) c
γ (φ+ β)
It is clear that ∂p¯i/∂γ < 0, ∂p¯i/∂c > 0, and ∂p¯i/∂B > 0, while the
effect of φ is ambiguous. This suggests that a greater reputational concern
makes the threshold more restrictive, while a larger cost c (which is a per-
period loss made by the firm because of following the inefficient policy)
and a higher variance of beliefs as measured by B, leads to a less restrictive
threshold.
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